Non-parametric method for European option bounds

There is much research whose efforts have been devoted to discovering the distributional defects in the Black–Scholes model, which are known to cause severe biases. However, with a free specification for the distribution, one can only find upper and lower bounds for option prices. In this paper, we derive a new non-parametric lower bound and provide an alternative interpretation of Ritchken’s (J Finance 40:1219–1233, 1985) upper bound to the price of the European option. In a series of numerical examples, our new lower bound is substantially tighter than previous lower bounds. This is prevalent especially for out of the money options where the previous lower bounds perform badly. Moreover, we present how our bounds can be derived from histograms which are completely non-parametric in an empirical study. We discover violations in our lower bound and show that those violations present arbitrage profits. In particular, our empirical results show that out of the money calls are substantially overpriced (violate the lower bound).     

Explaining the volatility smile: non-parametric versus parametric option models

We employ a “non-parametric” pricing approach of European options to explain the volatility smile. In contrast to “parametric” models that assume that the underlying state variable(s) follows a stochastic process that adheres to a strict functional form, “non-parametric” models directly fit the end distribution of the underlying state variable(s) with statistical distributions that are not represented by parametric functions. We derive an approximation formula which prices S&P 500 index options in closed form which corresponds to the lower bound recently proposed by Lin et al. (Rev Quant Financ Account 38(1):109–129, 2012). Our model yields option prices that are more consistent with the data than the option prices that are generated by several widely used models. Although a quantitative comparison with other non-parametric models is more difficult, there are indications that our model is also more consistent with the data than these models.     

Optimizing service failure and damage control

Should a provider deliver a reliable service or should it allow for occasional service failures? This paper derives conditions under which randomizing service quality can benefit the provider and society. In addition to cost considerations, heterogeneity in customer damages from service failures allows the provider to generate profit from selling damage prevention services or offering compensation to high-damage customers. This strategy is viable even when reputation counts and markets are competitive.     

Ownership coordination in a channel: Incentives,returns, and negotiations

In many industries firms have to make quantity decisions before knowing the exact state of demand. In such cases, channel members have to decide which firm will own the units until demand uncertainty is resolved. The decision about who should retain ownership depends on the balance of benefit and risk to each member. Ownership, after all, is costly. Whichever member owns the units accepts the risk of loss if more units are produced than can be sold. But ownership also grants firms the flexibility to respond to demand once it becomes known by adjusting price. In this study, we analyze ownership decisions in distribution channels and how those decisions are affected by demand uncertainty. We model demand based on micro-modeling of consumer utility functions and capture demand uncertainty related to market size and price sensitivity. This study shows that as long as the degree of uncertainty about market size is intermediate, the retailer and the manufacturer both benefit when the manufacturer maintains ownership of the units. But when there is substantial uncertainty about market size, the retailer and the channel are better off if the retailer takes ownership but the manufacturer still prefers to maintain ownership. Thus, there is potential for channel conflict regarding ownership under high levels of uncertainty. We show that, using product returns, the manufacturer can achieve the same outcome under retailer ownership as under manufacturer ownership. This provides an additional new rationale for the prevalence of product returns. The first-best outcome (from the perspective of total channel profit), however, is under retailer ownership without product returns when uncertainty is high (i.e., product returns reduce the total channel profit). Negotiations between the manufacturer and the retailer can lead to the first-best outcome but only under quite restrictive constraints that include direct side payments by the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer being pessimistic about its outside option (when an agreement cannot be reached) during the negotiation.     

Rural-to-urban migration, human capital, and agglomeration

A new general-equilibrium model that links together rural-to-urban migration, the externality effect of the average level of human capital, and agglomeration economies shows that in developing countries, unrestricted rural-to-urban migration reduces the average income of both rural and urban dwellers in equilibrium. Various measures aimed at curtailing rural-to-urban migration by unskilled workers can lead to a Pareto improvement for both the urban and rural dwellers. In addition, the government can raise social welfare by reducing the migration of skilled workers to the city. Moreover, without a restriction on rural-to-urban migration, a government's efforts to increase educational expenditure and thereby the number of skilled workers may not increase wage rates in the rural or urban areas.     

