The extent of corporate governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: The case of Egypt

This paper assesses the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure and the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance (CG) attributes (board composition, board size, CEO duality, director ownership, blockholder ownership and the existence of audit committee) on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. The measurement of disclosure is based on published data created from a checklist developed by the United Nations, which was gathered from a manual review of financial statements and websites of a sample of Egyptian companies listed on Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). Although the levels of CG disclosure are found to be minimal, disclosure is high for items that are mandatory under the Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs). The failure of companies to disclose such information clearly shows some ineffectiveness and inadequacy in the regulatory framework in Egypt. Moreover, the phenomenon of non-compliance may also be attributed to socio-economic factors in Egypt. Therefore, it is expected that Egyptian firms will take a long time to appraise the payback of increased CG disclosure. The findings indicate that that—ceteris paribus—the extent of CG disclosure is (1) lower for companies with duality in position and higher ownership concentration as measured by blockholder ownership; and (2) increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board and firm size. The results of the study support theoretical arguments that companies disclose corporate governance information in order to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs and to improve investor confidence in the reported accounting information. The empirical evidence from this study enhances the understanding of the corporate governance disclosure environment in Egypt as one of the emerging markets in the Middle East.     

The impact on the market for audit services of aggressive competition by auditors

Supporters of direct uninvited solicitation activities argue that clients can make more informed choices of auditors when auditors are allowed to solicit prospective clients. In banned markets, auditors are allowed to submit bids to provide audit services only when invited by the client. This study provides theoretical models that examine the efficiency of client–auditor alignments in the banned and allowed market. We identify conditions under which realignment differences between the two markets occur and derive client losses in the banned market as compared to the allowed market. We also identify conditions under which independence may be impaired in the allowed market, consistent with the claims of solicitation opponents. However, we believe that, in view of the potential positive effects related to audit pricing and client–auditor alignment, restrictions on advertising or direct uninvited solicitation are not necessarily indicated. Instead, regulators or market mechanisms should insure that the independence (truth-telling) condition is so readily satisfied as to be virtually irrelevant. This can happen in one of two ways: (a) increased scrutiny, leading to an increased likelihood of discovery, or (b) increased penalties when an audit failure is discovered, leading to increased costs of an audit failure, or both.     

Automation, speed, and stock market quality: The NYSE's Hybrid

Automation and trading speed are increasingly important aspects of competition among financial markets. Yet we know little about how changing a market's automation and speed affects the cost of immediacy and price discovery, two key dimensions of market quality. At the end of 2006 the New York Stock Exchange introduced its Hybrid Market, increasing automation and reducing the execution time for market orders from 10 seconds to less than one second. We find that the change raises the cost of immediacy (bid-ask spreads) because of increased adverse selection and reduces the noise in prices, making prices more efficient.     

Two-Stage Acquisitions, Free-Riding, and Corporate Control

This study examines two-stage acquisitions, focusing upon first- and second-stage excess returns for both acquired and acquiring firms, and analyzing the relation between acquisition returns and ownership interest. The evidence suggests that target firm shareholders do not free-ride. Evidence is also provided indicating that premiums are paid by the majority holder to acquire a remaining minority interest.     

New development: New global health care PPP developments—a critique of the success story

Health care public–private partnerships (PPPs), where clinical services as well as infrastructure are delivered by the private sector, are coming under the spotlight as governments seek to achieve value for money in health budgets. Existing examples have been widely reported as successful. However, this article urges caution as a closer look at the evidence shows that handing over control of service delivery to the private sector is difficult to monitor and evaluate, carries cost implications which remain largely unquantified and can create additional risk.     

The Relation Between Investor Uncertainty and Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements: Evidence from the Property‐Casualty Insurance Industry in the USA

Abstract:   This paper investigates the relationship between investor uncertainty, gauged by properties of analysts' forecasts, and the stock market response to earnings. We find that uncertainty is best characterized by a comprehensive measure recently proposed by Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998) , BKLS. The BKLS measure is related to uncertainty‐inducing events, as well as factors that affect the difficulty faced by analysts in forecasting earnings. We conclude that, first, pre‐disclosure uncertainty is a significant determinant of the price reaction to the earnings release, and second, BKLS is a more comprehensive measure of uncertainty than simple dispersion.