Correction to: Earnings announcement return extrapolation

Review of Accounting Studies - A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-021-09605-9     

Poverty in Palanpur

The meaning and identification of poverty are examined usingthree indicators of standard of living in the North Indian villageof Palanpur. The first is intended as a measure of "apparentprosperity" based on the personal assessments of investigatorsafter intensive field work in the village over the full agriculturalyear 1983–84. The other two are income in 1983–84,and a measure of permanent income obtained by averaging incomesfrom four surveys conducted over a twenty-six-year interval.A comparison of these three indicators shows that income measuredin any one year may give a misleading impression of the incidenceof poverty. The risk of poverty for households is calculated.Vulnerability is high among low-caste households and those whichare involved in agricultural labor. Categories, however, arenot homogeneous; for example, whereas the landless and widowsare more likely to be poor, some of such households are quitewell off. It is argued that poverty in a good agricultural yearis a better indicator of sustained poverty than poverty in abad year. Occupational mobility out of agricultural labor islow, and changes in the distribution of land are largely accountedfor by demographic processes such as household splits.     

A BUREAUCRAT'S PROCUREMENT STRATEGY: BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND RATIONING

ABSTRACT ** :  We investigate a bureaucratic principal responsible for the procurement of goods and services from private agents. The bureaucrat is evaluated on output and controlled by a limited budget. The agents maximize profit, have private information about variable production costs, and have positive outside options which are lost upon acceptance of a procurement contract. The setting is relevant for, e.g. governmental agencies. We show how this setup makes probabilistic rationing and overproduction for low-cost agents a useful tool for the bureaucrat.     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

A simple search model of money with heterogeneous agents and partial acceptability

Summary. Simple search models have equilibria where some agents accept money and others do not. We argue such equilibria should not be taken seriously. This is unfortunate if one wants a model with partial acceptability. We introduce heterogeneous agents and show partial acceptability arises naturally and robustly. There can be multiple equilibria with different degrees of acceptability. Given the type of heterogeneity we allow, the model is simple: equilibria reduce to fixed points in [0,1]. We show that with other forms of heterogeneity equilibria are fixed points in set space, and there is no method to reduce this to a problem in R¹.Received: 4 September 2002, Revised: 23 September 2002JEL Classification Numbers: C78, E40.A. Shevchenko, R. Wright: We thank seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Indiana University, Purdue University, University of Toronto, the 2002 Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at Vanderbilt University, and the 2001 Conference on Economic Dynamics at the University of Essex. The National Science Foundation and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland provided financial support. Braz Ministerio de Camargo and Gabriel Camera provided some helpful suggestions. Correspondence to: R. Wright     

Characterizing Pareto Improvements in an Interdependent Demand System

Interdependent preferences generally imply Pareto inefficiency. For a general demand system, we provide a characterization of Pareto improvements. For a prominent parametric specification, the Linear Expenditure System, we characterize in detail the welfare loss associated with interdependent preferences. Using an estimated empirical model of this kind, we calculate the compensating variation corresponding to the welfare loss.     

Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation

The finite horizon version of D. P. Baron and J. Ferejohn's [1989, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.83, 1181-1206] legislative bargaining model is investigated. With three or more periods, a continuum of divisions is supportable as subgame perfect equilib- ria. There exist equilibria where coalitions larger than a minimal winning coalition receive strictly positive shares. With sufficiently patient players and a sufficiently long horizon, any interior distribution is supportable as an equilibrium. In contrast, a generic uniqueness result applies when introducing heterogenous time preferences. The unique backwards induction equilibrium in the perturbed game is nonstationary, and neither the original (symmetric) nor the perturbed game provides guidance for equilibrium selection in the infinite game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C78, D72, D78, H49.     

The Zilcha criterion for dynamic inefficiency

Summary. This paper reexamines the condition (1 + n), which Zilcha (1991) presents as a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic inefficiency of stationary allocations in overlapping generation models with stochastic production. We show that this condition is necessary but not sufficient for a stationary allocation to be dynamically inefficient by Zilchas definition. We also show that there is a narrow but widely studied class of specifications in which the Zilcha test is both necessary and sufficient for dynamic inefficiency of stationary competitive equilibrium allocations. Outside this class, however, counterexamples can be constructed relatively easily.Received: 30 September 2002, Revised: 13 August 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D90, E13, E22. Correspondence to: Steven RussellWe thank Jon Burke, Subir Chakrabarti, Itzhak Zilcha and an anonymous referee for helpful conversations and/or comments.     

The proper panel econometric specification of the gravity equation: A three-way model with bilateral interaction effects

We argue that the proper specification of a panel gravity model should include main (exporter, importer, and time) as well as time invariant exporter-by-importer (bilateral) interaction effects. In a panel of 11 APEC countries, the latter are highly significant and account for the largest part of variation. First version received: February 2001/Final version received: June 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  We are grateful to two anonymous referees and Robert Kunst for their helpful comments.     

Environmental technology foresight: New horizons for technology management

Decision-making in corporate technology management and government technology policy is increasingly influenced by the environmental impact of technologies. Technology foresight (TF) and environmental impact assessment (EIA) are analyzed with regard to the roles they can play in developing long-term strategies and policies for reducing the environmental impact of technologies. The methods for TF and EIA are quite well developed, but remain within a tradition of rational decision-making. However, recent studies of tecnology management and innovation have shown that technology development can be explained only to a certain degree by rational decision-making. EIA is usually presented as an objective and scientific method, based on normative underpinnings that usually remain hidden. Thus, systematic information-providing instruments such as TF and EIA can play only a limited role. We propose a procedure for environmental technology foresight. The case is made that environmental technology management will be most helped by a 'constructive' approach in order to stimulate incorporation of long-term environmental objectives.