A technical note on “Optimizing inventory decisions in a multi-stage multi-customer supply chain”

We first generalize Khouja [Khouja, M., 2003. Optimizing inventory decisions in a multi-stage multi-customer supply chain. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 39 (3), 193–208] integrated model considering the integer multipliers mechanism and next individually derive the optimal solution to the three- and four-stage model using the perfect squares method, which is a simple algebraic approach so that ordinary readers unfamiliar with differential calculus can understand the optimal solution procedure with ease. We subsequently deduce the optimal expressions for Khouja (2003) and Cárdenas-Barrón [Cárdenas-Barrón, L.E., 2007. Optimal inventory decisions in a multi-stage multi-customer supply chain: a note. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 43 (5), 647–654] model, and identify the associated errors in Khouja (2003). We present two numerical examples for illustrative purposes. We finally shed light on some future research by extending or modifying the generalized model.     

Differences in Roma and non-Roma students’ ratings of their peers’ popularity: an inquiry into the oppositional culture in Hungarian schools with the use of a survey experiment

Quality & Quantity - Oppositional culture theory posits that students who belong to oppressed ethnic minority groups define their ethnic identity in opposition to the majority of students....     

Investment and the soft budget constraint in China

This paper examines the incentive effects of the soft budget constraint on the investment behavior of firms in general and on the investment-cash flow sensitivity in particular. To this end, we develop a simple model of moral hazard that takes the soft budget constraint into account. Within this moral hazard environment, we show that investment is positively related to the amount of internal funds. We further show that the presence of the soft budget constraint deteriorates the moral hazard problem, thereby making the investment level less sensitive to the amount of internal funds. This is the case irrespective of whether the soft budget constraint renders the firm more or less liquidity constrained. To test the model's empirical implications, we employ data of China's listed companies for the period from 1997 to 2003. We use the share of state ownership as a proxy for the severity of the soft budget constraint. We find strong evidence that firms with larger shares of state ownership exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with smaller shares of state ownership.     

Frictional wage dispersion with Bertrand competition: An assessment

I examine whether a version of the Cahuc et al. (2006) model can match the magnitude of wage dispersion, as measured by the ratio of the average and the lowest wage — the so-called mean-min ratio of Hornstein et al. (2011). I find that the workers? bargaining power is a crucial parameter: the mean-min ratio strictly decreases in the bargaining power up to a point near 1/2 and is essentially flat thereafter, generating the same amount of wage dispersion as the canonical wage ladder model, which is a special case of the CPVR model. Consequently, this model can yield large wage dispersion only for low bargaining power on the workers? side. I show that the share of job-to-job transitions with wage drops is decreasing in the bargaining power, calibrate the latter to the former, and demonstrate that the CPVR model generates an empirically plausible amount of wage dispersion. I also show that negative wages arise when workers have no bargaining power, and discuss the implications for the empirical findings of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b).     

A generalized algebraic model for optimizing inventory decisions in a centralized or decentralized multi-stage multi-firm supply chain

First of all, a number of integrated models with/without lot streaming under the integer multiplier coordination mechanism is generalized by allowing lot streaming and three types of inspection for some/all upstream firms. Secondly, the optimal solutions to the three- and four-stage models are individually derived, both using the perfect squares method, which is a simple algebraic approach so that ordinary readers unfamiliar with differential calculus can easily understand how to obtain the optimal solution procedures. Thirdly, optimal expressions for some well-known models are deduced. Fourthly, expressions for sharing the coordination benefits based on Goyal’s (1976) scheme are derived, and a further sharing scheme is introduced. Fifthly, two numerical examples for illustrative purposes are presented. Finally, some future research works involving extension or modification of the generalized model are suggested.     

On incentive structures of a socialist economy

This paper considers an incentive structure B_T as an alternative to the incentive structure B_D recently suggested by Domar. Both of these incentive structures induce managers in a planned economy to provide the socially desirable output level while allowing them to set prices. In two aspects B_T is better than B_D. First, B_D works only if demand is elastic at the optimal output level while B_T works whether demand is elastic or inelastic at that level. Second, even when demand is elastic at the optimal level, there are circumstances for which output converges to the optimal level faster under B_T than under B_D.     

Earnings quality: Some evidence on the role of auditor tenure and auditors’ industry expertise

Prior studies suggest that auditors with short tenure are associated with lower earnings quality because of the lack of client-specific knowledge and/or low balling. In this study, we examine whether industry specialization of auditors and low balling affect the association between auditor tenure and earnings quality. We find that the association between shorter auditor tenure and lower earnings quality is weaker for firms audited by industry specialists compared to non-specialists. In addition, we do not find results consistent with the low balling explanation.     

THE 2007–2008 U.S. RECESSION: WHAT DID THE REAL‐TIME GOOGLE TRENDS DATA TELL THE UNITED STATES?

In the extant literature of business cycle predictions, the signals for business cycle turning points are generally issued with a lag of at least 5 months. In this paper, we make use of a novel and timely indicator—the Google search volume data—to help to improve the timeliness of business cycle turning point identification. We identify multiple query terms to capture the real‐time public concern on the aggregate economy, the credit market, and the labor market condition. We incorporate the query indices in a Markov‐switching framework and successfully “nowcast” the peak date within a month that the turning occurred. (JEL E37, G17)     

Risk perception by industrial radiographers: Hungary and the UK compared

Perceptions of risks from two groups of industrial radiographers, one from Hungary, (n = 45) and from the United Kingdom, (n = 29) were compared by the psychometric method. The comparison was made because both groups were at risk for high doses of ionizing radiation. We found the groups had similar demographic profiles but poor socio-economic conditions of Hungarians were associated with higher levels of emotional distress. Correlation HU-UK for personal and general risks were at a significant level for topics that included lifestyle and radiation risks. Perceptions of risks from radiation were small except for large personal risk from East European nuclear power plants. Knowledge of radiation risk intranationally was correlated positively with personal risk for UK radiographers and negatively for Hungarians. However, average overall risk perceptions from the same topic list for all radiographers did not differ significantly from a group (n = 1461) of UK citizens, though radiographer's risks from radiation were considerably greater. As a new lifesaving intervention it was proposed that radiation risk reduction could be achieved by genetic testing.     

Regret theory and the banking firm: The optimal bank interest margin

This paper examines the optimal bank interest margin, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate of a bank, when the bank is not only risk-averse but also regret-averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that the presence of regret aversion raises or lowers the optimal bank interest margin than the one chosen by the purely risk-averse bank, depending on whether the probability of default is below or above a threshold value, respectively. Regret aversion as such makes the bank less prudent and more prone to risk-taking when the probability of default is high, thereby adversely affecting the stability of the banking system.