How Institutions Influence SME Innovation and Networking Practices: The Case of Vietnamese Agribusiness

This paper addresses impacts of the institutional framework on small and medium‐sized enterprise (SME) innovation and networking practices. Through an explorative study of a domestic SME‐dominated sector in Vietnam, we find that the institutional framework limits incentives for long‐term investments, resulting in exploitative cost‐control strategies rather than product‐oriented innovation. Due to dominating social norms, SMEs form trust‐based friendship networks, potentially limiting knowledge acquisition and weakening business rationality. Institutional pressures reinforce negative influences on SMEs' incentives to develop innovation ambidexterity. The findings suggest that new institutional economic sociology provides a promising foundation for understanding how institutional frameworks influence SMEs' innovation practices in emerging economies.     

Perverse Effects of Other-Referenced Performance Goals in an Information Exchange Context

We argue and demonstrate that an emphasis on outperforming others may lead to perverse effects. Four studies show that assigning other-referenced performance goals, relative to self-referenced mastery goals, may lead to more interpersonally harmful behavior in an information exchange context. Results of Study 1 indicate that assigned performance goals lead to stronger thwarting behavior and less accurate information giving to an exchange partner than assigned mastery goals. Similarly, in Study 2 performance goal individuals more subtly deceived highly competent opponents relative to lowly competent opponents, who received more blatant treatment. Finally, Studies 3 and 4 show in methodologically complementary ways that tactical deception considerations may account for the interpersonally harmful behavior of performance goal individuals.     

A Meta-analysis of Loss Aversion in Product Choice

Loss aversion is a behavioral phenomenon with game-changing implications for economic theory and practice. We conduct a meta-analysis of 33 studies (providing 109 observations) investigating loss aversion in random utility models of brand choice. Specifically, we use multilevel modeling techniques to examine potential moderators of preference asymmetries as well as the variability of loss-aversion effects within and between studies. We find that loss aversion is manifest in product choice, but that it exhibits substantial variation across research contexts. Product-related variables (e.g., the category type), consumer characteristics (e.g., reference-point mechanisms), and particularly methodological decisions (e.g., model specifications) determine the observed degree of loss–gain disparity. Practical implications of the specific findings and opportunities for future research are discussed.     

Bemessungsgrundlage kontra Fünf-Stufen-Tarif

Die Komplexit?t des deutschen Steuersystems hat in den vergangenen Jahren immer wieder Kritik hervorgerufen und zu verschiedenen Verbesserungsvorschl?gen geführt, von denen jedoch bislang noch keiner ungesetzt wurde. Denn um eine breite politische Akzeptanz zu erlangen, müssen Reformvorschl?ge zum Steuersystem neben Transparenz und Einfachheit gleichzeitig sicherstellen, dass die Einkommensungleichheit nicht versch?rft, das Steueraufkommen insgesamt nicht zu gering wird und die Erwerbsanreize nicht gef?hrdet sind. Durch Steuervereinfachung alleine werden diese Ziele nicht per se erreicht.     

What Drives CEOs to Take on More Risk? Some Evidence from the Laboratory of REITs

Many have pointed to excessive risk‐taking by the CEOs of financial firms as a contributor to the recent worldwide economic crisis. The same observers often blame questionable corporate governance structures and compensation practices for that risk‐taking. But is this perception correct? And what is the relationship between CEO incentives and risk‐taking outside of the financial industry, where the government guarantees provided by deposit insurance could have distorted incentives? In an attempt to answer these questions, the authors analyze the relationship between CEO incentives and corporate risk‐taking by 101 U.S. REITs during the period 2003 to 2007. Their main finding is that corporate risk‐taking, as measured by the growth rate in corporate debt (the only measure of risk that is completely under the control of the CEO), is inversely related to CEO stock ownership—that is, the larger the CEO's equity ownership stake, the slower the growth in debt financing and financial risk‐taking. At the same time, the authors find that financial risk‐taking is positively related to large cash bonuses for the CEOs and to situations in which the CEO is also chairman of the board of directors. Finally, the authors also report that CEOs who are relatively new to the job grow more slowly and borrow less, suggesting that boards of directors can temporarily contain risky expansion plans by the CEO. These results provide support for those corporate governance reformers who wish to cut cash bonus payments for CEOs in favor of long‐term stock ownership.     

Does off-farm employment contribute to agriculture-based environmental pollution? New insights from a village-level analysis in Jiangxi Province, China

This study examines the conventional wisdom that off-farm employment contributes to environmental pollution by increasing the use of agro-chemicals. In order to analyse the role of household decision making and village factor markets in more detail, we run simulations with a hybrid farm household/village computable general equilibrium model that is applied to a village in Northeast Jiangxi Province. We find that the negative lost-labour effect of off-farm employment on agricultural incomes is much stronger than the (small) positive income effect. As a result of reduced labour resources and increased leisure consumption, farm households reduce the intensity of rice cultivation as well as the production of (especially) cash crops. The shift in production activities is stronger for migration than for off-farm employment, because migrants cannot combine off-farm work with onfarm work, and because migration reduces the village market price of oxen services. The shift towards less intensive rice production means that off-farm employment (and migration in particular) reduces the levels of chemical inputs and manure used in agricultural production. The decline in fertilizer input is much larger than the decline in manure use, because manure is a nontradable commodity and is applied only once per year. We therefore conclude that migration and, to a lesser extent, local off-farm employment lead to lower incomes from agricultural production, but have benign effects on environmental quality.     

Short- and long-term participation tax rates and their impact on labor supply

Generous income support programs as provided by European welfare states have often been blamed to hamper employment. This paper investigates the importance of incentives inherent in the tax-benefit system for the individual decision to take up work. Using German microdata over the period 1993–2010, we find that recent reforms in Germany increased work incentives at the extensive margin measured by the participation tax rate (PTR), particularly for low-income individuals. Work incentives are even higher if the time horizon is extended to more than one year, pointing at an overestimation of the disincentives by standard measures. Regression analysis reveals that a decrease in the PTR increases the probability of taking up work significantly.     

The role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to acquisitions

Based on stock swap transactions involving public acquirers originating from the UK between 1998 and 2011, this paper investigates the role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to stock swap deals. In contrast to common claims that strong corporate governance constrains accruals manipulation, my results show that well-governed acquirers engage more aggressively in income-increasing accruals manipulation than those with weak governance. This finding is consistent with a role of corporate governance that incentivises managerial actions in the interests of firms’ shareholders. Overall, this finding highlights the setting-specific nature of the earnings management and corporate governance relation. My results are robust to different discretionary accrual models, differences in the firm's growth structure, merger and acquisition control variables, a control group of 100% cash acquirers, an analysis of buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and potential sample selection problems.