Directly measuring early exercise premiums using American and European S&P 500 Index options

The Chicago Board Options Exchange concurrently listed European‐style and American‐style options on the Standard and Poor's 500 Index from April 2, 1986 through June 20, 1986. This unique time period allows for a direct measurement of the early exercise premium in American‐style index options. In this study, using ask quotes, we find average early exercise premiums ranging from 5.04 to 5.90% for calls, and from 7.97 to 10.86% for puts. Additionally, we are able to depict a potentially useful functional form of the early exercise premium. As in previous studies, we find some instances of negative early exercise premiums. However, a trading simulation shows that traders must be able to trade within the bid–ask spread to profit from these apparent arbitrage opportunities. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:287–313, 2003     

Application of replacement theory in dairy cows and its use in disease treatment

A model to simulate the costs and returns of an individual dairy cow over 14 years under various assumptions of genetic potential, health status and management was developed especially to evaluate the effects of diseases that reduce production and reproduction efficiency and to evaluate alternative management interventions. Data were collected from the Food Animal Health Resource Management System (FAHRMX), Today's Electronic Planning (TELPLAN), Today's Electric Farm Accounting (TELFARM) databases and secondary sources at Michigan State University. A case study of cystic ovaries was analysed using the model. The results showed that it is more economical to treat cystic ovaries than not to treat, and treatment with Gonadotropin Releasing Hormone (GNRH) was superior to Human Chrionic Gonadotropin (HCG). Four to five lactations were the optimum for keeping a dairy cow to replacement and it was estimated that there is a loss of US$0.45 per day of extended calving interval (days open beyond the optimal 70 days).     

Earnings Performance and Discretionary Disclosure

While the influence of earnings performance on disclosure is a fundamental issue in the disclosure literature, our understanding of this influence is limited. In this paper, I examine a comprehensive set of disclosures from a sample of firms experiencing an extended period of seasonally adjusted earnings increases. I study how these firms adjust disclosure in response to earnings increases, how disclosure changes as the period of strong earnings performance nears an end and how firms disclose during a subsequent period of earnings decline. I find an increase in disclosure during the period of increased earnings. This increase is pervasive across all types of disclosure and tends to be bundled with earnings announcements. The market responds positively to this disclosure. Firms continue to disclose at a high level as they approach earnings declines. However, they shift to disclosures that focus on the positive short-term results and do not discuss the impending decreases. While this behavior is systematic, the market does not appear to anticipate the subsequent earnings declines. Once the firms announce earnings declines, the magnitude of disclosure returns to the level provided prior to the increased earnings.     

Changing Risk Premia: Evidence from a Small Open Economy

Little is known about the differences in the relation between risk and return in large economies such as the U.S. compared with smaller, less studied, markets. In this paper, Sweden serves as a representative for small open economies. The price of risk on the Swedish stock market is estimated using a conditional asset pricing model that allows for time variation in the risk. Four different GARCH-M models are used in the econometric specification. The estimates of the price of risk are invariably positive and significant, and we conclude that there exists a time-varying risk premium in the Swedish stock market. Our results show that there are small differences in the preferences towards risk of representative investors in small and large economies.     

UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE "PROBLEM": A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance.     

Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game-Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.     

Credit risk and sustainable debt: a model and estimations of why the Euro is stable in the long-run

Sustainable debt has become the key issue in rating of private as well as sovereign debtors. The problem of how to estimate sustainable debt has also been at the center of the debate over the Asian 1997–1998 financial crisis. If the external value of the currency depends on the external debt of a country, it is necessary to estimate the creditworthiness of the country. This paper studies credit risk and sustainable debt in the context of a dynamic model. For a dynamic growth model with an additional equation for the evolution of debt, we demonstrate of how to compute sustainable debt and creditworthiness. The model is estimated by employing time series data for the core countries of the Euro-area. The computations show that the Euro-area has large external assets. Using time series methods, the sustainability of external debt (assets) is estimated for those core countries of the Euro-area. Those estimations show that the Euro will be a stable currency in the long-run.     

Learning across the life cycle: Experimentation and performance among the hollywood studio heads

Guided by notions from the literature on organizational learning, this paper investigates how product line experimentation and organizational performance change across the careers of top managers. Its subjects are the studio heads who ran all the major Hollywood film studios from 1936 to 1965. The study found first, that product line experimentation declines over the course of executive tenures; second, that there is an inverse U‐shaped relationship between top executive tenure and an organization's financial performance; and third, that product line experimentation is more likely to benefit financial performance late in top executives' tenures. These findings are consistent with a three‐stage ‘executive life cycle’. During the early years of their tenures, top managers experiment intensively with their product lines to learn about their business; later on their accumulated knowledge allows them to reduce experimentation and increase performance; finally, in their last years, executives reduce experimentation still further, and performance declines. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

HBS-JFE conference volume: complementary research methods

The purpose of the Harvard Business School-Journal of Financial Economics conference was to reexamine the role of clinical work in our profession. Clinical research–empirical work that examines a relatively small number of events intensively–accounts for a very small fraction of published work in the field. The pieces in this conference volume are case studies of different “clinical” research techniques that are used to develop, test, apply and communicate theory.