On the Virtues of Hiring Lemons

Recruiting high‐ability workers and implementing optimal efforts are among the key objectives of a firm's personnel policy. We show that, if the firm applies a tournament scheme—that is, a competitive career system—selection and incentive issues are strictly interrelated, thus leading to a fundamental conflict: if the firm is primarily interested in balanced worker competition, there will be a rationale for hiring low‐ability workers (‘lemons’). Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Minimal belief change, Pareto-optimality and logical consequence

Summary. A rational agent changes her beliefs in response to new information; a widely held idea is that such belief changes should be minimal. This paper is an overview of the theory of minimal belief revision. I employ a decision-theoretic framework to compare various principles for minimal belief revision. The main topics covered include the AGM postulates for belief revision, belief contraction, Grove's representation theorem, axioms for conditionals, and the connections between minimal belief change and questions in formal logic. I characterize under what conditions belief revision functions are consistent with the Levi Identity, and under what conditions belief contraction functions are consistent with the Harper Identity. Received: August 20, 2000; revised version: March 19, 2001     

Estimating features of a distribution from binomial data

We propose estimators of features of the distribution of an unobserved random variable W. What is observed is a sample of Y,V,X where a binary Y equals one when W exceeds a threshold V determined by experimental design, and X are covariates. Potential applications include bioassay and destructive duration analysis. Our empirical application is referendum contingent valuation in resource economics, where one is interested in features of the distribution of values W (willingness to pay) placed by consumers on a public good such as endangered species. Sample consumers with characteristics X are asked whether they favor (with Y=1 if yes and zero otherwise) a referendum that would provide the good at a cost V specified by experimental design. This paper provides estimators for quantiles and conditional on X moments of W under both nonparametric and semiparametric specifications.