The Ethical Dimension of Managerial Leadership Two Illustrative Case Studies in TQM

In recent decades, Total Quality Management (TQM) has become an important phenomenon in the world of business, but the implications and scope of quality programs are quite different everywhere. Since different explanations have been given, most authors agree that management commitment and leadership are indispensable elements for a successful TQM implementation. Nevertheless, the study of the literature reflects a terminological confusion on this point. The authors of this paper argue that commitment and leadership are not synonymous terms.While committed managers may lead the process of quality using exclusively their formal authority, those who are leaders generate a kind of influence that goes further than that. This paper suggests a multidimensional perception of leadership and upholds that only by considering the ethical dimension of leadership, together with technical and psycho-emotive ones, it is possible to explain more accurately interpersonal influences beyond the scope of power. As an illustrative example of the importance of considering each dimensions, the authors present two case studies of TQM implementation.     

反向基金的非反向操作

尽管名字叫反向基金,但威尔·达诺夫掌管的这家560多亿美元的巨型基金并没有严格地进行反向操作。事实上,投资于正确的管理者造就了这只基金的辉煌     

Innovation,endogenous overinvestment,and incentive pay

We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm. Finally, managers of more risky and less profitable divisions should obtain steeper incentives to facilitate efficient investment decisions.     

Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection*

Rochet (1991) showed that with distortionary income taxes, social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re‐examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational assumptions. Individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident (or ill health). Social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance, but private insurance markets are affected by both adverse selection and moral hazard. We study how equity and efficiency considerations should be traded off in choosing the optimal coverage of social insurance when those features are introduced. The case for social insurance is strongest when the government is well informed about household productivity.     

Multifactor and analytical valuation of treasury bond futures with an embedded quality option

A closed‐form pricing solution is proposed for the quality option embedded in Treasury bond futures contracts, under a multifactor and D. Heath, R. Jarrow, and A. Morton (1992) Gaussian framework. Such an analytical solution can be obtained through a conditioning approximation, in the sense of M. Curran (1994) and L. Rogers and Z. Shi (1995), or via a rank 1 approximation, following A. Brace and M. Musiela (1994). Monte Carlo simulations show that both approximations are extremely accurate and easy to calculate. Application of the proposed pricing model to the EUREX market from January 2000 through May 2004, yields an excellent fit and an insignificant estimate of the quality option magnitude. On average, this delivery option accounts for only of the futures prices. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 27:275–303, 2007     

How groups learn,continuously

This article examines how groups learn, conditions that affect learning, and interventions to improve the learning process. Adaptive group learning is reacting almost automatically to stimuli to make minor changes in process and outcome. Generative group learning is proactive learning for mastery. Transformative group learning is reconstructing meaning and fundamentally changing the way the group operates. Pressures and opportunities in the environment and group readiness stimulate and support these different types of learning. Group leaders, members, and human resource professionals who facilitate, coach, and provide resources for development can apply this knowledge to diagnose group conditions and encourage continuous learning. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations

Previous literature has shown that demand fluctuations affect the scope for tacit collusion. I study whether discount factor fluctuations can have similar effects. I find that collusion depends not only on the level of the discount factor but also, and more surprisingly, on its volatility. Collusive prices and profits increase with a higher discount factor level, but decrease with its volatility. These results have important implications for empirical studies of collusive pricing, the role that collusive pricing may play in economic cycles and the study of cooperation in repeated games.     

Banking Relationships: Effects on Debt Terms for Small Spanish Firms*

This paper analyzes the effect of banking relationships on interest rates and the probability that guarantees must be provided in a sample of small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). The results indicate that SMEs that work with fewer banks obtain debt at a lower cost. This seems to suggest that concentrated banking relationships reduce the uncertainty of lending to risky firms, which translates into lower interest rates. Reduction in risk could come from greater flexibility in negotiations, increased control over the investment, and mitigation of the free‐rider problem. When the relationship is exclusive, which would represent the maximum concentration, a bank can take advantage of its monopoly position and require more guarantees from a firm. SMEs that have longer‐term relationships with their bank are more likely to be required to provide guarantees. This result seems to suggest that SMEs involved in longer‐term relationships are subject to the information monopoly of the lender.     

Indonesia's Trade and Price Interventions: Pro-Java and Pro-Urban

In 1987 and 1995 Indonesia's price and trade policies (intervention regime) increased the income of Java's urban centres and reduced that of people living in rural Java and the other islands. This happened because the regime protected manufacturing activities, most of them located in Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya, and taxed primary sector based activities, located outside urban Java. It protected some primary sector based activities directly, but the entire intervention regime, with manufacturing protection included, taxed them. As a result, regions deriving income from primary sector based activities lost. Indonesia's intervention regime is regressive: it transfers income from poorer to richer regions. This regime and its effects on regional incomes continue. Governments have designed programs to raise the income of Eastern Indonesia, but have omitted the most effective instrument: opening the economy to international competition. A serious attempt to reduce regional income disparities should begin by eliminating barriers to international trade.