Exclusive Versus Non-exclusive Dealing in Auctions with Resale

We consider a seller who can either sell exclusively through resellers, or allow potential consumers to purchase directly from him. The consumers’ willingness to pay is private information. All transactions are in the form of second-price sealed bid auctions. We show that, if the resellers can gain access to a substantially bigger portion of the market than the seller himself, the seller obtains a higher revenue by dealing exclusively through them, i.e., by committing to not sell to any consumer. The result is due to a “winner’s curse” effect: the resellers win only if the consumers that they compete against submit lower bids, i.e., if part of their customer base has low valuations. This depresses the resellers’ willingness to pay relative to what they would be willing to pay under an exclusive resale contract. Our results do not depend on the presence of transaction costs: exclusive dealing yields strictly higher revenue even when the resellers can market the item at zero cost. We would like to thank Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Michael Rothkopf and seminar participants at Iowa State University, the Midwest Mathematical Economics meetings, the Milken Institute, Rutgers University, SUNY at Stony Brook Summer Workshop on Game Theory, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams

We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents’ individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents’ contributions are strategic substitutes or when they are independent.     

A preliminary investigation of factors affecting seafood consumption behaviour in the inland and coastal regions of Victoria,Australia

This paper examines whether there are any substantial differences in factors influencing seafood consumption (at‐home) behaviour of consumers from two different regions of Victoria, Australia. We have used the logit modelling procedure and found that there exist noticeable regional differences in seafood consumption behaviour. In the case of the inland region, it is found that the variables price, distance, taste, quality and season are significant at the conventional level. For the coastal region, the factors quality, age and number of persons employed (at the 5% level) and size of households (at the 10% level) significantly influence the seafood consumption behaviour.     

‘Forest governmentality’: A genealogy of subject-making of forest-dependent ‘scheduled tribes’ in India

This paper analyses the historical trajectories of both British colonial rule and independent India to categorise scheduled tribes and to appropriate and legalise forests in tribal areas. It builds upon Foucault's notion of governmentality to argue that the history of the scheduled tribes’ subject-making and the related history of forest demarcation is indispensable for understanding the current politics of decentralised forest management in India. Three dimensions of ‘forest governmentality’ - the history of categorisation, the politics of social identity, and the technologies of forest governance - are discussed to show how recent efforts to politicise forest tenure rights have reinforced political control over the scheduled tribes through new forms of authority, inclusion and exclusion. However, to claim their individual and community right to forestland and resources, the scheduled tribes have internalised their ‘new’ ethnic identity, thereby creating countervailing power and room to manoeuvre within the current forest governance regime. This is supported by a case study of the Bhil, a predominantly forest-dependent scheduled tribe in the semi-arid region of western India.     

Targeting Debt and Deficits in India: A Structural Macroeconometric Approach

This study attempts to construct a consistent macroeconomic framework for India to review the macro-fiscal linkages over the 14th Finance Commission period, 2015–2019. A macroeconomic policy simulation model comprising of real, external, monetary, fiscal and macroeconomic block is built for the purpose. The estimated model is used for policy simulations to address three scenarios: (a) shock due to 7th Pay Commission award, (b) targeting deficit and debt and (c) targeting higher growth. The results suggest that while Pay Commission award would result in slightly higher growth compared to the base case, this also results in higher inflation, fiscal-revenue deficits, current account deficit as well as higher government liability. Further simulation results suggest that expenditure switching policy, which is the core of expansionary fiscal consolidation mechanism, of increasing higher government capital expenditure and reducing the government transfers could result in higher growth with a manageable fiscal deficit of 5.3% that also brings down the government (centre plus states) liability to around 60% by 2019–2020.

     

Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights

This essay is on the Indian constitution and extends and responds to the work of Singh (Constitutional Political Economy 17:17, 2006) in the analysis of economic rights. The veto player framework is used to analyze the development of economic rights which was diminished and civil rights (through Public Interest Litigation) which was expanded since Indian independence. The Congleton Model (Constitutional Political Economy 12:193–215, 2001) and Tsebelis Model (British Journal of Political Science 25(3):298–325, 1995) on veto players are used to develop the hypotheses and analyze the evolution of the Indian constitution.     

Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option

We characterize the optimal selling mechanism for a seller who faces demand demarcated by a high and a low end and who can access an (online) auction site (by paying an access cost) in addition to using his own store that can be used as a posted price selling venue. We first solve for the optimal mechanism of a direct revelation game in which there is no venue-restriction constraint. We find that the direct optimal mechanism must necessarily incorporate a certain kind of pooling. We then show that even with the venue constraint, the seller can use a two stage indirect mechanism that implements the allocation rule from the optimal direct mechanism, and uses the venues in an optimal fashion. The first stage of the indirect mechanism is a posted price at the store. If the object is not sold, we move to stage two, which involves an auction at the auction site. A feature of this auction is a buy-now option which is essential for implementing the pooling feature of the optimal direct mechanism. We also show that the buy-now option in the optimal mechanism is of a “temporary” variety, and that a “permanent” buy-now option, in contrast, cannot implement the optimal mechanism. Auctions with a temporary buy-now option are in widespread use on eBay. We thank the Associate Editor, George Deltas, for his insightful comments. We also thank seminar participants at the University of Basel and the SAET conference 2007.     

An asymmetric analysis of the J‐curve effect in the commodity trade between China and the US

This paper follows a non‐linear ARDL error‐correction approach to examine the presence of the J‐curve in the commodity‐level trade between the United States and China. The analysis disaggregates the US–China trade flows by commodities and separately examines the trade balance responses of 97 commodities to the changes in the real yuan–US$ exchange rates. The analysis at the commodity level alleviates potential aggregation bias that is present in earlier studies offering little evidence for long‐run asymmetric effects of exchange rate on the China–US trade balance. We find strong support for short‐run asymmetric effects in the case of two‐third of the commodities, whereas significant long‐run asymmetric effects are present in the case of one‐third of the commodities including those commodities which command large shares in the China–US trade.