Structural holes in social networks: A remark

In a recent article, [S. Goyal, F. Vega-Redondo, Structural holes in social networks, J. Econ. Theory 137 (1) (2007) 460-492] the authors (GVR) showed the importance of stars and cycles in a given network formation game. Implicitly, in their article, a network is called an equilibrium if it is generated by an equilibrium strategy. We extend the results of GVR to the case of a stronger requirement: namely, that a network can be called an equilibrium only if all the strategies generating it are equilibria. We also show, in a dynamic framework, that both definitions differ in crucial ways.     

Computing uniformly optimal strategies in two-player stochastic games

We provide a computable algorithm to calculate uniform ε-optimal strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games. Our approach can be used to construct algorithms that calculate uniform ε-equilibria and uniform correlated ε-equilibria in various classes of multi-player non-zero-sum stochastic games.     

Telecommunications for development: findings of the ITU-OECD project

This article presents the main findings of a major research project jointly sponsored by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The purpose of the project was to shed some light on the ways in which telecommunications contribute to economic and social development. The author also describes one approach to rural telecommunications explored by the project — the GLODOM concept.     

Computations of Greeks in a market with jumps via the Malliavin calculus

Using the Malliavin calculus on Poisson space we compute Greeks in a market driven by a discontinuous process with Poisson jump times and random jump sizes, following a method initiated on the Wiener space in [5]. European options do not satisfy the regularity conditions required in our approach, however we show that Asian options can be considered due to a smoothing effect of the integral over time. Numerical simulations are presented for the Delta and Gamma of Asian options, and confirm the efficiency of this approach over classical finite difference Monte-Carlo approximations of derivatives.Received: July 2003, Mathematics Subject Classification (1991): 90A09, 90A12, 90A60, 60H07JEL Classification: C15, G12We thank M. Coutaud for contributions to the simulations.     

TRADE POLICY AND MARKET POWER: FIRM‐LEVEL EVIDENCE

This article identifies the effect of trade policy on market power through new data and a new identification strategy. We identify market power by observing how exporting firms price discriminate across markets following variations in bilateral exchange rates. Pricing‐to‐market is prevalent in all countries in our sample, even among small firms, although it is increasing in firm size. More importantly, we find that the effect of nontariff measures (NTMs) is not isomorphic to that of tariffs. Whereas tariffs reduce the market power of foreign firms through rent‐shifting effects, NTMs reinforce the market power of nonexiting firms, domestic and foreign alike.     

Federal Reserve System Rising: The Expansion of Board Veto Authority on the Eve of the Great Depression

Most scholars agree that restrictive Federal Reserve System (FRS) policies contributed to the depression’s duration and severity. FRS policy mistakes are attributed to faulty ideas, poor leadership, and decentralised institutions. Extant scholarship treats ideas as constraints which systematically led policy-makers astray. This paper instead focuses on the dual roles ideas play in shaping institutions and uniting coalitions behind institutional projects. It traces the rise and fall of New York FRS Governor Benjamin Strong’s ‘great idea’ that the FRS should promote international monetary stability. Declining support for New York’s internationalism enabled a rural Board faction to expand its veto power from 1928 to 1930. In the critical year following the 1929 stock market crash, Board obstruction of New York FRS attempts to lower its discount and bill rates caused its investments to fall faster than the system’s bond portfolio expanded, forcing outstanding system credit to contract. Beyond showing that the Board’s pre-depression rise mattered, the paper speaks to broader debates about how ideas become empowered to shape policies and inform interests.     

Pollution effects of free trade areas: Simulations from a general equilibrium model

Abstract

A two-factors, two-goods, three-countries general equilibrium model is developed to assess the effects of a Free Trade Area (FTA) on pollution emissions. It also makes it possible to compare the effects of a discriminating commercial policy with alternative–non discriminating–policies, such as full trade liberalization or non-discriminating protection. A theoretical model is first developed in order to take into account country-differences in factor endowment, environmental regulation, pollution abatement technology, marginal disutilities of pollution, as well as terms of trade effects. This model is subsequently calibrated and computed in accordance with empirical evidence. The main conclusion shows that the move from protection to FTA reduces world pollution emissions. A second result indicates that, in case of full trade liberalization, world pollution is further reduced.