IFRS Adoption in Emerging Markets: The Case of Jordan

The aim of this study is to research the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Jordan, which was one of the first Middle Eastern emerging economies to adopt IFRS. The paper investigates the related factors that pressure and prevent such adoption over time, and illustrates the developmental aspects of such adoption. An interpretive methodology is employed, and perceptions of the study's participants are analysed regarding the adoption of IFRS in Jordan, which is an area that is under researched. Semi‐structured interviews were undertaken to collect Jordanian experts’ perceptions. Based on the empirical data analysis and prior theoretical and empirical literature, an adoption model was developed, which can serve future studies as well. The model illustrates the paradox of accounting changes in emerging economies, in which the actual conditions that pressure IFRS adoption are also the conditions that prevent full adoption. The model also provides an explanation of the implementation process of IFRS in emerging economies at both country and corporation levels. It combines practical features and related theories in an integrative model seeking to explain the phenomenon of IFRS as a new accounting regulation change.     

SEPARATING EFFICIENCY AND EQUALITY,AUTOMATION, AND PIKETTY'S THEORY OF INCREASING CAPITAL SHARE

Despite disincentive effects, it is more efficient to tackle inequality by general equality promotion policies, including tax/transfers, than by trying to pursue equality in specific issues or policies. The latter policy also has the same degree of disincentive effects as the general policy but has additional distortive effects. While Piketty' concern with inequality is well taken and his proposal to reduce inequality has merits, his argument on the inevitability of increasing capital share under capitalism and the condition of rate of returns to capital being larger than the rate of growth in incomes (r > g) is not correct. (JEL D3, D6, H)     

BUYERS,SELLERS, AND MIDDLEMEN: VARIATIONS ON SEARCH‐THEORETIC THEMES

We study exchange that is bilateral but indirect—it involves chains of intermediaries, or middlemen—in markets with frictions. These frictions include search and bargaining problems. We show how, and how many, intermediaries might get involved in a chain, and how bargaining with one depends on upcoming negotiations with those downstream. The roles of buyers, sellers, money, and prices are discussed, allowing us to clarify some neglected connections between different branches of search theory. Pursuing one such connection, with monetary economics, we show how bubbles can emerge in intermediation, even with fully rational agents and perfect foresight.     

Dissecting Exchange Rates and Fundamentals in the Modern Floating Era: The Role of Permanent and Transitory Shocks

In this paper, we apply a permanent–transitory decomposition method to analyze the link between nominal exchange rates and fundamentals in the modern floating era. The results suggest that transitory shocks dominate nominal exchange rate fluctuations, while permanent shocks dominate the variations in fundamentals. Therefore, the findings suggest that the nominal exchange rate should not be approximated by a pure random walk. Moreover, we find that unobserved fundamentals in the Taylor rule model can explain the transitory components in exchange rates.     

Country Differences in Material Deprivation in Europe

This paper assesses to what extent differences in the characteristics of individuals (micro‐level perspective) and country‐specific factors (macro‐level perspective) can explain country differences with respect to material deprivation levels. Thus, our work aims to simultaneously consider the macro dimension and the predominantly individually‐oriented study field of material deprivation using multilevel techniques. We make use of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. Our results show that country‐specific factors seem to be much more relevant than individual effects in explaining country differences in material deprivation. We estimate that the introduction of country‐specific factors reduces the proportion of total variance due to between‐country differences in deprivation by 72.7 percent, while individual‐level variables reduce this proportion by only 9.4 percent. We also show, through interaction variables, that the effect of sociodemographic characteristics can be shaped by institutional and structural factors, especially by the level of GDP.     

The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services—Empirical Evidence for Germany

Competing insurance intermediaries provide heterogeneous services that are difficult for incompletely informed consumers to assess. Transaction cost economics, search theory, and principal‐agent theory provide arguments on product quality differences between exclusive agents and independent intermediaries. This article uses a sample of 927 insurance intermediaries in Germany. By performing OLS estimations, we test the impact of the different distribution channels and other factors on intermediaries’ service quality. Depending on the proxies used for service quality, we find mixed evidence for the product quality hypothesis. Service quality depends to a large extent on the information‐gathering and processing activities of the individual intermediaries, independent of the respective distribution channel.     

Marx and Engels’ Vision of a Better Society

Notwithstanding their much noted aversion to detailing the nature of a post-capitalist society, Marx and Engels indeed have a broad vision of such a better society that both runs through and informs their entire lives' work. It is rooted in their concepts of the inherently social nature of humans and potential authentic human development in accord with human nature, and the negation by humans as the active agents of history of the barriers posed to that development. This paper discuses their dialectic approach to defining a better society, their concept of human nature that it rests on, and finally specifies a number general aspects they give for a better future socialist society.     

Tailored versus Mass Produced: Portfolio Managers Concurrently Managing Separately Managed Accounts and Mutual Funds

Using a matched sample of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and mutual funds (MFs) with the same portfolio manager and investment style, we find that concurrently managed MFs consistently underperform their SMA counterparts and generate more negative return gaps. Fund characteristics and liquidity betas fail to fully explain the underperformance. An event‐study analysis finds that the weights placed into top (bottom)‐performing stocks increase for existing SMAs (MFs) and negative return gaps increase for the MFs after the onset of concurrent management. We find that higher compensation collected by SMA fund managers are associated with more unseen managerial actions which positively contribute to the SMA return gap. Our results suggest that when managers concurrently manage both SMAs and MFs, they favor SMA performance over their MF performance.     

Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study*

We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a laboratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add‐on product. Besides choosing the base‐good price, sellers take an action that mimics the effects of shrouding the add‐on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters, in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas four‐firm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base‐good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.     

Price Discrimination with Private and Imperfect Information

In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U‐shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.