Criticisms of capitalism,budgeting and the double enrolment: Budgetary control rhetoric and social reform in France in the 1930s and 1950s

This article is a contribution to the study of the spread of management innovations, methods and rhetorics. It particularly concerns the influence of ideological and political factors, which have so far mostly escaped in-depth study. In particular, we seek to understand to what extent a critique of society developed by social reformers can be a source of inspiration for managers, leading them to change their practices and experiment with new devices. Relying on the framework of historical change in management practices developed by Boltanski and Chiapello [Boltanski, L., & Chiapello, E. (2005). The new spirit of capitalism. London: Verso (Translation of Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, Paris: Gallimard, 1999)], we study the specific development of budgetary control in France, examined in the light of the general political and economic history of the 20th century. This framework simultaneously encompasses the dissemination of a new accounting practice, the transformation of capitalist institutions and mo des of regulation in a given period and country, and the programmatic discourses [Miller, P., & Rose, N. (1990). Governing economic life. Economy and Society, 19(1), 1–31] associated with the historical move.     

Agglomeration Effects and the Competition for Firms

A two-region economy consists of a given but different number of immobile workers in each region, and a given number of mobile firms. Firms create jobs where they locate, but there is frictional unemployment. Two sorts of agglomeration effects arise: those from economies of scale in matching, and those from production economies external to the firm. Regions may either be part of a unitary state in which case all regional policies are decided by the central government, or they may be part of a federal state in which case some policies are determined by the regional governments. We characterize the resource allocations in both a unitary and a federal state, and identify the set of instruments that are required to replicate the social optimum in each state.     

A model of repeat advertising

Advertising conveys information not only about product characteristics but also about the number of consumers who know about the product. More advertising may shift expectations towards a larger consumer base, increasing buyers' valuation when there are consumption externalities.     

Telecommunications for development: findings of the ITU-OECD project

This article presents the main findings of a major research project jointly sponsored by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The purpose of the project was to shed some light on the ways in which telecommunications contribute to economic and social development. The author also describes one approach to rural telecommunications explored by the project — the GLODOM concept.     

A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels

This paper extends the classic war of attrition to allow for a wide range of actions. Players alternate making arbitrary payments, and their opponent may either match this payment, or concede. We analyze both cases of complete and incomplete information. As opposed to the classic war of attrition, the equilibrium is unique, rent-dissipation is only partial, and weaker (lower valuation) players concede more quickly than stronger players.     

Bank Employee Incentives and Stock Purchase Plans Participation

We investigate which factors influence 44,649 employees’ decision to invest in a top retail banking group in France. We have two objectives: (i) to explore factors associated with the amount invested in the plan, and (ii) to explore whether these factors have same associations with the probability of investing more than the incentive pay i.e. being an active investor. Specifically, we focus on four parameters that have been shown to affect participation: liquidity constraints, imperfect knowledge of the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs. We confirm Engelhardt and Madrian (Natl Tax J 57:385–406, 2004) assumptions according to which such factors contribute to explain non-participation. We show that ESPP contributors have very specific and unobserved motivations, as shown with the positive correlations between error terms in the two steps of investment decisions. The existence of unobservable investment motives can be explained by a lower risk aversion, a higher time preference, or a strong willingness to participate to corporate governance.     

International portfolio diversification is better than you think

Using aggregate data on bilateral cross-border equity holdings, we investigate whether investors correctly hedge their over-exposure to domestic risk (the well-known equity home bias) by investing in foreign stock markets that have low correlation with their home stock market. To deal with the endogeneity of stock return correlations, we instrument current correlations with past correlations. Controlling for many determinants of international portfolios, we find that, all else equal, investors do tilt their foreign holdings towards countries, which offer better diversification opportunities. The diversification motive that we uncover is stronger for source countries exhibiting a higher level of home bias.