On structural change,the social stress of a farming population,and the political economy of farm support

A rationale for providing support to the farm sector in the course of economic development and structural change is a growing gap between the incomes of non‐agricultural workers and the incomes of farmers. Drawing on a model that enables us to analyze the level of social stress experienced by farmers as employment shifts from the farm sector to other sectors, we find that even without an increasing gap between the incomes of non‐agricultural workers and the incomes of farmers, support to farmers might be needed/can be justified. This result arises because under well‐specified conditions, when the size of the farm population decreases, those who remain in farming experience increasing aggregate social stress. The increase is nonlinear: it is modest when the outflow from the farm sector is relatively small or when it is large, and it becomes more significant when the outflow is moderate. This finding can inform policymakers who seek to alleviate the social stress of the farming population as to the timing and intensity of that intervention.     

An impulse-control method for investment decisions in dynamic technology

This paper presents a new framework to augment standard methods in evaluating profitability of investments, especially those involved in dynamic technology. In this case there is a possibility that although a certain investment is profitable using standard methods, it should not be undertaken because it precludes a more profitable investment later on, when more advanced equipment will be available. The investment decision faced by a firm is presented here as an impulse-control problem, where the process of technological progress is modelled explicitly. The outcome of the optimization yields, in addition to investment expenditures, the expected time period between consecutive investments. A simple example demonstrates the use of the technique in actual investment decisions.     

Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives

This paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at-the-money. Hall and Murphy [Hall, Brian, Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. American Economic Review 90 (2), 209–214] claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance. However, they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort-averse into their model. We revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages, options, and stock grants. We simulate the manager’s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders’ equity under alternative compensation schemes, and identify schemes that are optimal. Our simulations indicate that, when abstracting from tax considerations, it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable (i.e., substantially in-the-money) on their expiration date. Prior to 2006, the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations. Recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006.     

Payout policy,financial flexibility,and agency costs of free cash flow

This paper explains how firms choose between dividends and open-market repurchase programs, the prevailing method that firms use to disburse cash today. While earlier theories about payout policy are motivated by signaling, the motivation for payout in this paper is to prevent the waste of free cash by self-interested insiders. In the model, dividends prevent free cash waste by forcing cash out, but result in underinvestment if the cash paid out is later needed for operations. Open-market programs stimulate payout by providing personal gains to informed insiders that are associated with the firm's repurchase trade. Yet, they also avoid the underinvestment problem by leaving insiders the option to cancel the payout. Because their execution is optional, however, open-market programs only partially prevent the waste of free cash. The model provides testable predictions that are generally consistent with the empirical evidence.     

Intentions to Return of Clandestine Migrants: Comment

We take issue with the reasoning of Coniglio et al. ( 2009 ) that whereas better‐skilled illegal migrants will prefer to return‐migrate, lower‐skilled illegal migrants will not. We argue that under asymmetric information, all the illegal migrants are initially paid a wage based on the average productivity of the group of illegal migrants. The better‐skilled illegal migrants thus face two “taxes:” being paid less than if they were legal, and being averaged down. Therefore, better‐skilled illegal migrants can be expected to expend more effort to become legal than lower‐skilled illegal migrants. And once legalized, there is no reason for the better‐skilled illegal migrants to want to return to their country of origin more than the lower‐skilled illegal migrants. Thus, it is the lower‐skilled illegal migrants that are likely to dominate the return migration flow. We argue that in other respects too, the model of Coniglio et al. is not based on reasonable assumptions, and that even under the postulated assumptions, the model suffers from several inconsistencies. In particular, when the rate of return to savings is an increasing function of skill level, we would expect there to be few better‐skilled individuals among illegal migrants in the first place. Also, an obvious distinction between savers and borrowers is ignored.