Key countries in the Third World

Present classifications of the developing countries are of limited usefulness as a basis for determining development policy priorities in the industrialised countries, argue our authors. They define a group of “key countries” which are of strategical importance for the world economy and outline the development risks facing these countries.¹ They suggest that the OECD countries would be better advised to follow a policy of cooperation with these key countries rather than the “man mind thyself” policies which are presently gaining in popularity.     

Problems now and in the past

In some places, voices are raised today which assert that development aid is not worth the noise that is being made about it, because the industrialised countries went through exactly the same phase of development by their own, unaided efforts and still had arrived where they are now. Any development aid, so it is said, will only paralyse the determination of LDCs to aid themselves. The author discusses this assertion in the following article.     

United States concessions in the Kennedy Round and short-run labor adjustment costs

This paper reports on an econometric analysis of the exemptions awarded to United States industries from the across-the-board 50 percent tariff cut imposed in the Kennedy Round. It is shown that as much as 50 percent of the inter-industry variation in reductions in nominal tariff and non-tariff rates may be accounted for by variables that proxy labor adjustment costs. In particular, certain industrial characteristics are significantly related to the Kennedy Round reductions: declining industries, and industries with a high proportion of unskilled or old workers, are associated with low reductions.     

Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary and fiscal policy coordination: Implications for European Monetary Union

In a two-country model, we consider the implications of monetary and fiscal policy coordination for macroeconomic stabilization. We show that the optimal regime is one of monetary and fiscal policy coordination under flexible exchange rates. In the context of the European Community, this suggests that the desire to fix exchange rates may not be costless. In addition, we show that fiscal coordination requires a relatively high degree of flexibility in fiscal policy. This result suggests that limits on the flexibility of fiscal policies, as suggested in the Delors Report, may hinder macroeconomic stabilization.     

Testing for non-linear dependence in inter-war exchange rates

Testing for Non-Linear Dependence in Inter-War Exchange Rates. — This paper tests weekly inter-war floating exchange rate data for the pound-dollar, pound-franc and pound-reichsmark for non-linearity. Initial tests reveal strong evidence of generic non-linearity in these series and indicate neglected non-linear structure in the residuals of linear representations. Attempts to model this structure using GARCH residual processes have only been partially successful. Thus, two parametric models of such non-linearity were estimated. Comparing the forecasts from these models shows the mean square forecast errors of linear-GARCH and bilinear models to be lower than those from linear forecasts for all series, and that SETAR model forecasts outperform all other models for the pound-dollar.     

The effects of domestic rice market interventions outside business-as-usual conditions for imported rice prices

The Philippine government intervenes in the domestic rice market through the imposition of import tariffs and the provision of producer and consumer subsidies. While policymakers are aware that these programmes come with allocative efficiency costs, they justify the programmes on the grounds that they insulate the domestic economy from unexpected price spikes in the international rice market. An interesting matter for policy evaluation is to quantify the insulation benefit that the programmes provide in circumstances of sudden severe import price spikes. To examine this question, we undertake a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) simulation in which the Philippines is subject to an external rice price shock. We find that the insulation benefit of the support programmes under a 2008-like event is worth approximately 0.10% of real consumption. However, the cost of insuring against these price spikes is significant. We estimate the annual cost of the rice market interventions at approximately 0.40% of real consumption.