Contextual Framing and Monetary Incentives in Field Experiments on Risk Preferences: Evidence from German Farmers

Recent studies cast doubt on the ability of abstract experiments to predict decision‐making in the field. Thus, scholars have argued for more ‘realism’ by introducing context to field experiments. Yet, such realism may work against the induced values of monetary incentives in economic experiments. It is an open question whether contextual framing works best with or without inducing values, through methods such as the use of monetary incentives. Using a sample of 146 German farmers, we compare experimentally the predictive power of a framed lottery in an agricultural context vs. using an abstract version. For one half of the sample, lotteries are incentivised; for the other half, they are hypothetical. Although risk preferences differ between treatments, all four lottery tasks correlate poorly with farmers’ real‐world use of risk management instruments such as harvest or hail insurance. Subjects who start with an agricultural framing are willing to take significantly greater risks in the lotteries. More generally, our findings cast doubt on the ability of lottery tasks to predict risk‐taking in the field.     

‘The capital market is dead’: the difficult birth of index-linked gilts in the UK

This article describes how and why the Thatcher government introduced index-linked gilts in 1981. It outlines the earlier deliberations by the monetary authorities during the 1950s and 1960s on how an indexed government security might help or hinder the fight against inflation. Although these discussions came to nothing, rising inflation and increasing difficulties with managing the gilt-edged market during the 1970s revived interest in the indexation of government securities. Both the Page Commission in 1974 and the Wilson Report in 1980 recommended the introduction of inflation-indexed securities, but the election of the Conservative government in 1979 gave real momentum to their possible issuance. Although Margaret Thatcher was initially opposed to indexation, Nigel Lawson galvanized the Treasury and the Bank of England to work on a scheme to issue index-linked gilts as a means of improving economic performance. The article traces the contentious series of discussions surrounding the possible effects of index-linked gilts on government debt interest costs, on monetary policy and monetary targets, and on the possible ‘crowding out’ of corporate bonds and equities which could not offer a guaranteed real return. Despite teething problems, the introduction of inflation-linked bonds in the UK was deemed a success.     

Hedging costs and joint determinants of premiums and spreads in structured financial products

Evaluating more than 317,000 discount certificates in the German secondary market, we find that premiums and spreads are endogenous and negatively related but depend on different key determinants. The fundamental determinants of the premiums are mainly profit-related, that is, dividends of the underlying, issuers’ credit risk, lifecycle effect, and competition, whereas hedging costs are less important. However, initial hedging costs (IHC) are priced into the premium in the case of large inventory changes. The spread is mostly determined by hedging costs and risk components, such as IHCs, rebalancing costs, volatility, scalper risk, and overnight gap risk—but also by dividends.     

Forecasting the past: the case of US interest rate forecasts

This study evaluates 10-year US government bond yield forecasts and three-month US Treasury bill rate forecasts for the period between October 1989 and December 2004. In total, 136 forecast time series with approximately 13,800 forecast data were scrutinized, making this the most extensive analysis of interest rate forecasts to date. Not one of the forecast time series proved to be unbiased. In the majority of cases, information from the past was not efficiently integrated into the forecasts. The sign accuracy is significantly better than random walk forecasts in only a very few of the forecast time series. The modified Diebold–Mariano test for forecast encompassing reveals that the information content of most of the forecast time series is lower than that of the naïve forecasts, the simple ARIMA models, the implicit forward rates, or average interest rate expectations. The forecasting process is dominated by the present and past market situation.     

Institutional stakeholdings and better-informed traders at earnings announcements

Utama and Cready [Utama, S., Cready, W.M., 1997. Institutional ownership, differential predisclosure precision and trading volume at announcement dates. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 129–150] use total institutional ownership to proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders, an important determinant of trading around earnings announcements. We argue that institutions holding small stakes cannot justify the fixed cost of developing private predisclosure information. Also, institutions with large stakes generally do not trade around earnings announcements since they are dedicated investors or face regulations that make informed trading difficult. However, institutions holding medium stakes have incentives to develop private predisclosure information and trade on it; we show that their ownership is a finer proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders at earnings announcements.     

Bankers in the Boardroom and Firm Performance in China

We use a dataset comprising the appointments of commercial bankers as board of directors at Chinese listed firms and find that financially distressed firms are more likely to recruit a commercial banker as a director of the board. The presence of a banker on the board increases access to bank loans, yet many investors react negatively to announcements of such appointments. We also find that such appointments are typically followed by a drop in the appointing firm’s operating performance, and an increase in rent-seeking activities. This suggests that bank directors cannot strengthen corporate governance. Most financial resources are expropriated by corporate insiders.     

Knowledge of campaign finance regulation reduces perceptions of corruption

We use an experimental survey design to measure how campaign finance regulation influences perceptions of political corruption and trust in politicians when citizens are exposed to information about regulation. Unlike most observational studies, results of this experimental study suggest that knowledge of campaign finance regulation substantially reduces citizens’ perceptions of corruption but has only limited effect on trust in politicians. Findings have crucial implications for public policy. At a time when public cynicism about politics is high, a significant reduction in perceptions of political corruption through successful dissemination of campaign finance regulation would be a boost to the legitimacy of democracies.     

Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of "incomplete contracting". However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1999 a ). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.     

Eine Analyse ultimaten Verhaltens als Erklärungsansatz des moral hazards

For the insurance industry the moral hazard poses an incalculable risk. Changes in the behaviour of the insuree can lead to higher claims settlements and thus to higher premiums for the insured collective. Asymmetrically allocated information gives the insured individual the possibility to profit from the idea of common protection in a way that impairs insurer and the collective on the whole. Based on the homo oeconomicus model, economic concepts, first and foremost the agency theory of new institutional economics have made attempts to provide solutions for this management problem. However, behavioural economic experiments have demonstrated that the homo oeconomicus model does not fully succeed in describing the realities. As a result, the solutions proposed in these economic concepts have to be rated inadequate.The moral hazard is inherent in the conflicting realm of cooperation and defection, behaviour patterns that have evolved during the history of development of human behaviour. Ultimate behaviour analyses of these patterns do offer the opportunity to understand why humans behave in specific ways based on man's evolutionary origins and sources. Consequently, ultimate behaviour analyses could provide a solid foundation for the development of a framework giving insurers the possibility to exert influence on the insuree's behaviour and thus to assist in successfully impacting the moral hazard.