Quantile estimation of frontier production function

The purpose of the paper is to provide new information on the performance of frontier estimation methods, using data from Italian hotel industry. Quantile regression is also suggested as solution to frontier production function estimation. It is shown that, while the choice of estimation methods among conventional techniques significantly affects the economic analysis, quantile regression provides valuable new information by estimating the whole spectrum of production functions corresponding to different efficiency levels. In addition, the method makes available a coherent framework to analyze the performance of the conventional techiniques. Jel classification: C14, C16, D24We would like to thank the Co-Editor, the Associate Editor and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions. The research was supported by the University Research Council and the National Research Council. The usual disclaimer applies.The estimates were computed using the Roger Koenker and StatLibS-Plus routine of quantile regression and the Tim Coelli and CEPA Web site FRONTIER 4.1 Program. The data set is provided by the Ho.Re.Ca. survey conducted by ISTAT in 1992.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: December 2002     

Prior symmetry, similarity-based reasoning, and endogenous categorization

This paper presents a rational theory of categorization and similarity-based reasoning. I study a model of sequential learning in which the decision maker infers unknown properties of an object from information about other objects. The decision maker may use the following heuristics: divide objects into categories with similar properties and predict that a member of a category has a property if some other member of this category has this property. The environment is symmetric: the decision maker has no reason to believe that the objects and properties are a priori different. In symmetric environments, categorization is an optimal solution to an inductive inference problem. Any optimal solution looks as if the decision maker categorizes. Various experimental observations about similarity-based reasoning coincide with the optimal behavior in my model.     

A Common Nomenclature for Stated Preference Elicitation Approaches

It is often difficult to determine what actually was done in work involving data collected with stated preference surveys because the terms used to describe various procedures have ambiguous and sometimes conflicting meanings. Further, terms used to describe data collection procedures often are confounded with terms used to describe statistical techniques. We call for the use of a common nomenclature to describe what was done in a data collection effort for stated preference studies, and take a first step at setting out such nomenclature. We only seek to improve clarity in the communication of research results and take no position here on appropriateness of particular procedures.     

Pareto-improving Untied Aid with Environmental Externalities

This paper shows that even untied aid is Pareto-improving if and only if the marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor country is sufficiently larger than in the recipient country.     

Is limit pricing evolutionarily stable?

We have analyzed the question whether or not limit-pricing behavior can be viewed as a strategy, which survives the replicator dynamics in a game in which firms change strategies through imitation. Our results show that, regardless of the proportion of low cost incumbents in the population, potential entrants that play the strategy "enter" when they observe limit output are wiped out. The unique ESS consists of all low cost incumbents playing the "limit output" strategy, and all high cost incumbents playing the "monopoly output". This ESS includes potential entrants playing "stay out" after observing the limit output, and playing "enter" if monopoly output is observed in the first stage. Hence, limit pricing survives the replicator dynamics and appears in the stable state of the population.JEL Classification: B25, C73, L11We would like to thank an anonymous referee for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. Correspondence to: U. Soytas     

Predation and reputation acquisition in debt markets

This paper presents a model of predation based on reputational differences between the entrant and an incumbent. While the incumbent has an established reputation in the debt market, the entrantss quality is not yet known in the debt market. We show that the incumbent may have incentives to prey in order to interfere with the reputation acquisition of the entrant.Received: June 2002 , Accepted: December 2002, JEL Classification: C72, D82, G3, L1I am grateful to one anonymous referee for very valuable comments. In addition, for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper, I thank Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole, António Pires, Soumodip Sarkar, and seminar participants at M.I.T., Boston University and Western Ontario University.     

Improved estimation of extreme quantiles in the multivariate Lomax (Pareto II) distribution

Estimation of a quantile of the common marginal distribution in a multivariate Lomax (Pareto II) distribution with unknown location and scale parameters is considered. For quadratic loss and specified extreme quantiles, it is established that the best affine equivariant procedure is inadmissible by constructing a better estimator.     

Bargaining power in stationary parallelogram games

A stationary variant of the repeated prisoners dilemma in which the game frontier is a parallelogram is analyzed. By using the probabilistic cheap talk concept of [3], the discount factor becomes fungible, and for a critical value of the discount factor a unique Pareto-optimal and Pareto-dominant solution can be found. The relative bargaining power of the players can be quantified in terms of the shape of the parallelogram. If the parallelogram is asymmetric, the solution results in an asymmetric allocation of payoffs. Players with more bargaining power receive a greater share of the allocation. The solution satisfies some standard bargaining axioms within the class of parallelogram games. A characterization is provided in terms of these axioms and one new axiom, weak-monotonicity, which is in the spirit of, but different from, the Kalai-Smorodinsky restricted-monotonicity axiom.Received: 15 January 2001, Accepted: 4 December 2003, We thank Wayne Shafer for interlocution and helpful comments.     

The large-sample joint distribution of key circular statistics

In this paper we derive the large-sample asymptotic joint distribution of the statistics used as fundamental measures of central location, concentration, skewness and kurtosis in the analysis of circular data. The importance of the distributional result in relation to inference for the corresponding population measures is illustrated, with various new confidence set constructions being derived and applied in the analysis of data from an animal orientation experiment.     

Seat allocation distributions and seat biases of stationary apportionment methods for proportional representation

In a proportional representation system, apportionment methods are used to round the vote proportion of a party to an integer number of seats in parliament. Assuming uniformly distributed vote proportions, we derive the seat allocation distributions for stationary divisor methods. An important characteristic of apportionment methods are seat biases, that is, expected differences between actual seat numbers and ideal shares of seats, when the parties are ordered from largest to smallest. We obtain seat bias formulas for the stationary divisor methods and for the quota method of greatest remainders.Acknowledgement. We thank Friedrich Pukelsheim for many fruitful discussions.Received March 2004