When cost improvements harm consumers

This paper demonstrates that improving cost efficiency in a vertical structure might sometimes be detrimental to consumers. This is in stark contrast with the standard microeconomics result which suggests that the surplus generated by any efficiency gain in production is shared between firms and final consumers, depending on the degree of market power. These new results may apply in contexts such as the diffusion of knowledge and techniques and governmental intervention through income support programs.      

From Libertinism to Marital Commitment: The Economics of Marital Search with Heterogeneous Agents

Synopsis The actual characteristics and desires of candidates or marriage cannot be clearly identified without careful examination (Anderson & Hamori 2000). Accordingly, the classified advertisement system looks like a market or lemons (Akerlof 1970), which sharply contrasts with the matchmaking agency system. The continued existence of classified advertisement system just proves it furthers the goals of certain singles—namely, libertine females and libertine males. The present paper uses two databases: the first database consists of a sample of personal advertisements extracted from a specialized publication; the second database is the customer file of a matchmaking agency. This paper predicts which variables will determine the commitment level desired by individuals and why matchmaking agencies customers are more sincere than advertisers.     

Are athletes more cooperative than nonathletes? A laboratory experiment

Former athletic employees receive a better wage when hired than other employees because recruiters associate positive values to athletic participation. Whereas athletes are considered as more cooperative than others, this assumption lacks empirical support. We implement a laboratory experiment in order to examine whether athletes (i.e., individuals engaged in intense athletic participation) exhibit more cooperative behaviours than nonathletes. We compare the cooperative behaviours of athletes and nonathletes in a single‐shot public good game using a variant of the strategy method. We find that athletes exhibit significantly more conditional cooperative behaviours than nonathletes but no significant differences in unconditional behaviours.     

Among the Ashes: Trade Union Strategies in the UK and German Steel Industries

The trade unions in the steel industry have faced two waves of restructuring, the first centring on closures, capacity reductions and mass redundancies, the second involving fundamental changes to patterns of work organization, labour utilization and industrial relations. Overall, the trade unions involved have failed to develop an adequate response to management-led change, relying instead on traditional methods and lines of interest representation. The challenges embodied in such developments as teamworking and craft restructuring are considered, together with union responses and the structural and ideological constraints on those responses. Contrasts are drawn with more successful union involvement in comparable changes in the German steel industry. In the conclusion, the authors review the dilemmas facing the UK unions in the steel industry and the main areas for a new agenda.     

Time-consistent subsidies to unlucky firms

This paper examines government subsidies that prevent unlucky firms from going out of business. Subsidies can save jobs and prevent an increase in unemployment insurance expenditures, but they modify the incentives of the firms to exert adequate effort. If firms expect to obtain help, they may not undertake enough effort to decrease the probability of needing help. The cost-minimizing government must therefore trade off the savings in unemployment insurance expenditures against the increased bill in subsidies to the firms. The analysis shows that this trade-off is significantly affected by the level of commitment of the government; if the government cannot commit to a future subsidy policy, the level of subsidies will be unambiguously higher, the level of effort by the firms lower, and the number of firms making losses higher than if the government could so commit.     

Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics

Summary. We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to “sell out” to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective.Received: 20 Februay 2003, Revised: 25 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D72, H2.Nicolas Sahuguet: Correspondence toWe thank Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite for their comments. We also thank the editor Dan Kovenock and an anonymous referee. The second author is grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under grant SES-0078870.     

Herd behaviour as an incentive scheme

Summary. We consider a set-up in which firms sequentially adopt a technology. The technology is a public good. Late movers, upon observing the early movers adopting the old technology, (partly) infer that the new technology does not exist. This hampers their incentives to innovate. Early movers anticipate this and rather exert effort to try to invent the new technology. Hence, in our model herding reduces free-rider problems and may - in the presence of switching costs - even increase efficiency.Received: 20 June 2002, Revised: 26 May 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D83, D82, D62.I am very grateful to my thesis advisor Mathias Dewatripont for his many helpful suggestions. I thank seminar participants at ECARES, DELTA, IAE, GREMAQ and WZB. I also benefited from comments made by A.Banerjee, P.Bolton, M.Castanheira, J.Gyntelberg, P.Legros, G.Roland, M.Ruckes, X.Vives, J.Zwiebel and an anonymous referee. I gratefully acknowledge financial assistance provided by the European Commission through its TMR program (Contract number FMRX-CT98-0203) and from the Inter University Poles of Attraction Program (Contract PAI P4/28). Finally, I am also very grateful to M.Castanheira for his many encouragements at the start of my research work.     

Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects

Summary. We introduce strategic waiting in a global game setting with irreversible investment. Players can wait in order to make a better informed decision. We allow for cohort effects, which arise endogenously in technology adoption problems with positive contemporaneous network effects. Formally, cohort effects lead to intra-period network effects being greater than inter-period network effects. Depending on the nature of the cohort effects, our game may or may not satisfy dynamic increasing differences. If it does, our model has a unique rationalizable outcome. Otherwise, multiple equilibria may exist as players want to invest at the same point in time others do.Received: 13 July 2004, Revised: 20 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82, D83.We thank George-Marios Angeletos, Helmut Bester, Andreas Blume, Estelle Cantillon, Frank Heinemann, Christian Hellwig, Larry Karp, Tobias Kretschmer, In Ho Lee, Robin Mason and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank seminar participants at the EEA-meeting in Stockholm 2003, ESRC Workshop in Warwick 2004, Free University Berlin, IAE (Barcelona), Keele, MIT, Southampton, University of Pittsburgh, and at a CEPR-conference in Brussels 2002 for comments, and the European Union for providing financial support through the TMR network on network industries (Contract number FMRX-CT98-0203). This paper was completed while the first author visited the Department of Economics at MIT, whose hospitality he gratefully acknowledges.