Do Institutions Matter for Foreign Direct Investment?

Using a panel of 69 countries during 1981 and 2005, we investigate the role of institutions in determining foreign direct investment (FDI). We find that institutions are a robust predictor of FDI and that the most significant institutional aspects are linked to propriety rights. Using a novel data set, we also study the impact of institutions on FDI at the sectoral level. We find that institutions do not have a significant impact on FDI in the primary sector but that institutional quality matters for FDI in manufacturing, and particularly in services.     

Profit-Enhancing Parallel Imports

We investigate competition between a domestic intellectual property right holder and a foreign imitator and consider how parallel imports affect their profits. We consider a two-country model. Country A is a developed country where intellectual property rights are highly protected, and country B is a developing country where protection is weak. The intellectual property right holder can sell the products for both markets while the imitator cannot export the products to country A. We find that permitting parallel imports can be beneficial for both players because it serves as a commitment device to soften price competition.     

Attitudes Towards Foreign Products and Welfare with Capital Mobility

We develop a model of trade with imperfect competition to study the welfare implications in developing and developed countries of the asymmetry in attitudes towards foreign products. In the developed country, consumers benefit from a better perception of foreign products while the rental rate of capital declines as long as the location of capital remains unchanged. However, when capital is mobile, the developing country hosts more and more capital at the expense of the developed country as perception of varieties produced in the developed country improves and the surplus of consumers in the developed country can decrease.     

Do Sovereign Defaults Hurt Exporters?

This paper uses a difference-in-difference methodology similar to the one originally proposed by Rajan and Zingales to test whether sovereign defaults hurt the more export-oriented industries disproportionately, and it finds strong support for this hypothesis. However, contrary to the findings of previous studies, our estimates suggest that the effect of defaults is short-lived.     

Overreaction to Fearsome Risks

When risks threaten, cognitive mechanisms bias people toward action or inaction. Fearsome risks are highly available. The availability bias tells us that this leads people to overestimate their frequency. Therefore, they also overreact to curtail the likelihood or consequences of such risks. More generally, fear can paralyze efforts to think clearly about risks. We draw on a range of environmental risks to show the following: (1) Fear leads us to neglect probability of occurrence; (2) As fearsome environmental risks are usually imposed by others (as externalities), indignation stirs excess reaction; (3) We often misperceive or miscalculate such risks. Two experiments demonstrate probability neglect when fearsome risks arise: (a) willingness-to-pay to eliminate the cancer risk from arsenic in water (described in vivid terms) did not vary despite a 10-fold variation in risk; (b) the willingness-to-accept price for a painful but non dangerous electric shock did not vary between a 1 and 100% chance. Possible explanations relate to the role of the amygdala in impairing cognitive brain function. Government and the law, both made by mortals and both responding to public pressures, similarly neglect probabilities for fearsome risks. Examples relating to shark attacks, Love Canal, alar and terrorism are discussed.     

Voters prefer more qualified mayors,but does it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany

This paper studies the importance of politicians’ qualification, in terms of education and experience, for fiscal outcomes. The analysis is based on a large panel for 2031 German municipalities for which we have collected information on municipal budgets as well as the election results and qualification levels of mayoral candidates. We principally use a regression discontinuity design focusing on close elections to estimate causal effects. We find that mayors with prior experience in office have a tendency to reduce the level of local public debt, lower total municipal expenditures and decrease the local taxes, even though these results are only significant in some specifications. In contrast, the education level of the mayor exerts no significant effects on the overall fiscal performance of the municipality. The results are partly surprising as both education and experience are shown to matter greatly in the electoral success of mayoral candidates.     

Migrate or not? The effects of regulation SHO on options trading activities

In this study, we investigate the effects of stock short-sale constraints on options trading by exploiting two US Securities and Exchange Commission rule changes under Regulation SHO: Rule 203 (locate and close-out requirements) and Rule 202T (temporary removal of short-sale price tests). We find that stock short selling activities decrease (increase) significantly after Rule 203 (Rule 202T) implementation, supporting the validity of Rule 203 (Rule 202T) as an exogenous increase (decrease) in short-sale constraints. Options volume increases significantly after Rule 203 went into effect and the result is more pronounced among firms with lower levels of institutional ownership and smaller options bid-ask spreads. Therefore, the evidence from Rule 203 suggests that investors may use options as substitutes for stock short sales when short selling is less feasible or more costly due to the locate and delivery requirements. In contrast, we find no significant change in the options trading volume of pilot stocks during the pilot program of Rule 202T. Overall, our results indicate that the impact of short-sale constraints on options trading varies with the types of constraints affected.