Common socio-economic cycle periods

We present a meta-analysis of cycle periods in historical socio-economic data found in the K-wave literature. The literature on stochastic and deterministic cycles in variables such as the consumer price index, employment, interest rates, commodity prices, GDP, war and hegemony is huge and scattered. However our meta-analysis reveals various commonalities. Our key finding is that there is a common set of cycle periods that is common across most socio-economic variables.     

Spurious principal components

The principal component regression (PCR) is often used to forecast macroeconomic variables when there are many predictors. In this letter, we argue that it makes sense to pre-whiten the predictors before including these in a PCR. With simulation experiments, we show that without such pre-whitening, spurious principal components can appear and that these can become spuriously significant in a PCR. With an illustration to annual inflation rates for five African countries, we show that non-spurious principal components can be genuinely relevant in empirical forecasting models.     

The social costs of gun ownership: a reply to Hayo,Neumeier, and Westphal

We respond to the new article by Hayo, Neumeier, and Westphal (HNW), which is a critique of our 2006 article. The principal contribution of that article wa     

CONSUMER THEORY, HOME PRODUCTION, AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY

Arguments about the existence of the so-called energy efficiency gap are typically based on evaluations of efficiency measures as investments whose end result is to reduce the cost of providing a given level of energy services. This article demonstrates that the investment approach tends to undervalue energy efficiency improvements because it omits the increase in utility that results from the consumer's substitution of energy services for other goods. The substitution occurs because the efficiency measure reduces the marginal cost (implicit price) of energy services. Sample calculations based on a Cobb-Douglas utility function are used to illustrate the potential size of the undervaluation of efficiency investments.     

Revisiting the Roots of Japan's Economic Stagnation: The role of the Japanese corporation

For a long period in the 20th century, the development of the Japanese corporation appeared congruent with the development of the Japanese economy. The growth-maximising behaviour of the Japanese corporation and the preference for internal growth over acquisitions (see Odagiri, 1992) appeared to suit the long-term ambitions of Japan. Now, that formerly clear connection between the ambitions of corporate Japan and the Japanese public interest is no longer so clear. Increasingly, the global ambitions of the corporation appear as an impediment to Japan's economic development. By favouring the development of large-scale transnational corporations, Japanese industrial policy-making appears to have contained a fundamental flaw. Japan is now dominated by large-scale organisations with global ambitions, controlled by corporate elites. It is unlikely that their strategic decisions will correspond with the wider public interest, which raises the possibility that Japan is now afflicted with 'strategic failure'. Other examples from around the world suggest that Japan is not unique in this respect. Alternative ways forward are suggested.     

Sequencing and the Adding-up Property in Contingent Valuation of Endangered Species: Are Contingent Non-Use Values Economic Values?

This paper presents tests of the theoretical validity of the contingent valuation (CV) method. The validity of CV is especially a concern when involving environmental goods with a predominant non-use value. One test of theoretical validity is the adding-up property that implies that a specific good should be equally valued irrespectively of it is being valued directly or built-up sequentially. In this CV study four independent sub-samples stated willingness to pay for the same composite good, or package, using different sequences. One sub-sample valued the composite good directly, while two sub-samples faced built-up sequences valuing first subsets of this composite good. A fourth sub-sample valued the composite good from a dividing-out approach, facing first the valuation of a larger multi-package. Theoretically expected sequencing effects were observed; the subset goods obtained higher values earlier in a sequence, and the dividing-out approach decreased the stated value for the composite good. Most importantly, these CV data did pass the tests of the adding-up property.     

Access price structure and entrant build-or-buy incentives in mobile markets

Journal of Regulatory Economics - We consider a market structure with three mobile providers, two of which are vertically integrated with nationwide coverage. The third provider (an entrant)...     

Should the Pre‐Notification of Mergers Be Compulsory in Australia?

Australia is unusual among the world's antitrust jurisdictions in not making the pre‐notification of mergers compulsory. However, if the parties are concerned that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is likely to object to the merger, there are strong incentives for them to notify the ACCC as the regulator has developed a strong reputation for imposing heavy costs on parties that fail to notify such mergers. The result is a system of quasi‐compulsory notification that creates the strongest incentives for parties to notify the ACCC of those proposals to which it is most likely to object. This study analyses data extracted from the ACCC's merger database and the empirical results are consistent with this characterisation. Mergers reported voluntarily by the parties are found to experience longer delays to completion, and are more likely to be challenged by the ACCC, when compared with a sample of all other mergers assessed by the regulator. The results suggest that non‐compulsory notification allows the parties themselves to pre‐sort the proposed merger vis‐à‐vis its interest to the ACCC.     

Through Trial and Error to Collusion*

In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint‐profit‐maximizing outcome.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).