Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills

In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w.r.t. technological innovations, so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions) from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dworkin.     

A class of fair distribution rules à la Rawls and Sen

Summary. This paper discusses and develops “non-welfaristic” arguments on distributive justice à la J. Rawls and A. K. Sen, and formalizes, in cooperative production economies, “non-welfaristic” distribution rules as game form types of resource allocation schemes. First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle which the distribution rule should satisfy if this takes individuals' needs into account. Second, one class of distribution rules which satisfy Needs Principle, a class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules, is proposed. Third, axiomatic characterizations of the class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules are provided. Received: July 30, 1999; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal, Professors Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Gravel, Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, Prasanta Pattanaik, Kotaro Suzumura, Koich Tadenuma, and Yongsheng Xu for their fruitful comments. An earlier version of this paper was published with the title name, “A Game Form Approach to Theories of Distributive Justice: Formalizing Needs Principle” as the Discussion Paper No. 407 of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, and in the proceedings of the International Conference on Logic, Game, and Social Choice held at Oisterwijk in May 1999. That version was also presented at the 3rd Decentralization Conference in Japan held at Hitotsubashi University in September 1997, at the annual meeting of the Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics held at Waseda University in September 1997, and the 4th International Conference of Social Choice and Welfare held at University of British Colombia in July 1998. This research was partially supported by the Japanese Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Correspondence to: N. Yoshihara     

Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons

We consider the problem of the tragedy of commons in cooperative production economies, and propose a mechanism to resolve this tragedy, taking into account that the coordinator cannot perfectly monitor each agent’s labor skill and each agent may have an incentive to overstate as well as understate his own skill. Even in such a situation, the mechanism implements the proportional solution (Roemer in Soc Philos Policy 6:74–92, 1989 and Roemer and Silvestre in J Econ Theory 59:426–444, 1993) in Nash and strong equilibria when it is played as a normal form game. Moreover, the mechanism triply implements the solution in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria when it is played as a two-stage extensive form game. We are greatly thankful to Semi Koray, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee of this journal for their concrete and helpful comments on improving the paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Japanese Economic Association held at Hitotsubashi University in October 2001 and at the Conference on Economic Design held at NYU in July 2002. We are grateful to Takehiko Yamato for his useful comments in the former conference. We are also thankful to Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Kotaro Suzumura, and Yoshikatsu Tatamitani for their kind comments.     

A PROGRESS REPORT ON MARXIAN ECONOMIC THEORY: ON THE CONTROVERSIES IN EXPLOITATION THEORY SINCE OKISHIO ()

This report explores the development of exploitation theory in mathematical Marxian economics by reviewing the main controversies surrounding the proper definition of exploitation since the contribution of Okishio. The report first examines the debates on the Fundamental Marxian Theorem and Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle, developed mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the property relation theory of exploitation by Roemer. Then, the more recent exploitation theory proposed by Vrousalis and Wright is introduced. Finally, the report introduces and comments on recent axiomatic studies of exploitation by focusing on the work of Veneziani and Yoshihara.     

One-directional adjacency matrices in spatial autoregressive model: A land price example and Monte Carlo results

In the context of spatial econometrics, we discuss the specification of one-directional effects, not mutual dependencies. Using an empirical study (a spatial autoregressive model of land price data in Fukui Prefecture, Japan) and Monte Carlo simulation results (contiguity matrices built based on regular lattices using the rook criteria), we show that spatial dependencies might not be recognized if such dependencies are assumed to be reciprocal.     

Extended social ordering functions for rationalizing fair allocation rules as game forms in the sense of Rawls and Sen

We examine the possibility of constructing social ordering functions, each of which associates a social ordering over the feasible pairs of allocations and allocation rules with each simple production economy. Three axioms on the admissible class of social ordering functions are introduced, which embody the values of procedural fairness, non-welfaristic egalitarianism, and welfaristic consequentialism, respectively. The logical compatibility of these axioms and their lexicographic combinations subject to constraints are examined. Two social ordering functions that give priority to procedural values rather than to consequential values are identified. These two can uniformly rationalize a nice allocation rule in terms of the values of procedural fairness, non-welfaristic egalitarianism, and Pareto efficiency.     

Detecting emerging research fronts in regenerative medicine by the citation network analysis of scientific publications

In this paper, we detect emerging research fronts in a huge number of academic papers related to regenerative medicine, a field of radically innovative research. We divide citation networks into clusters using the topological clustering method, track the positions of papers in each cluster, and visualize citation networks with characteristic terms for each cluster. Analyzing the clustering results with the average published year and parent-child relationship of each cluster could be helpful in detecting recent trends. In addition, tracking topological measures, within-cluster degree z and participation coefficient P, enables us to determine whether there are emerging knowledge clusters. Our results show the success of our method in detecting emerging research fronts in regenerative medicine, and these results are confirmed as reasonable by experts. Finally, we predict the future core papers, with the potential of many citations, via the betweenness centralities in the citation network of the research into adult and somatic stem cells.     

An integrative institutional approach to MNC performance in China

This study adopts an integrative approach that incorporates the resource-based view and institutional theory in its analyses of the performances of multinational corporations in China. Firm-specific resources have been assumed as a unique source of competitive advantages when firms go overseas. However, differences in institutional environments between the host country and the home country can negatively affect the competitiveness generated by resource exploitation. Empirical analysis using the data consisting of 209 Japanese firms operating in China finds that while the exploitation of firm-specific resources improves their performance, institutions in China moderate the positive impact on performance.     

THE TRANSPORT SECTOR AND REGIONAL PRICE DIFFERENTIALS: A SPATIAL CGE MODEL FOR CHINESE PROVINCES

With regression formulas replaced by equilibrium conditions, a spatial CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) model can substantially reduce data requirements. Detailed regional analyses are thus possible in countries where only limited regional statistics are available. Alhough regional price differentials play important roles in multiregional settings, transport does not receive much attention in existing models. This paper formulates a spatial CGE model that explicitly considers the transport sector and FOB/CIF prices. After describing the model, the performance of our model is evaluated by comparing the benchmark equilibrium for China with a survey-based interregional I-O table for 1987. The structure of Chinese economies is summarized using information obtained from the benchmark equilibrium computation. This includes regional and sectoral production distributions and price differentials. The equilibrium for 1997 facilitates discussion of changes in regional economic structures that China has experienced in the decade.     

A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction

The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification— $s$ -mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving ‘one less’ preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down.