Modelling CSR: How Managers Understand the Responsibilities of Business Towards Society

The purpose of this article is to develop a model of how managers perceive the responsibilities of business towards society. The article is based on the survey responses of more than 1,000 managers in eight large international firms. It is concluded that the managerial perceptions of societal responsibilities differ in some respects from the mainstream models found in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) and business ethics literature. The article is an output of RESPONSE: an EU- and corporate-funded research project on managerial perceptions of CSR.     

Continuous‐time models,realized volatilities,and testable distributional implications for daily stock returns

We provide an empirical framework for assessing the distributional properties of daily speculative returns within the context of the continuous‐time jump diffusion models traditionally used in asset pricing finance. Our approach builds directly on recently developed realized variation measures and non‐parametric jump detection statistics constructed from high‐frequency intra‐day data. A sequence of simple‐to‐implement moment‐based tests involving various transformations of the daily returns speak directly to the importance of different distributional features, and may serve as useful diagnostic tools in the specification of empirically more realistic continuous‐time asset pricing models. On applying the tests to the 30 individual stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index, we find that it is important to allow for both time‐varying diffusive volatility, jumps, and leverage effects to satisfactorily describe the daily stock price dynamics. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Median‐voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation*

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median‐voter model where agents differ in wealth. Taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump‐sum transfers. Voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare. We characterize time‐consistent Markov‐perfect equilibria twofold. First, restricting utility classes, we show that the economy's aggregate state is mean and median wealth. Second, we derive the median‐voter's first‐order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers. Our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state.     

以价值为基础的维修管理——用OEE作为关键性能指标

介绍挪威工业界使用OEE作为考核设备效率的关键性能指标,以及实际使用OEE指标的4个层次生产损失的模式和15个生产损失要素。     

The Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities in Federal Systems: The Political Economy of NIMBY

This paper offers a new political economy explanation for thepervasive problem of siting hazardous waste treatment facilitiesin federal system. We first show that a decentralized systemyields the first-best waste treatment capacity level and that acentralized structure gives rise to free-riding behavior amonglocal jurisdictions. In our model, each community seeks toinfluence the central government through political contributions.This leads to suboptimal levels of treatment capacity. Thecapacity is increasing in the compensation level if the marginalbenefit of treatment capacity is sufficiently large, and in thegovernment's weight on aggregate social welfare relative tolobbying activities. The centralized system can replicate thedecentralized system with a sufficiently high compensation level.Since compensation has proved difficult, a centralized systemfaces greater obstacles than a decentralized system.     

Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders

Can price and advertising be used by vertically differentiated duopolists to signal qualities to consumers? We show that pure price separation is impossible if the vertical differentiation is small, while adding dissipative advertising ensures the existence of separating equilibria. Two simple, but nonstandard, equilibrium refinements are introduced to deal with the multisender nature of the game, and they are shown to produce a unique separating and a unique pooling profile. Pooling results in a zero‐profit Bertrand outcome. Separation gives strictly positive duopoly profits, and dissipative advertising is used by the high‐quality firm when products are sufficiently close substitutes. Finally, compared to the complete‐information benchmark, the separating prices of both firms are distorted upwards when the degree of vertical differentiation is large, and downwards when it is small.     

Adaptive planning and uncertainty resolution

The article discusses uncertainty resolution and the approaches to uncertainty in planning. Statically perceived uncertainty may be described more or less explicitly in decision making. Stating various possible outcomes and, possibly, their numerical probabilities may allow quantitative theory to be applied. However, there will be a residual of genuine uncertainty due to the limits set by the available information. By “buying” more information the decision maker can decrease the genuine uncertainty. It is also often possible to reduce uncertainty by waiting. The most effective way is to state the expectations explicitly and to let the various future states of information correspond to alternative decisions in a conditional strategy. This requires a new kind of forecast that refers to the development of information available. A less efficient mode of planning can still take into consideration the fact that revisions are expected. This is flexible planning in a wide sense.     

Procurement auctions with entry of bidders

In procurement auctions with a fixed number of bidders there is a tradeoff between cost efficiency and rent extraction. An optimal mechanism, therefore, entails distortions of effort (Laffont and Tirole, 1987). If potential suppliers must sink an entry investment before they can participate in the auction, then decreasing the firms' rent may imply reduced entry. We show that if potential bidders are uninformed before entry, commitment to a plain, nondistortive auction is optimal. In contrast, if potential bidders learn all their private information before entry, the optimal mechanism entails the same distortions as in Laffont and Tirole's static model.     

Accounting for the role of habit in behavioural strategies for injury prevention

The limited success of behavioural strategies in injury prevention has been attributed to failure to properly apply behaviour change models to intervention design and the explanation of safety behaviours. However, this paper contends that many health behaviour change interventions do not succeed because they fail to take into account the habitual quality of most health and safety-related behaviour; a more complete model of behaviour change needs to be based on a better understanding of the role of habit. The overall aim is to contribute to better understanding of behavioural strategies for injury prevention. When habits are weak, attitudes and intentions predict behaviours, but as behaviours turn into habits, they become better predictors of future behaviour than attitudes or intentions. Furthermore, where habits are strong, individuals are less likely to act on new information, evaluating counter-habitual information negatively. Integrating the concepts of strong and weak habits with upstream and downstream strategies, a framework is presented for tailoring strategies to the habit strength of the target behaviour.     

Determinants of the Prevalance of Start-ups and High-Growth Firms

The purpose of this study is to identify key institutional determinants of firm emergence and growth. We do this using various types of data from Sweden. A characterization of a number of institutions and policy measures shows that they are likely to have contributed to an environment that discourages entrepreneurial activity and firm growth. Aspects dealt with include: missing arenas for entrepreneurship in the care sectors and for household-related services, taxation of entrepreneurial income, incentives for wealth accumulation, wage-setting institutions and labor market regulations. Using original data, we provide evidence of a low prevalence of nascent entrepreneurs and a small net employment contribution by high-growth firms. We admit that indisputable evidence for the effects of institutional arrangements is almost impossible to establish. However, the consistency of our theoretical arguments and empirical data makes a strong case for the notion that the Swedish case illustrates the costs of giving too little weight to economic renewal in policy making.