From risk society to audit society

Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, the 2008 banking crisis occurred in an ultra-regulated environment. Legislative and regulatory financial-security regimes have in fact multiplied in recent years. The economic crisis is accelerating the transition of the risk society towards the audit society. But the G20 （Group of Twenty） declarations in Washington and London also reveal a managerial utopia： the march towards a society of confidence or harmony that would make controls superfluous. In this context, the article seeks to call upon philosophical, sociological and managerial references to risk, from Foucault to Power by way of Beck, Giddens ＆ Ewald, to shed light on the official declarations of the leaders of the world＇s main economies. The documentary corpus examined includes all the G20 works published between November 8, 2008 （preparation for the Washington Summit） and April 2, 2009 （conclusions of the London Summit）. The political philosophy underlying the G20＇s works remains fundamentally liberal, even though saving the worldwide market economy involves established security systems as well as self-control and control of others. In the end, the leaders do not decide between reinforcing the existing tools and inventing new systems. The updating of security technologies is meant to serve the preservation of the capitalist managerial utopia. This gives rise to a new variant of Beck＇s risk-society paradigm, too often confined to environmental threats alone, in three phases： （1） The crisis is a consequence of financial modernity and in particular of the inefficiency of regulation in the face of growing sophistication in techniques; （2） To restore confidence, the states and international institutions want, paradoxically, both to reinforce regulation and promote flexibility; （3） Thereupon, flexi-security controlled by worldwide economic governance characterizes the second financial modernity.     

-Best response set

This paper introduces a notion of p-best response set (p-BR). We build on this notion in order to provide a new set-valued concept: the minimal p-best response set (p-MBR). After proving general existence results of the p-MBR, we show that it characterizes set-valued stability concepts in a dynamic with Poisson revision opportunities borrowed from Matsui and Matsuyama [An approach to equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 415–434.] Then, we study equilibrium selection. In particular, using our notion of p-BR, we generalize Morris et al. [p-Dominance and belief potential, Econometrica 63 (1995) 145–157.] that aimed to provide sufficient conditions under which a unique equilibrium is selected in the presence of higher order uncertainty.     

Is customer satisfaction a relevant metric for financial analysts?

This study examines the effects of customer satisfaction on analysts' earnings forecast errors. Based on a sample of analysts following companies measured by the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI), we find that customer satisfaction reduces earnings forecast errors. However, analysts respond to changes in customer satisfaction but not to the ACSI metric per se. Furthermore, the effects of customer satisfaction are asymmetric; for example, analysts are more willing to use good news (i.e. an increase in customer satisfaction information) than bad news (i.e. a decrease in satisfaction). Similarly, customer satisfaction reduces negative deviation more than positive deviation of the analysts' forecasts from actual earnings. Furthermore, the effects of customer satisfaction depend upon the base level of satisfaction that the firm has achieved. Finally, the effects of customer satisfaction on analysts' forecast errors differ across firms with volatile satisfaction scores and those with stable satisfaction scores. We discuss the implications of our results for marketers and participants in financial markets.     

On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors

This paper studies the impact of a small probability event on strategic behavior in incomplete information games with non-common priors. It is shown that the global impact of a small probability event (i.e., its propensity to affect strategic behavior at all states in the state space) has an upper bound that is an increasing function of a measure of discrepancy from the common prior assumption. In particular, its global impact can be arbitrarily large under non-common priors, but is bounded from above under common priors. These results quantify the different implications common prior and non-common prior models have on the (infinite) hierarchies of beliefs.     

On hierarchical competition in oligopoly

In this paper, we consider a hierarchical oligopoly model, in which firms compete on quantities of an homogeneous product. We provide a proof and an interpretation that under the three necessary and sufficient conditions of linear aggregate demand, constant and identical marginal costs, the strategy of leaders at any stage depends neither on the number of leaders who play after nor on the number of remaining stages. So, all firms behave as Cournotian oligopolists on the residual demand. We show that these three assumptions are not only sufficient but also necessary. Any departure from any of these assumptions rules out this property.     

Growth-Enhancing Bubbles

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that speculation in financial markets reduces long-run growth. It shows that the real impact of a (rational deterministic) speculative bubble depends on the type of asset that is being speculated on. Speculative bubbles on equity raise the market value of firms, thus encouraging entrepreneurship, firm creation, investment, and growth. On the other hand, speculation on other types of assets is shown to be unambiguously growth-impairing. The model can explain some stylized facts about financial development and growth. Finally, regulatory implications are discussed briefly.     

Hedging in Futures and Options Markets with Basis Risk

This paper analyzes the hedging decisions for firms facing price and basis risk. Two conditions assumed in most models on optimal hedging are relaxed. Hence, (i) the spot price is not necessarily linear in both the settlement price and the basis risk and (ii) futures contracts and options on futures at different strike prices are available. The design of the first‐best hedging instrument is first derived and then it is used to examine the optimal hedging strategy in futures and options markets. The role of options as useful hedging tools is highlighted from the shape of the first‐best solution. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22:59–72, 2002     

INDONESIA'S BANKING CRISIS: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHAT DID WE LEARN?

This article traces the stages of the Indonesian banking crisis of the late 1990s. Almost every stage of the handling of the crisis was complicated by governance issues. Beyond these, among the lessons identified are how quickly things can get out of hand in an apparently strongly performing economy; that at the outset of a crisis information will be very limited; and that management of a crisis will be an evolving process. A blanket guarantee covering all bank liabilities may be indispensable; however, the authorities are 'buying time', and the more time that has to be bought the more expensive the process will be. Transparency too is indispensable, to generate public trust and support, and to ensure that actions taken by the authorities are irreversible. Overall, while not everything was done right, the strategy put in place had positive elements that have served to protect a core banking system and establish conditions for recovery.     

Indonesia's banking crisis: a new perspective on $50 billion of losses

The Asian crisis devastated the Indonesian banking sector and led to astronomical losses, almost entirely paid for by the government, i.e. by the general public. The paper provides a new perspective on the crisis, stressing that bank losses are not the same as losses to the economy: most of the ‘losses’ of the banks are actually transfers to borrowers and depositors. It should be possible to recover part of the amounts concerned through taxation of the major beneficiaries. The paper contrasts the conventional approach, embedded in business accounting, used to manage the banking crisis, with an alternative approach that relies on national accounting concepts. It shows how the latter can provide a new perspective, elucidating the massive transfers of wealth that took place during the crisis. This suggests possible improvements in bank resolution strategies, through the identification and quantification of the main transfers of wealth, followed by their taxation.     

The Role of Firms' Collaborative Agreements in the Information Technology Industry Transformation

While most articles on firm partnerships focus on the firm, the alliance or networks, we investigate the role of collaborative agreements during industrial transformation phases. Observation of a single industry, the Information Technology (IT) industry, shows that the growth of collaborative agreements formed by industry leaders in the early 1990s can be interpreted as an attempt to absorb a major industry shock characterized by vertical disintegration and the emergence of 'divided technical leadership'. Such firms have adopted collaborative agreements to maintain their leadership by controlling new entrants in the new industry segments that have resulted from the disintegration. Partnerships became a strategic component of the new 'divided technical leadership' market structure that emerged from the competitive crash of the early 1990s.