The Effects of CEO Founder Status and Stock Ownership on Entrepreneurial Orientation in Small Firms

This paper studies how governance drives entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in small firms. We argue that founder status and ownership create powerful personal incentives for small firm CEOs to engage in behaviors that influence EO. Integrating stewardship theory and the principal‐principal branch of agency theory, we test our hypotheses on a sample of 339 Swedish firms, and find that CEO founder status is significantly and positively associated with EO, while CEO stock ownership significantly but negatively predicts EO. We additionally test two boundary conditions that show that the founder‐CEO's prior managerial experience in start‐up firms positively moderates the founder‐EO relationship, while contrary to expectations, CEO ownership diversification has no effect on the negative association between ownership and EO. Thus, our study adopts a corporate governance perspective to explain how variations in EO across small firms are driven by the goals and motivations of its leader. Our research also shows that in small, private firms the balance of power is tipped in favor of the CEO rather than the board of directors. Finally, we underline the importance of adopting alternative theoretical lens like stewardship and principal‐principal agency, given that traditional principal‐agent problems are largely mitigated in the small firm context.     

Disclosure timing: Determinants of quarterly earnings release dates

Existing research on discretionary disclosures provides valuable insights on the potentials causes and consequences of alternative forms of disclosure. However, relatively little is known about how managers choose to time the release of financial information. This paper focuses on the quarterly earnings release dates and investigates why some choose to release earnings information relatively early, compared to others. The results indicate that the reporting lag (days between fiscal period end and quarterly earnings release date) is shorter for firms facing greater demand for information from investors and greater litigation costs. The reporting lag, however, is longer for firms with greater block ownership and those whose operations are somewhat more complex.     

MODELING EQUILIBRIUM REGIONAL INTEGRATION BY ENDOGENISING MARGINAL COST IN THE COURNOT FRAMEWORK

This paper examines the formation of endogenous alliances between local firms and multinational enterprises (MNE), which in turn drives regional integration in the global economy. The proposed model is an extension of the Cournot duopoly with linear demand, in which the cost function is predicated on the size of local alliance that can be interpreted as the scale of operation. The paper also makes a departure by assuming managers are not only motivated by profits, but also by the scale of operation or "empire building". Forward-looking MNEs strategize their current alliance formation activities from whence we derive a Nash equilibrium configuration of regional integration. We demonstrate that the equilibrium can be beset with multiplicity, indeterminacy, fragility, and chaotic regimes.     

Capital Accumulation and Convergence in a Small Open Economy

Outward‐oriented economies seem to grow faster than inward‐looking ones. Does the literature on convergence have anything to say on this? In the dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model, with factor‐price equalization, there is no convergence of incomes. This is because with identical preferences and return to capital, irrespective of initial levels, the growth rates of consumption are the same. In the specific factors' model, there is factor‐price equalization in the long run, but incomes depend on endowments of non‐accumulable factors. Different specifications for the intersectorally mobile factors have different implications for development (as well as convergence).     

How do auditors view managers’ voluntary disclosure strategy? The effect of earnings guidance on audit fees

The objective of this study is to examine the relation between attributes of earnings forecasts issued by managers and audit fees. Although there is an extensive literature on managers’ disclosure of earnings forecasts, there is a paucity of research on how auditors incorporate information from these voluntary disclosures. We find that the issuance of an annual or quarterly management earnings forecast in the prior period is positively associated with the current period audit fees. Our results indicate that on average, audit fees are higher by about 7% for firm-years associated with an annual forecast. Among the firms that issue earnings forecasts, we find no association between audit fees and likelihood of updating a previously issued earnings forecast, indicating that auditors do not view such behavior negatively. Further, we find audit fees to be positively associated with the error and the bias (or optimism) in the forecasts for annual forecasts but not for quarterly forecasts. Overall, these results suggest that management’s forecast behavior captures higher business risk for the auditor via greater risk of earnings management or litigation risk.     

Using residual income to refine the relationship between earnings growth and stock returns

We use residual income (RI) to decompose earnings growth into growth in RI, growth in invested capital and other components and use this decomposition to explain stock returns. Our approach provides a significant increase in explanatory power vis-à-vis a regression of returns on levels and changes in earnings. While the market values growth in RI more than growth in invested capital, it still undervalues growth in RI and overvalues growth in invested capital. Earnings growth from growth in RI is more persistent, while earnings growth from growth in invested capital is more likely to reverse. Future returns are positively associated with growth in RI and negatively associated with growth in invested capital. A trading rule based on these findings generates significant hedge returns that persist after controlling for known risk factors. Hence, RI, a measure long recommended by accountants, allows investors to differentiate and evaluate different sources of earnings growth.     

A semi-reduced form equation for the Sterling's real effective exchange rate

This paper derives and estimates a semi-reduced form expression for the UK's real effective exchange rate. The expression was derived following Blanchard and Kahn. Non-linear least squares and non-linear instrumental variables were used in estimation.     

Managerial utility-maximizing operating decisions under compound demand risk

This paper examines the demand and cost conditions under which utility maximizing pricing-risk and advertising-risk relationships are determinate. The structure of the firm's demand uncertainty captures both uncertain customer arrivals and uncertain individual customer demand. In addition to standard demand restrictions and constant marginal cost, determinate results depend upon the degree of managerial risk-aversion, the correlation between individual demand and customer arrival disturbances, the firm's cost fixity, and bounded product differentiation effects of advertising. The symmetry between price-cuts and advertising as demand-increasing costs is extensively examined; firm equilibrium requires that price-cuts not be an inferior input for increasing demand.     

Tax evasion and intertemporal choice

It has often been argued that the misreporting of regular wage income is limited by third-party withholding and reporting requirements. However, income arising from savings investment is often not subject to such withholding requirements. This paper uses a simple dynamic model to examine the problem of tax evasion of investment income. Assuming that individuals can misreport investment income but not wage income, it is shown that alterations in the audit rate and penalty rates affect an individual's saving (or investment) decisions. This suggests that parameters traditionally used to control tax evasion impact the aggregate output of an economy and the rate of economic growth. This paper is based on the author's dissertation completed at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The author is indebted to the dissertation committee, Helmuth Cremer (co-chair), Firouz Gahvari (co-chair), Catherine Eckel, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, and Richard Steinberg for their guidance and suggestions. All remaining errors are the author's responsibility.