The indirect effects of foreign direct investment on trade: A network perspective

The relationship between international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the main features of globalisation. In this paper, we investigate the effects of FDI on trade from a network perspective, since FDI takes not only direct but also indirect channels from origin to destination countries because of firms’ incentive to reduce tax burden, to minimise coordination costs and to break barriers to market entry. We use a unique data set of international corporate control as a measure of stock FDI to construct a corporate control network (CCN), where the nodes are the countries and the edges are the corporate control relationships. Network measures, as the shortest path length and the communicability, are then computed on the CCN to capture the indirect channel of FDI. Empirically, we find that corporate control has a positive effect on trade both directly and indirectly. The result is robust with different specifications and estimation strategies. Hence, our paper provides strong empirical evidence of the indirect effects of FDI on trade. Moreover, we identify a number of interplaying factors such as regional trade agreements and the region of Asia. We also find that the indirect effects are more pronounced for the manufacturing sector than for primary sectors such as oil extraction and agriculture.     

When Blame-Giving Crisis Communications are Persuasive: A Dual-Influence Model and Its Boundary Conditions

Journal of Business Ethics - Companies faced with a crisis sometimes blame others in their communications, when they feel that responsibility for the negative event lies elsewhere. Research has...     

Shortfall aversion

Shortfall aversion reflects the higher utility loss of spending cuts from a reference than the utility gain from similar spending increases. Inspired by Prospect Theory's loss aversion and the peak‐end rule, this paper posits a model of utility from spending scaled by past peak spending. In contrast to traditional models, which call for spending rates proportional to wealth, the optimal policy in this model implies a constant spending rate equal to the historical peak when wealth is relatively large. The spending rate increases when wealth reaches a model‐determined multiple of peak spending. In 1926–2015, shortfall‐averse spending is smooth and typically increasing.     

Who should sell stocks?

Never selling stocks is optimal for investors with a long horizon and a realistic range of preference and market parameters, if relative risk aversion, investment opportunities, proportional transaction costs, and dividend yields are constant. Such investors should buy stocks when their portfolio weight is too low and otherwise hold them, letting dividends rebalance to cash over time rather than selling. With capital gains taxes, this policy outperforms both static buy‐and‐hold and dynamic rebalancing strategies that account for transaction costs. Selling stocks becomes optimal if either their target weight is low or intermediate consumption is substantial.     

Identity Bias in Negative Word of Mouth Following Irresponsible Corporate Behavior: A Research Model and Moderating Effects

Current research has documented how cases of irresponsible corporate behavior generate negative reactions from consumers and other stakeholders. Existing research, however, has not examined empirically whether the characteristics of the victims of corporate malfeasance contribute to shaping individual reactions. This study examines, through four experimental surveys, the role played by the national identity of the people affected on consumers’ intentions to spread negative word of mouth (WOM). It is shown that national identity influences individual reactions indirectly; mediated by perceived similarity and sympathy. Consumers perceive foreign victims as different from the self and this reduces the sympathy experienced towards them. Sympathy is an emotion that shapes consumer reactions and regulates WOM. The study identifies two moderating processes of this effect. Individuals who score high on collective narcissism are most likely to be strongly biased against foreign victims. In-group bias is also moderated by the perceived severity of the crisis. When a case is perceived as very serious, perceived similarity plays a less important role in generating sympathy because consumers focus on the perceived suffering of the victims. Hence, in-group bias is stronger in cases perceived as having minor consequences. The paper contributes to the literature on corporate social irresponsibility and offers implications for both scholars and managers.     

Financial Literacy: The Role of the Local Context

In this article, we investigate the role of local factors associated with the financial literacy of Italian adults (no. 945). Using a multilevel regression model, together with the common socioeconomic and sociodemographic variables already used in previous studies, we also add certain environmental variables at the local level. We separately analyze the three indexes that define the OECD financial literacy index—Financial Attitude Index (FAI), Financial Knowledge Index (FKI), and Financial Behavior Index (FBI)—because they show a dynamic of their own in each region. Our findings confirm that the FKI and the FAI are associated to some extent with environmental traits, while the FBI is not. We conclude that not only the sociodemographic and socioeconomic conditions of individuals but also certain features of the regional context where they live have an impact on their financial literacy. Consequences for financial education programs are highlighted.     

How the sender’s positioning and the target’s CSR record influence the effectiveness of scapegoating crisis communications

Past research on scapegoating argues that this crisis communication strategy is often ineffective because it can be perceived as an unfair attempt at shifting blame. In contrast, a few studies have shown that scapegoating can be effective by increasing the perceived ethicality of the sender relative to the target that is presented as responsible for wrongdoing. Reconciling these inconsistent findings, we show that the relative effectiveness of scapegoating depends on the perceptions of the sender and of the target. Our findings show that both the positioning of the sender as an underdog or a top dog and the positive or negative CSR record of the target contribute to explaining the effectiveness of scapegoating. Following a crisis, scapegoating appears to be most effective when the sender is an underdog and the target has a negative CSR record. The effectiveness of scapegoating for an underdog is however reduced when the target has a positive CSR record. At the opposite end, scapegoating might backfire when the sender is a top dog that attacks a target with a positive CSR record. Finally, when a top dog attacks a target with a negative CSR record, scapegoating reduces negative word of mouth even though this effect does not appear to be mediated by perceived ethicality. The study contributes to research on scapegoating communications and on the consequences of an underdog positioning and a positive CSR record for companies trying to manage the negative fallout from an ethical crisis.

     

“Just Look the Other Way”: Job Seekers’ Reactions to the Irresponsibility of Market-Dominant Employers

Journal of Business Ethics - Past research on recruitment has shown that employer image predicts job seekers’ perceptions of organizational attractiveness. We contribute to this body of work...     

Strategic Interactions and Contagion Effects under Monetary Unions

This paper applies game theory and a cost‐benefit analysis to study voluntary exits and contagion effects in countries joined to a monetary union. The paper looks at two non‐core or periphery countries of a large union and examines the role of structural asymmetries and strategic interactions as determinants of equilibrium outcomes, following both country‐specific and common shocks. The paper finds that under almost symmetry between countries, country‐specific shocks are never associated with multiple equilibria and, if large enough, can spread to other countries leading to contagion. By contrast, common shocks are seen to sustain multiple equilibria if almost‐symmetric countries are considered and to have implications similar to those found in the country‐specific case if large structural asymmetries are admitted.