Policymakers' horizon and the sustainability of international cooperation

This paper examines the impact of policymakers' horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived countries run by policymakers. We show that re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely-lived policymakers. We also show that, when voting suffers from a recency bias, policymakers may have incentives to “collude” to get re-elected and term limits may help international cooperation.     

International portfolio diversification is better than you think

Using aggregate data on bilateral cross-border equity holdings, we investigate whether investors correctly hedge their over-exposure to domestic risk (the well-known equity home bias) by investing in foreign stock markets that have low correlation with their home stock market. To deal with the endogeneity of stock return correlations, we instrument current correlations with past correlations. Controlling for many determinants of international portfolios, we find that, all else equal, investors do tilt their foreign holdings towards countries, which offer better diversification opportunities. The diversification motive that we uncover is stronger for source countries exhibiting a higher level of home bias.     

An Update on EU Financial Reforms

In the context of a transatlantic comparison,the first thing to be mentioned is the difference between the time sequence of financial reforms in the European Union and its equivalent in the United States.The financial crisis started simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic, with the initial disruption of some financial market segments in August 2007 and the major panic episode of September through October 2008.But they are not at the same stage of policy reaction and especially regulatory reform now....     

A note on productivity change in European cooperative banks: the Luenberger indicator approach

The Luenberger productivity indicator is employed to estimate and decompose productivity change in a sample of cooperative banks operating in 10 EU member states. An average annualised productivity growth of 2.59% is reported between 1996 and 2003, though there is heterogeneity in growth rates across countries. Generally speaking, productivity growth is driven by technological change. However, cooperative banks in southern European banking markets benefit as much from efficiency growth or catching‐up with industry best practice. The results suggest that technology sharing arrangements and greater competition arising from deregulation are positive contributors towards productivity change.     

What Can and Cannot Be Done about Rating Agencies

Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are prominent participants in the assessment of credit risk by financial markets. They determine and publish credit ratings, which represent the CRA’s opinions on issuers’ relative probability of default. The market for credit ratings is currently dominated in most western countries by three players:     

Decision making under risk in Deal or No Deal

We analyse the choices of 399 contestants in the Australian version of the television game show Deal or No Deal. We calculate risk aversion bounds for each contestant, revealing considerable heterogeneity. We then estimate a structural stochastic choice model that captures the dynamic decision problem faced by contestants. To address individual heterogeneity, we nest the dynamic problem within the settings of both a random effects and a random coefficients probit model. Our structural model produces plausible estimates of risk aversion, confirms the role of individual heterogeneity and suggests that a model of stochastic choice is indeed appropriate. We find mixed evidence of greater risk aversion by females. We also examine generalizations to expected utility theory, finding that the rank‐dependent utility model adds non‐negligible explanatory power and indicates optimism in probability weighting. Finally, we test, but are unable to confirm, the existence of an endowment effect for lotteries. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation

This paper studies inter-jurisdictional competition in the fight against crime and its impact on occupational choice and the allocation of capital. In a world where capital is mobile, jurisdictions are inhabited by individuals who choose to become either workers or criminals. Because the return of the two occupations depends on capital, and because investment in capital in a jurisdiction depends on its crime rate, there is a bi-directional relationship between capital investment and crime which may lead to capital concentration. By investing in costly law enforcement, a jurisdiction makes the choice of becoming a criminal less attractive, which in turn reduces the number of criminals and makes its territory more secure. This increased security increases the attractiveness of the jurisdiction for investors and this can eventually translate into more capital being invested. We characterize the Nash equilibria—some entailing a symmetric outcome, others an asymmetric one—and study their efficiency.     

Ethically robust comparisons of bidimensional distributions with an ordinal attribute

We provide foundations for robust normative evaluation of distributions of two attributes, one of which is cardinally measurable and transferable between individuals and the other is ordinal and non-transferable. The result that we establish takes the form of an analogue to the standard Hardy–Littlewood–Pólya theorem for distributions of one cardinal attribute. More specifically, we identify the transformations of the distributions which guarantee that social welfare increases according to utilitarian unanimity provided that the utility function is concave in the cardinal attribute and that its marginal utility with respect to the same attribute is non-increasing in the ordinal attribute. We establish that this unanimity ranking of the distributions is equivalent to the ordered poverty gap quasi-ordering introduced by Bourguignon [12]. Finally, we show that, if one distribution dominates another according to the ordered poverty gap criterion, then the former can be derived from the latter by means of an appropriate and finite sequence of such transformations.     

Talking trade: language barriers in intra-Canadian commerce

This article tests for one mechanism that can explain the existence of a language barrier to trade. Specifically, the author asks if those industries that require more cross-border communication to export their products trade more between Canadian provinces that know the other’s language(s). The author finds that trade in industries with a need to communicate directly (orally) with importers increases with the probability that people in another province speak the same language. This finding reveals a disadvantage for minority language regions in services trade.     

The financial crisis and hedge fund returns

The financial crisis has focused the lens of politicians and regulators on hedge funds as a source of systemic and operational risk in asset markets. We examine the extent to which available data can provide useful information regarding the impact of hedge funds on the financial system. Using data from January 1994 through September 2008, we find dramatic changes in the exposures of hedge funds to risk factors, accompanied by a significant and widespread increase in correlation between hedge fund and factor returns. Lastly, the discontinuity at zero in the cross-sectional distribution of hedge fund returns persists throughout the sample.