What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

Using HMDA Data as a Regulatory Screen for Fair Lending Compliance

This paper describes and evaluates the Federal Reserve System's recently developed program designed to use HMDA data as a screening device for fair lending enforcement. The program is designed to identify institutions showing potentially discriminatory patterns in their treatment of minority mortgage applicants vis-a`-vis nonminority applicants. The program also selects specific loan files to pull for additional information in cases where a more comprehensive evaluation might be appropriate. This paper discusses the motivation behind the adoption of the program and its innovative matched-pair method and assesses its value and potential shortcomings.     

The conceptual understanding of scientific principles in Home Economics

This paper stresses the importance of scientific understanding as part of Home Economics courses and describes how personal misconceptions can interfere with this understanding. It examines the misconceptions held by third level undergraduate students of a basic scientific principle used in the cooking of food, that of boiling, and compares these misconceptions with those of second level pupils commencing their formal education in science. Little difference is reported between the two groups in terms of the misconceptions held. The effectiveness of a teaching methodology based on a constructivist view of knowledge, that of cognitive conflict, in changing misconceptions is reported.     

Moral fictions and scientific management

This paper examines Alasdair MacIntyre's argument in After Virtue that corporate managers do not have the rational expertise in social control which they have used to justify their position in modern society. In particular, it is claimed that managerial science by taking an emotivist view, putting ends and values beyond the reach of sound rational judgment, has made human relationships matters of manipulation and undermined its own moral legitimacy. The question is advanced as to whether managers must operate from emotivist premises or whether they can truly understand and thus truly manage human affairs by rational reflection about human purpose, value, and intention. Paul C. Santilli is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y. His previous publication is: The Informative and Persuasive Functions of Advertising: A Moral Appraisal, Journal of Business Ethics 2 (1983), 27–33.Paper presented at the 16th Conference on Value Inquiry, entitled: Ethics and the Market Place: An Exercise in Bridge-Building or On the Slopes of the Interface.     

Money creation and economic activity

Summary In the Netherlands not much attention is paid to money supply figures as an indicator of actual monetary conditions. This can be partly explained by the publication lag and the continuous revisions of seasonally adjusted data. However, the information that can be derived from money supply figures is limited because of temporary disturbances originating from the foreign exchange market. In this paper a correction method for these temporary disturbances is proposed. Money supply figures show a much closer link to real economic activity when corrected in this way.A different version of this essay with less emphasis on Holland but more information about other West-European countries has been published as chapter II Watching the money supply in: Eduard J. Bomhoff,Monetary Uncertainty, Amsterdam and New York, 1983. We gratefully acknowledge the able research assistance of Isolde B. Woittiez and Geert Rouwenhorst; Kempen and Co. kindly provided the two figures.     

Realizing the Potential of Real Options: Does Theory Meet Practice?

The idea of viewing corporate investment opportunities as “real options” has been around for over 25 years. Real options concepts and techniques now routinely appear in academic research in finance and economics, and have begun to influence scholarly work in virtually every business discipline, including strategy, organizations, management science, operations management, information systems, accounting, and marketing. Real options concepts have also made considerable headway in practice. Corporate managers are more likely to recognize options in their strategic planning process, and have become more proactive in designing flexibility into projects and contracts, frequently using real options vocabulary in their discussions. Thanks in part to the spread of real options thinking, today's strategic planners are more likely than their predecessors to recognize the “option” value of actions like the following: ? dividing up large projects into a number of stages; ? investing in the acquisition or production of information; ? introducing “modularity” in manufacturing and design; ? developing competing prototypes for new products; and ? investing in overseas markets. But if real options has clearly succeeded as a way of thinking, the application of real options valuation methods has been limited to companies in relatively few industries and has thus failed to live up to expectations created in the mid‐ to late‐1990s. Increased corporate acceptance and implementations of real options valuation techniques will require several changes coming together. On the theory side, we need more realistic models that better reflect differences between financial and real options, simple heuristic methods that can be more easily implemented (but that have been carefully benchmarked against more precise models), and better guidance on implementation issues such as the estimation of discount rates for the “optionless” underlying projects. On the practitioner side, we need user‐friendly real options software, more senior‐level buy‐in, more deliberate diffusion of real options knowledge throughout organizations, better alignment of managerial incentives with long‐term shareholder value, and better‐designed contracts to correct the misalignment of incentives across the value chain. If these challenges can be met, there will continue to be a steady if gradual diffusion of real options analysis throughout organizations over the next few decades, with real options eventually becoming not only a standard part of corporate strategic planning, but also the primary valuation tool for assessing the expected shareholder effect of large capital investment projects.     

Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure

In this article we investigate the impact of the Enron audit failure on auditor reputation. Specifically, we examine Arthur Andersen's clients' stock market impact surrounding various dates on which Andersen's audit procedures and independence were under severe scrutiny. On the three days following Andersen's admission that a significant number of documents had been shredded, we find that Andersen's other clients experienced a statistically negative market reaction, suggesting that investors downgraded the quality of the audits performed by Andersen. We also find that audits performed by Andersen's Houston office suffered a more severe decline in abnormal returns on this date. We are not able to show that Andersen's independence was questioned by the amount of non–audit fees charged to its clients.     

Forbearance: An empirical analysis

Several recent articles have analyzed conditions under which allowing capital-deficient banks to continue to operate may be optimal policy. This article examines the performance of banks admitted into the FDIC's Capital Forbearance Program between 1986 and 1989 and finds that, for the majority of these banks, there was no substantial improvement in their capital ratios. We use a logit regression analysis to attempt to identify those banks whose financial condition improved with forbearance and find that banks which did improve are not clearly identifiable from pre-forbearance financial data. Instead, the banks which improved did so due to infusions of new capital, extraordinary income, and improvements in the local economies, factors which are not easily identifiable ex ante by regulators. The conclusion is that, while some grants of forbearance may result in large saving to the FDIC, in the majority of cases granting forbearance to troubled banks is unlikely to reduce the expected loss to the deposit insurer.University of HoustonUniversity of HoustonCooperative Bank of Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan     

Bounds for Functions of Dependent Risks

The problem of finding the best-possible lower bound on the distribution of a non-decreasing function of n dependent risks is solved when n=2 and a lower bound on the copula of the portfolio is provided. The problem gets much more complicated in arbitrary dimensions. When no information on the structure of dependence of the random vector is available, we provide a bound on the distribution function of the sum of risks which we prove to be better than the one generally used in the literature.