On the Timing Ability of Mutual Fund Managers

Existing studies of mutual fund market timing analyze monthly returns and find little evidence of timing ability. We show that daily tests are more powerful and that mutual funds exhibit significant timing ability more often in daily tests than in monthly tests. We construct a set of synthetic fund returns in order to control for spurious results. The daily timing coefficients of the majority of funds are significantly different from their synthetic counterparts. These results suggest that mutual funds may possess more timing ability than previously documented.     

Does Net Buying Pressure Affect the Shape of Implied Volatility Functions?

This paper examines the relation between net buying pressure and the shape of the implied volatility function (IVF) for index and individual stock options. We find that changes in implied volatility are directly related to net buying pressure from public order flow. We also find that changes in implied volatility of S&P 500 options are most strongly affected by buying pressure for index puts, while changes in implied volatility of stock options are dominated by call option demand. Simulated delta‐neutral option‐writing trading strategies generate abnormal returns that match the deviations of the IVFs above realized historical return volatilities.     

Renegotiation in agency contracts, menus vs. simple contracts

The literature on contracts has shown that renegotiation in agency relationships generates efficiency losses when the principal leads the renegotiation. We show that contractual incompleteness may reduce such efficiency loss. This provides an explanation to the widespread use of simple contracts. We further point at the limited liability of the agent as a source of inefficiency when he leads the renegotiation; this latter result tempers the irrelevancy of contractual incompleteness demonstrated earlier in the literature. I thank E. Del Rey and the referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the EU RTN grant HPRN-CT-2000-00064 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Agglomeration Effects and the Competition for Firms

A two-region economy consists of a given but different number of immobile workers in each region, and a given number of mobile firms. Firms create jobs where they locate, but there is frictional unemployment. Two sorts of agglomeration effects arise: those from economies of scale in matching, and those from production economies external to the firm. Regions may either be part of a unitary state in which case all regional policies are decided by the central government, or they may be part of a federal state in which case some policies are determined by the regional governments. We characterize the resource allocations in both a unitary and a federal state, and identify the set of instruments that are required to replicate the social optimum in each state.     

Management Buyouts and Human Resource Management

This paper reports the findings from a survey of the effects of management buyouts on human resource management (HRM). Buyouts resulted in increased employment, the adoption of new reward systems, and expanded employee involvement. These developments support the resource‐based view that buyouts develop internal assets over agency theory predictions that managers will adopt a cost reduction approach. The type of buyout influences the subsequent development of HRM. Buyouts report more commitment‐orientated employment policies where employees own shares, and where the buyout pursues a ‘buy and build’ corporate strategy and adopts a business strategy of enhancing customer service and developing markets.     

Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games

We study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and is drawn according to the same probability distribution at every stage). We prove that any n-player stochastic game admits an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff. When the game is positive and recursive, a stationary correlated equilibrium payoff exists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.     

Exclusive dealing and common agency in international markets

This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high, domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised be prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes.     

An Explanation of the Life Span of New French Firms

In contrast to previous studies on firm survival which tend to focus on features related to the structure of the firms and their area of activity, our aim here is to widen the perspective usually adopted in the field, taking into account a larger and more qualitative set of variables. Among these variables, features related to the individual characteristics of the entrepreneur, to the context of entrepreneurship and to the insertion in entrepreneurial networks are significant to explain the life span of new firms. The empirical material is drawn from two surveys, which provide detailed data about a group of new firms created in France in 1994 and closed down before 1997 or still running in 1997. Our empirical approach on qualitative data is based on data analysis methods (linear discriminant analysis, barycentric discriminant analysis, analysis of variance). According to the characteristics of the entrepreneur, the main explanatory factors for the survival of new firms are the fact that they are entrepreneurs who have taken over firms, that they have acquired during their previous occupational activity an experience in the same branch of activity and that they experience a successful integration into the entrepreneurial networks. These three factors show that the survival of young firms is indirectly conditioned by the existence of an initial custom, by the mastery of a job and by the know-how in the entrepreneurial function.     

Credit constraints and the persistence of unemployment

In this paper, we argue that credit market imperfections impact not only the level of unemployment, but also its persistence. For this purpose, we first develop a theoretical model based on the equilibrium matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) where we introduce credit constraints. We show these credit constraints not only increase steady-state unemployment, but also slow down the transitional dynamics. We then provide an empirical illustration based on a country panel dataset of 20 OECD countries. Our results suggest that credit market imperfections significantly increase the persistence of unemployment.