Patterns of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Decisions

This paper examines the pattern of settlements, investor wins and state wins in investor-state dispute settlement cases, focusing on the impact of arbitration rules, the resources and experience of the litigants, the type of treaty breach under investigation, and the pattern of state intervention. Logistic regression results show that settlements are more likely when investors do not disclose their allegations publicly, when the host state has been involved in a greater number of past cases, and when the respondent state has a higher control-of-corruption rating. Panel awards to investors are more likely in cases of alleged direct expropriation and less likely for indirect expropriation. Panel decisions favoring the state increase with higher per capita income and rule-of-law ratings.     

Back to Basics: Remittances in the Keynesian Macroeconomic Framework

This paper examines a remittance multiplier based on the short-run Keynesian equilibrium approach and shows how income may be affected by remittance inflows. We explore this through the equilibrium in the goods and money markets, where remittances can affect both consumption and the demand for real money balances. We present this simple theoretical model utilizing a standard Keynesian framework. The short-run Keynesian equilibrium approach provides insight into how remittances affect output and income, and its potential multiplier effects. The model used is indicative of a positive relationship between the marginal propensity to consume out of remittances and the multiplier. The framework also shows that remittances will have a greater impact if its marginal propensity to consume is greater than that for standard disposable income.     

Cuba,Trade Dependency and the GATT/WTO System

Cuba sought economic independence from the U.S. and its reliance on sugar exports after its 1959 revolution, but subsequently developed new dependency relationships. In the meantime, Cuba remained inside the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), despite conducting most of its trade outside it. This paper explores the political economy of Cuba’s participation in the GATT and later the World Trade Organization (WTO). Documents show that Cuba sought to use its participation to gain new markets and influence in the developing world. While Cuba has gained little economically from its participation, in recent years it has diversified its exports and trade partners, and its trade interests now align more closely with WTO rules. Economic reforms will be necessary in order for Cuba to benefit.