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921.
Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain
about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation
(CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical
nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental
evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components
that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private
good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a
probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the
winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in
the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion
of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness
of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect
on the winning bid.
相似文献
922.
Sergio Beraldo 《International Review of Economics》2011,58(1):79-90
Indirect reciprocity is generally considered one of the leading mechanisms to explain how cooperation may emerge by natural selection. The basic intuition is that establishing a reputation of being a helpful individual increases the probability of being in turn helped. Two models have been proposed to describe how indirect reciprocity may work: the standing model (Sugden 1986/2004 in The economics of rights, cooperation and welfare. Blackwell, Oxford.) and the image-scoring model (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a in Nature 393:573–577, b in J Theoretical Biol 194:561–574). Although there is evidence that the former model would perform better under a wide set of circumstances, it is often maintained that it requires individuals with an implausibly large capacity of processing recursive information. In this paper, I argue that this is not actually the case. I further emphasize that even if the hypothesis of indirect reciprocity is unable to give a fair account of the ecological bases of cooperation, it has inspired a deal of research precious to social sciences. 相似文献
923.
In The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare (1986), Robert Sugden follows the tradition from Thomas Schelling and David Lewis in ascribing a central role to the notion
of salience within his theory of convention. However, against this, Bruno Verbeek (Instrumental rationality and moral philosophy,
Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002) has argued that an empirically adequate notion of salience may not be incorporated into a generic account of convention
without circularity obtains. This paper examines Verbeek’s argument against a background of experimental as well as theoretical
work on coordination problems. It finds that the argument fails to consider at least two candidate theories of salience that
may be incorporated into the theory of convention without circularity: cognitive hierarchy theory that iterates Sugden’s notion
of psychological salience and Schelling salience. Thus, in the end Verbeek’s criticism of the role ascribed to salience in
theories of convention may be dismissed, though its discussion draws a fruitful perspective. 相似文献
924.
We offer an analysis of the existence of a positive relationship between minimum wages and economic growth in a simple one-sector overlapping generations economy à la Romer (J Polit Econ 94:1002–1037, 1986), in the case of both homogeneous and heterogeneous labour and without considering any growth-sustaining externalities which the minimum wage can generate. Assuming also the existence of unemployment benefits financed with balanced-budget consumption taxes not conditional upon age, we show that the minimum wage can promote economic growth and welfare despite the occurrence of unemployment. There may also exist a growth- and welfare-maximising minimum wage. 相似文献
925.
We consider the problem of dividing a resource among a group of agents who have conflicting claims on it. We follow the axiomatic
approach and investigate the class of rules satisfying claims-inequality and claims-order preservation in gains and losses.
We show that these axioms single out the proportional rule when there are more than three agents. This result confirms the
central role of this rule and furthers our understanding of it in claims problems. 相似文献
926.
It has been argued that “paternalistically motivated forced savings constitutes an important, and to some the most important, rationale for social security retirement systems.” This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security in dynamically efficient economies. If the competing asset is linear storage and myopic agents are allowed to borrow against future pension benefits, there is no welfare-rationale for PAYG pensions. Sufficiently strong myopia may justify such pensions only if agents cannot borrow against their future pension, but then they are at a zero-saving corner. With enough myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the return to saving declines with saving, as in a model with a neoclassical technology. 相似文献
927.
Viktor J. Vanberg 《Constitutional Political Economy》2011,22(1):1-20
The tension that is often seen to exist between the ideals of liberalism and of democracy is examined in this paper in light of the distinction between two liberal outlooks at constitutional regimes, namely, on the one side, a liberal constitutionalism that focuses on the need to provide institutional safeguards of individual liberty as private autonomy and, on the other hand, a constitutional liberalism that focuses on the need to respect the freedom of individuals to choose the constitutional environment in which they wish to live. It is argued that a liberalism that consistently extends its fundamental ideal of individual sovereignty to the level of constitutional choice can be reconciled with the basic democratic ideal of citizen sovereignty. 相似文献
928.
Flows of people,flows of ideas,and the inequality of nations 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
The present paper examines a neglected determinant of aggregate productivity: temporary cross-border flows of people. We hypothesize
that interaction between people from different nations facilitates the international diffusion of ideas, thus stimulating
aggregate productivity. In order to assess the causal impact of people flows on productivity, we construct an instrument for
people flows. By analogy to the trade/growth literature, this instrument is derived from a fitted gravity equation involving
geographic determinants of bilateral travel flows. Our cross-section analysis reveal that greater international interaction
leads to higher productivity; a very similar result, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, is obtained when we employ dynamic
panel data methods for the purpose of identification. 相似文献
929.
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
Ananish Chaudhuri 《Experimental Economics》2011,14(1):47-83
I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary
punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants
in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively
correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high
contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions
of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching. 相似文献
930.