In Defense of Boards

It is often assumed that bad corporate performance means a bad CEO. The task of a board of directors is then simple: dismiss the executive. If it fails to do so, the board is said to be indolent. We take a kinder approach to observed board behavior and point to the problems even well-intended boards would encounter. They face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. We analyze the nature of the retention contract a board uses to discipline and screen executives. Consistent with empirical observation, we find that executives may become overly active to show their credentials, and that the link between bad performance and dismissal is weak.     

Die Grundannahmen der Gleichgewichtstheorie

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Exploring longitudinal risk‐return relationships

We study a longitudinal fit model of adaptation and its association with the longitudinal risk‐return relationship. The model allows the firm to adjust its position in response to partial learning about a changing environment characterized by two path‐dependent processes—a random walk and a stochastic trend. Computational simulations at low levels of learning in both environmental contexts are consistent with empirical data. However, the results are also consistent when firm behavior appears to be mindless in the form of a random walk. Hence, both imperfect learning and a mindless random walk can lead to the inverse longitudinal risk‐return relationships observed empirically. We discuss this apparent paradox and the possible resolution between mindless and conscious behavior as plausible causes of the longitudinal Bowman Paradox. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intergenerational redistribution and risk sharing with changing longevity

Trend increases in longevity are a global phenomenon challenging the fiscal sustainability of current welfare arrangements. Policy proposals abound and often build on implicit assertions concerning intergenerational equity. This paper offers a simple but manageable OLG model with endogenous retirement and cohort-specific longevity to address intergenerational redistribution and risk sharing. While it is well known that a utilitarian planner strives for consumption smoothing, it is shown that healthy ageing calls for work smoothing in the sense that retirement ages increase with longevity. Hence, cohorts with higher longevity should contribute to their larger consumption needs via later retirement, although it is shown that the planner still front-loads some financing (pre-saving). Stochastic longevity raises the issue of intergenerational risk sharing, which implies that cohorts turning out to have a high longevity are compensated at the expense of cohorts turning out to have a relatively short longevity.     

Earnings dynamics of men and women in Finland: permanent inequality versus earnings instability

I decompose the earnings variance of Finnish male and female workers into its permanent and transitory components using the approach of Baker (J Labor Econ,15:338–375, 1997) and Haider (J Labor Econ, 19:799–836, 2001) in the spirit of scientific replication. I find that the increasing earnings inequality of men and women is driven by both the transitory and permanent components of earnings. In addition, I find considerable differences in the earnings dynamics of men and women, that have been largely neglected in previous studies of earnings dynamics. The inequality among men is dominated by the permanent component. Conversely, permanent and transitory components are of comparable magnitudes to women. As a corollary, men experience more stable income paths but display larger permanent earnings differences. Women, on the other hand, face more unstable earnings profiles but show smaller permanent differences in earnings.     

Prices and Information Under Imperfect Competition

Imperfectly competitive product markets cannot be informationally efficient as private information has strategic implications interfering with price adjustment. This is illustrated in a duopoly model with sequential price setting where private information either leads to prices not being adjusted to all available information or to adjusted but biased prices.     

On myopia as rationale for social security

It has been argued that “paternalistically motivated forced savings constitutes an important, and to some the most important, rationale for social security retirement systems.” This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security in dynamically efficient economies. If the competing asset is linear storage and myopic agents are allowed to borrow against future pension benefits, there is no welfare-rationale for PAYG pensions. Sufficiently strong myopia may justify such pensions only if agents cannot borrow against their future pension, but then they are at a zero-saving corner. With enough myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the return to saving declines with saving, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.