Delegation,Skill Acquisition and Turnover Costs

The delegation of tasks to a subordinate and his access to key firm resources allow an organization to make optimal use of his knowledge and ability, but at the same time, thanks to on‐the‐job learning and the possibility of expropriation of these resources, this might increase the agent’s outside options. We model these risks as an increase in the quit propensity of the agent which determines higher turnover costs for the firm. The choice of the degree of delegation a principal offers to her subordinate is analyzed taking into account its benefits and costs. We show that the level of delegation is influenced by the principal’s and the agent’s abilities, but it is lower the higher turnover costs are and the lower the degree of specificity of human capital is or the higher the degree of expropriability of resources is. Finally, bureaucratic rules establishing the documentation of the agent’s activity are seen as a device to reduce turnover costs and to allow more delegation.     

Evaluation and comparison of European countries: public opinion on services

We propose the setting-up of an indicator for classifying European countries with relation to consumers’ satisfaction for services of general interest. Services considered are fixed telephone service, electricity supply, railways and postal service. The reference data set is the 2002 Standard Eurobarometer database (EB58) and it refers to EU members before 2004 enlargement. The proposed indicator is based on nonlinear principal component analysis and supplies a measure for the citizen’s satisfaction. Its robustness is verified by a Monte Carlo approach to examine the stability of nonlinear PCA results and to compute Bootstrap C.I.s of average country scores. The level of satisfaction is eventually used for country comparison and for detecting possible hotspots, which might be useful when addressing decision making policies.     

Candidates’ Education and Turnout: Evidence from Italian Municipal Elections

We analyze the impact that the educational level of candidates running for the position of mayor has on electoral turnout by using a large dataset for Italian municipal elections held between 1993 and 2011. We firstly estimate a municipality fixed effects model and show that the median education of candidates standing in an election is positively correlated with turnout. To handle endogeneity issues arising from the unobservable time variant features of electoral races, we build on the literature which shows that politicians’ educational level is positively affected by their wage and apply a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design on the basis of the fact that the wages of mayors in Italy increase non‐monotonically at different thresholds. Results show that an exogenous increase in the median educational level of candidates, induced by a higher wage, leads to an increase in turnout of about 1 percentage point.     

Challenges to open innovation in traditional SMEs: an analysis of pre-competitive projects in university-industry-government collaboration

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - Governments are increasingly focusing their efforts on stimulating innovation within small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). As a result,...     

Inter-firm knowledge diffusion, market power, and welfare

We propose an infinite-horizon quantity-setting differential game with learning spillovers and organizational forgetting to analyze the optimal management decisions affecting the evolution of the stock of know-how, and, in turn, the dynamics of productive efficiency. Specifically, we study the long run impact of inter-firm knowledge diffusion on market power, i.e. the ability of a firm to raise the price above the marginal cost, and welfare. We consider two types of processes through which knowledge is acquired: (i) passive learning, or learning-by-doing, where managers do not actively invest in information and (ii) active learning, or learning-by-investing, where managers acquire new and additional information through specific investments in human capital. We show that: under (i), knowledge diffusion reduces market power; under (ii), knowledge diffusion reduces market power as long as learning spillovers are sufficiently important. From a welfare viewpoint, we also show that: under (i), knowledge diffusion is always welfare-enhancing; under (ii), weak spillovers are required in order for knowledge diffusion to be welfare-enhancing.     

Remittances,financial development,and growth

Despite the increasing importance of remittances in total international capital flows, the relationship between remittances and growth has not been adequately studied. This paper studies one of the links between remittances and growth, in particular how local financial sector development influences a country's capacity to take advantage of remittances. Using a newly-constructed dataset for remittances covering about 100 developing countries, we find that remittances boost growth in countries with less developed financial systems by providing an alternative way to finance investment and helping overcome liquidity constraints. This finding controls for the endogeneity of remittances and financial development, does not depend on the particular measure of financial sector development used, and is robust to a number of robustness tests, including threshold estimation. We also provide evidence that there could be an investment channel trough which remittances can promote growth especially when the financial sector does not meet the credit needs of the population.