Analyst following of privatized firms around the world: The role of institutions and ownership structure

We examine which factors affect the decision of analysts to follow newly privatized firms as well as the factors that determine the extent of that following. Contrary to traditional private firms, privatized firms harbor particular uncertainties related to the government's commitment toward privatization. The first-stage estimation shows that the decision by analysts to initiate coverage of newly privatized firms is positively influenced by lower political risk, better judicial efficiency, better information disclosure, and effective extra-legal institutions in the country. Conditional on the decision to initiate coverage, the second-stage results indicate that the extent of analyst following is more important: (1) when there is control relinquishment by the government, (2) when there is more participation by foreign investors and employees, and (3) for those larger firms in nonstrategic sectors. Finally, analysts' coverage is negatively related to postprivatization ownership concentration and underpricing. This latter result runs counter to the existing evidence on private firms—that is, that underpricing “buys” coverage.     

Firm Internationalization and Corporate Social Responsibility

Using a large sample of 3,040 U.S. firms and 16,606 firm-year observations over the 1991–2010 period, we find strong evidence that firm internationalization is positively related to the firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) rating. This finding persists when we use alternative estimation methods, samples, and proxies for internationalization and when we address endogeneity concerns. We also provide evidence that the positive relation between internationalization and CSR rating holds for a large sample of firms from 44 countries. Finally, we offer novel evidence that firms with extensive foreign subsidiaries in countries with well-functioning political and legal institutions have better CSR ratings. Our findings shed light on the role of internationalization in influencing multinational firms’ CSR activities in the U.S. and around the world.     

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ON FIRMS’ OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND FINANCING DECISIONS

We investigate the impact that the political connections of publicly traded firms have on their performance and financing decisions. Using a long‐term event study covering a sample of 234 politically connected firms headquartered in 12 developed and 11 developing countries from 1989 to 2003, we find that firms increase their performance and indebtedness after the establishment of a political connection. We also find that the political connection is more strongly associated with changes in leverage and operating performance for firms with closer ties to political power. Overall, our study confirms that politically connected firms gain easier access to credit and reap benefits in terms of performance from their ties with politicians.     

The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries

This paper examines the change in the financial and operating performance of 79 companies from 21 developing countries that experienced full or partial privatization during the period from 1980 to 1992. We use accounting performance measures adjusted for market effects in addition to unadjusted accounting performance measures. Both unadjusted and market-adjusted results show significant increases in profitability, operating efficiency, capital investment spending, output, employment level, and dividends. We also find a decline in leverage following privatization but this change is significant only for unadjusted leverage ratios. Our results are generally robust when we partition our data into various subsamples.     

DOES PRIVATIZATION FOSTER CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS?

We analyze the effect of privatization on the quality of legal institutions of governance. Our findings suggest that large-scale privatization (in terms of progress and volume) increases the risk of corruption in developing countries but has no effect on the legal institutions of governance (i.e., law and order and investor protection). The method of privatization (public share issues versus private sales) helps curb corruption and improve the quality of law enforcement and of investor protection. In developed countries, the progress and volume of privatization reduce the risk of corruption, and the method of privatization enhances the quality of law enforcement.