The functions of project evaluation

In trying to explain the difficulties of implementing evaluation models it can be useful to study how evaluations of product development proposals are carried out in practice when they are not influenced by normative models. In this article some results are reported from an in-depth study of how project proposals were evaluated in two Swedish companies operating in the same industry. One was among the most innovative in the industry, its product development activities had led it into a series of new products and had resulted in a very high profitability and an extremely high rate of growth. The product development of the other company had resulted much more in variations in existing products than in major innovations. Growth was very slow and profitability was approaching a critically low level. The way project proposals were evaluated in the companies proved to differ substantially. In one company the dominating evaluation mode was one where the task is considered to be to estimate what effect an acceptance of the project proposal will have on overall goals, such as profitability and growth. This is called the rationalistic approach. In the other company an evaluation mode with the opposite characteristics was used. The evaluators consider a few conspicuous or at least easily visible characteristics of the project proposal. On the basis of these a picture of the project is created which is perceived as good or bad. This picture is the basis for the decision. This is called the impressionistic approach. In the case reported here the rationalistic mode was used by the least successful and least innovative company while the impressionistic mode was used by the most successful and most innovative company. The paper presents arguments for interpreting the relationship between evaluation mode and performance not as coincidental but as causal. It is argued that even if the impressionistic mode may seem irrational from a traditional point of view, it is superior to the rationalistic one in some important respects.     

Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages and Involuntary Unemployment

Recent studies of wage bargaining and unemployment have emphasized the distinction between insiders and outsiders, and that unions act in the interest of insiders. Yet it is typically assumed that insiders and recently hired outsiders are paid the same wage. We consider a model where the starting wage may differ from the insider wage, but incentive constraints associated with turnover affect the form of the contract. We examine under what conditions the starting wage is linked to the insider wage so that increased bargaining power of insiders raises the starting wage and reduces the hiring of outsiders.
JEL classification : J 23; J 31; J 33     

Adoption rate forecasts and rollout strategies

Long-term broadband penetration forecasts for Western Europe are presented. The broadband penetration forecasts are adjusted according to the broadband coverage. The adjusted forecasts are defined as adoption rate forecasts. These forecasts are used as input to the techno-economic calculations to examine broadband roll out in the different access area types. The paper documents the profitability of broadband rollouts in sparsely populated areas and estimates the limits for having monopoly areas as a function of given characteristics. The identified monopoly areas will of course contribute to higher broadband coverage because the profitability in these small areas will be better than earlier expected because of none competition.     

On the transient behaviour of the GI/G/1 waiting-times

Abstract

Consider a single-server queuing system, where the arrival intervals T_i and the service-times U_i of consecutive customers form two independent sequences of independent and equally distributed random variables. Assume that customers arriving when the server is busy line up and that they are then served in order of arrival. Let W_n be the waiting-time of the nth customer and suppose that the server is idle at the start, i.e. W₁ = 0. Put W = lim _n ∞ W_n when the limit exists. Furthermore, let F_n (?) be the c.d.f. of W_n and put EW_n =ω _n .     

Are Investors Sensitive to the Quality and the Disclosure of Financial Statements?

This paper investigates the influence of Swiss firms'disclosure policy and of their financial analysts'coverage on stock price abnormal reactions to thepublication of the annual reports. It first showsthat, after controlling for the number of analysts,the absolute abnormal returns are significantly andpositively affected by the rating measure used as aproxy of the informational quality of annual reports.It furthermore emphasises asymmetry in therelationship between stock price abnormal reactionsand two informational variables, namely the quality ofthe firm's disclosure policy and its financialanalysts' coverage. It appears that while positiveabnormal returns are significantly and positivelyrelated to the rating variable, negative abnormalreturns are only affected by the number of financialanalysts. The inverse relationship between abnormalnegative returns and the financial analysts' coveragesupports the fact that competition among analystsreduces investors' adverse selection problem. Finally,the study evidences a non-linear relationship betweenrating and positive abnormal returns which ismeaningful for the ``good' and ``very good type' firmsand thus emphasises the signaling role played by afirm's financial disclosure policy.     

Renewable Energy Policy Instruments and Market Power

Markets for green certificates allow generators with market power to squeeze the margins of their competitors, as a generator that is vertically integrated into network activities might do. We analyze this issue in a stylized electricity industry in which a dominant producer of both conventional and renewable energy is facing a competitive fringe of renewable‐energy producers. We demonstrate that whether or not a dominant firm is vertically integrated into network activities, it can disadvantage the fringe producers by distorting certificates prices, thereby inducing cost inefficiency in the generation of renewable energy. We compare green certificates to a system of feed‐in tariffs, where a similar margin squeeze is not possible.     

A numerical comment on an upper bound for ruin probabilities

Abstract

In a paper by de Vylder (1977) an upper bound for the probability of ruin is constructed. A numerical example is given for a Poisson-process with claim d.f.=l-e?y , the operational time T=100, the premium loading λ=0.05 (c= 1.05) and the initial reserve u=50. In this case the limit is found to be ψ(u, T)?00.0025.     

The development of new products: The role of firm context and managerial cognition

We explore the effect of organizational factors and managerial cognition on firms' entrepreneurial actions and investigate the relationship between these antecedents by drawing from prior work on corporate entrepreneurship, managerial cognition, and the attention-based view of the firm. The analysis of data from 84 firms shows that firm strategy and resources influence the degree of negativity with which managers interpret events that lead to the development of new products. Our results also suggest that more negative evaluations of the triggering event lead to less innovative new products. While the strategy and the resources of a firm also have an effect on a new product's degree of innovativeness, at least part of this effect is mediated by executives' evaluation of the triggering event. The theoretical elaboration and our results contribute to a better understanding of the drivers of corporate entrepreneurial activities and point to the importance of considering both managerial and organizational factors for advancing our knowledge on firms' entrepreneurial actions.