Is physician behavior too serious a business to be left to economics? Reply to medical altruism in mainstream health economics: theoretical and political paradoxes

This short paper is a Reply to ‘Medical altruism in mainstream health economics: theoretical and political paradoxes. COMMENTS’.     

Co-operation and conflict in industrial relations: what are the implications for employees and trade unions?

This article explores the effects on employees of co-operation and conflict the workplace, outlining six workplace types. A survey of union representatives UK steel industry reveals evidence of co-operative industrial relations linked to superior terms and conditions, employee involvement and health and safety outcomes. However, it fails to find evidence that co-operative industrial relations are associated a broader HRM package of workplace restructuring, high performance work teams security provisions. Nor is any association revealed between co-operation and a greater role for trade unions. These findings suggest workplace co-operation in this industry remains part of a traditional gainsharing package and an 'alliance of insiders' than an HRM partnership or union incorporation. This raises broader questions the ability of co-operation to deliver important aspects of organizational competitive advantage.     

Multi-market contact and competition: evidence from the Depression-era portland cement industry

Theoretical work has suggested that contact between firms in different markets can facilitate tacit collusion. Empirical work on this link has been limited. We address the paucity of empirical evidence with a novel plant-level dataset for the cement industry during the Great Depression. We find that multi-market contact fosters tacit collusion and higher prices based on a new measure of contact that accounts for capacity utilization. A one standard deviation increase in our measure of contact increases prices by around 4.3%. We then examine the effect of the National Industrial Recovery Act's “Codes of Fair Conduct,” introduced in 1933 to stem deflation through cooperative behavior within industries. We find that the effects of the codes were most strongly felt in markets with the highest level of multi-market contact. This suggests that multi-market contact can be a useful ‘tool’ for firms to support collusive outcomes, tacit or otherwise.     

The Mises-Hayek business cycle theory,fiat currencies and open economies

This paper extends the Mises-Hayek business cycle theory to open economies with fiat currencies. I explore: (1) the problem of domestic versus international monetary policy with fiat currencies in an international setting. (2) How the feedback effects between central banks in the context of an expansionary monetary contributes to extend and transmit a Mises-Hayek business cycle from big economies to small financially integrated economies. I find that a lengthening of the period of production is not the only effect produced on the capital structure, but also a misallocation of capital goods between the production of tradable and non-tradable goods and services and that business cycles can become more severe when there are open economies with fiat currencies.     

REDUCING INEQUALITIES AMONG UNEQUALS

This article establishes an equivalence between four incomplete rankings of distributions of income among agents who are vertically differentiated with respect to some nonincome characteristic (health, household size, etc.). The first ranking is the possibility of going from one distribution to the other by a finite sequence of income transfers from richer and more highly ranked agents to poorer and less highly ranked ones. The second ranking is the unanimity among utilitarian planners who assume that agents' marginal utility of income is decreasing with respect to both income and the source of vertical differentiation. The third ranking is the Bourguignon (Journal of Econometrics, 42 (1989), 67–80) Ordered Poverty Gap dominance criterion. The fourth ranking is a new dominance criterion based on cumulative lowest incomes.     

Joint tax evasion

Tax evasion analysis typically assumes that evasion involves individual taxpayers responding to some given policies. However, evading taxes could require the collaboration of at least two taxpayers. Detection depends on the costly avoidance activities of both transacting partners. An increase in sanctions leads to a direct increase in the expected cost of a transaction in the illegal sector, but it may also increase the incentive for the partners to cooperate in avoiding detection. The total cost of transacting in the illegal sector can fall, and tax evasion may increase. The policy implications of this phenomenon are considered. JEL Classification: H26
L'évasion fiscale collective. Dans les analyses de l'évasion fiscale, on suppose habituellement que le payeur de taxe fait face à un ensemble donné de politiques auxquelles il réagit. Pourtant, dans le cas des transactions marchandes, l'évasion fiscale n'est possible que si plusieurs agents coopèrent ensemble. La probabilité que l'évasion soit détectée dépend alors des efforts que chacun fait pour la cacher. Dans un tel contexte, de plus lourdes sanctions accroissent le coût espéré des transactions illégales, mais peuvent aussi, indirectement, accroître l'incitation pour les partenaires à coopérer pour cacher leur activité illégale. Il en résulte que le coût total des transactions illégales peut diminuer et l'évasion fiscale augmenter. Nous étudions les implications de ce phénomène.     

THE EMPIRICAL MERIT OF STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS OF COMMODITY PRICE VOLATILITY: REVIEW AND PERSPECTIVES

This paper presents both the history of and state‐of‐the‐art in empirical modeling approaches to the world commodity price volatility. The analysis builds on the storage model and key milestones in its development. Specifically, it is intended to offer a reader unfamiliar with the relevant literature an insight into the modeling issues at stake from both a historical and speculative viewpoint. The review considers primarily the empirical techniques designed to assess the merits of the storage theory; it does not address purely statistical approaches that do not rely on storage theory and that have been studied in depth in other streams of the commodity price literature. The paper concludes with some suggestions for future research to try to resolve some of the existing empirical flaws, and hopefully to increase the explanatory power of the storage model.