Pricing Weather Derivatives Using the Indifference Pricing Approach

Abstract

This paper adopts an incomplete market pricing model–the indifference pricing approach–to analyze valuation of weather derivatives and the viability of the weather derivatives market in a hedging context. It incorporates price risk, weather/quantity risk, and other risks in the financial market. In a mean-variance framework, the relationship between the actuarial price and the indifference price of weather derivatives is analyzed, and conditions are obtained concerning when the actuarial price does not provide an appropriate valuation for weather derivatives. Conditions for the viability of the weather derivatives market are examined. This paper also analyzes the effects of partial hedging, natural hedges, basis risk, quantity risk, and price risk on investors’ indifference prices by examining the distributional impacts of the stochastic variables involved.     

A Spatial Cross-Sectional Credibility Model with Dependence Among Risks

A Bühlmann-Straub type credibility model with dependence structure among risk parameters and conditional spatial cross-sectional dependence is studied. Predictors of future losses for the model under both types of dependence are derived by minimizing the expected quadratic loss function, and nonparametric estimators of structural parameters are considered in the spatial statistics context. Predictions and estimations made for the proposed model are examined and compared to other models in an application with crop insurance data and in a simulation study.     

A model of flops

A firm surveys a large number of consumers, some of whom sincerely report their tastes and others of whom report strategically. It makes product decisions using the sample mean of survey responses. When firms and consumers agree on the fraction of sincere consumers, information loss is severe, and many products are flops as they poorly match consumer tastes. When beliefs differ, however, equilibrium is in linear strategies, and information aggregates. Despite this, flops still arise. A firm, however, can solve the flops problem by limiting the effect of strategic consumers. Binary surveys offer one such solution.     

Is There a Difference Between Solicited and Unsolicited Bank Ratings and, If So, Why?

This paper analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the actual outcome of bank ratings. Using two sample banks (one rated by Fitch and one rated by S&P), I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observable bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information and are therefore dependent on the quantity of public information disclosed by the banks. As a result, unsolicited ratings tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information. While the latter result is also consistent with the fact that credit rating agencies may blackmail low-disclosure firms, the findings suggest that blackmailing—if it is actually used—is ineffective in making these firms start to pay for a rating.     

‘Essential’ Patents,FRAND Royalties and Technological Standards

Standard Setting Organizations have developed FRAND agreements in order to prevent firms from holding up other participants once a standard is created. We analyze here the consequences of such agreements—in particular the requirements of fairness and non-discrimination—for the creation of technological standards that require the participation of existing patent holders. We abandon the usual assumption that patents bring known benefits to the industry or that their benefits are known to all parties. When royalty payments are increasing in one's patent portfolio, as is implicitly the case in FRAND agreements, private information about the quality of patents leads to a variety of distortions, in particular the incentives of firms to ‘pad’ by contributing patents that are ‘inessential’ for the given standard, a phenomenon that seems to be widespread. Several results emerge from the analysis: (i) the number of inessential patents co-varies positively with the number of essential patents; (ii) there is over-investment relative to the second-best, that is when padding cannot be avoided and (iii) the threat of disputes reduces incentives to pad but at the cost of lower production of strong patents; (iv) mitigating this undesirable side-effect calls for a simultaneous increase in the cost of padding, through a better filtering of patent applications.     

Demand for Crop Insurance in Developing Countries: New Evidence from India

Determining farmers’ real demand for crop insurance is difficult, especially in developing countries, where there is a lack of formal financial sector integration and a high reliance on informal risk mitigation options. We provide some new estimates of farmers’ willingness‐to‐pay for insurance in the context of a large‐scale subsidised programme in India. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with agricultural households across four states in India, enabling us to estimate preferences for specific insurance policy attributes such as coverage period, method of loss assessment, timing of indemnity payments and the cost of insurance. Our results suggest that farmers do value crop insurance under certain conditions and some are willing to pay a premium for such coverage in excess of the subsidised rates they are currently required to pay under this programme. In particular, farmers value the assurances that they will receive timely payouts when they incur losses, and may not have a strong preference for the method with which losses are assessed. On the other hand, farmers are quite sensitive to coverage periods. Our baseline assessment shows that when optimised to farmer requirements, there can be a sizeable demand for crop insurance by developing country farmers.     

A cross-category investigation into the effects of nine-ending pricing on brand choice

Retailers largely adopt nine-ending prices and these prices have attracted greater attention from researchers in marketing. Despite this increased interest, very few empirical studies have tried to quantify the effects of nine-ending prices on consumer actual behaviors. Those who have studied the behavioral effects of nine-ending prices have produced mixed findings. In this article, we investigated the cross-category effects of nine-ending pricing on consumer brand choice at the SKU level. We distinguished between different types of nine-ending while controlling for the rounded prices and other marketing-mix variables. We conducted our analysis on over 11,000 SKUs in 102 product categories of two (2) grocery retailers. We find that the effects of 99 ending prices on the SKU's category choice are larger in concentrated and promotional categories but smaller in expensive categories. However, their influence on purchase quantity is larger in expensive categories but smaller in concentrated categories.