Do international shocks affect small wholesalers and retailers?

Previous research has suggested that the smallest firms are those most vulnerable to international competition, as measured by exchange rate fluctuations and import shares. However, that work—and the overwhelming bulk of the empirical literature on determinants of exit or firm survival—dealt entirely with the manufacturing sector of the economy. This paper analyzes annual US data for 1989–2005 for about 50 wholesale and retail sectors to explain small firm exit rates in several employment size categories. The main result is that wholesalers respond negatively to a stronger currency in a manner similar to that of manufacturers, while retailers are generally unaffected.     

An Examination of Entry and Competitive Performance in Rural Banking Markets

This article explores the change in the level of competition in rural banking markets after the deregulation that occurred following passage of the Riegle‐Neal Act of 1994. Using an empirical model that utilizes both the number of banks and the value of deposits in a cross‐section of 278 rural markets, we decompose the impact of the entry of new banks into resulting changes in per capita demand and the costs/profits of local banks in 1994 and 2004. The results support the view that local banking markets have become more competitive since the mid‐1990s.     

Focusing on white space to improve patient throughput

When designing a new patient care process or modifying an existing one, healthcare leaders should: Set specific goals for frontline staff, Move beyond gathering and discussing data to acting on the data, Issue data reports frequently, Prepare to take advantage of success, Do not expect a silver bullet.     

Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.     

Why Are U.S. Stocks More Volatile?

U.S. stocks are more volatile than stocks of similar foreign firms. A firm's stock return volatility can be higher for reasons that contribute positively (good volatility) or negatively (bad volatility) to shareholder wealth and economic growth. We find that the volatility of U.S. firms is higher mostly because of good volatility. Specifically, stock volatility is higher in the United States because it increases with investor protection, stock market development, new patents, and firm‐level investment in R&D. Each of these factors is related to better growth opportunities for firms and better ability to take advantage of these opportunities.