The Ethics of Blockchain in Organizations

Journal of Business Ethics - Blockchain is an open digital ledger technology that has the capability of significantly altering the way that people operations (i.e. human resource management)...     

Coping with coopetition—Facing dilemmas in cooperation for sustainable development: The case of the Dutch smart grid industry

This paper is amongst the first to examine coopetition strategy for sustainable development at the network level. Companies who want to successfully implement complex innovative technologies that support sustainable development need to collaborate with other actors of the innovation ecosystem, including their competitors, so that they can develop standards, interoperable products, pool knowledge, and resources and bundle forces to compete against other technologies. Collaboration with competitors brings benefits, but also many risks. We investigated how firms cope with these risks when establishing an innovation ecosystem to implement a new technology in society. We conducted research in the Dutch smart grids sector and explored how these firms minimize inherent risks of coopetition. We found that system‐building actors in the Dutch smart grid field not only minimize inherent risks, but from the start of their collaboration they implement so‐called enablers to prevent these risks upfront.     

Family firm’s management composition: the role played by family members’ age in TMT and supervisor levels

Quality & Quantity - Family firms (FFs) are the backbone of entrepreneurial fabric in many countries. Management of such businesses is complex because of their features: the overlap between...     

Cost comparison of continued anticoagulation with rivaroxaban versus placebo based on the 1-year EINSTEIN-Extension trial efficacy and safety results

Aims: The EINSTEIN-Extension trial (EINSTEIN-EXT) found that continued treatment with rivaroxaban for an additional 6 or 12 months (vs placebo) after 6–12 months of initial anticoagulation significantly reduced the risk of recurrent venous thromboembolism (VTE) with a small non-significant increased risk of major bleeding (none fatal or in critical site). This study aimed to compare total healthcare cost between rivaroxaban and placebo, based on the EINSTEIN-EXT event rates.

Methods: Total healthcare cost was calculated as the sum of treatment and clinical event costs from a US managed care perspective. Treatment duration and event rates were obtained from the EINSTEIN-EXT study. Adjustment on treatment duration was made by assuming a 10% non-adherence rate. Drug costs were based on wholesale acquisition costs. Cost estimates for clinical events (i.e. recurrent deep vein thrombosis [DVT], recurrent pulmonary embolism, major bleeding, clinically relevant non-major bleeding) were determined from the literature. Results were examined over a ±20% range of each cost component and over 95% confidence intervals (CIs) of event rate differences in deterministic (one-way) and probabilistic sensitivity analyses (PSA).

Results: Total healthcare cost was $1,454 lower for rivaroxaban-treated (vs placebo-treated) patients in the base-case, with a lower clinical event cost fully offsetting drug cost. The cost savings of recurrent DVT alone (–$3,102) was greater than drug cost ($2,723). Total healthcare cost remained lower for rivaroxaban in the majority (73%) of PSA (cost difference [95% CI]?=?–$1,454 [–$2,396, $1,231]).

Limitations: This study was conducted over the 1-year observation period of the EINSTEIN-EXT trial, which limited “real-world” applicability and examination of long-term economic impact. Assumptions on drug and clinical event costs were US-based and, thus, not applicable to other healthcare systems.

Conclusions: Total healthcare costs were estimated to be lower for patients continuing rivaroxaban therapy compared to those receiving placebo in VTE patients who had completed 6–12 months of VTE treatment.     

The Great Recession,Austerity and Inequality: Lessons from Ireland

The advent of the Great Recession and the widespread adoption of fiscal austerity policies have heightened concern about inequality and its effects. We examine how the distribution of income in Ireland—a country which experienced one of the most severe economic contractions—has evolved over the years 2008 to 2013. Standard cross‐sectional analysis of the income distribution shows broad stability in the Gini coefficient and in decile shares, with one main exception: the share of the bottom decile fell sharply, with the largest fall in average incomes being for that group. Longitudinal analysis shows that the falls in the average income for the bottom decile were not due to decreasing income for those remaining in the bottom decile, but to falls in income from those initially located in higher deciles. The extent of redistribution through taxes and transfers increased strongly, as measured by the Reynolds‐Smolensky index, which rose from 0.20 before the onset of the crisis to 0.27 in 2013. Analysis indicates that about three‐quarters of this increased redistribution is due to automatic stabilisers and one‐quarter to discretionary policy changes.     

CEO internal experience and voluntary disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts

Internally‐promoted CEOs should have a deep understanding of their firm's products, supply chain, operations, business climate, corporate culture, and how to navigate among employees to get the information they need. Thus, we argue that internally‐promoted CEOs are likely to produce higher quality disclosure than outsider CEOs. Using a sample of US firms from the S&P1500 index from 2001 to 2011, we hand‐collect whether a CEO is hired from inside the firm and, if so, the number of years they worked at the firm before becoming CEO. We then examine whether managers with more internal experience issue higher quality disclosures and offer three main findings. First, CEOs with more internal experience are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Second, CEOs with more internal experience issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Finally, investors react more strongly to forecasts issued by insider CEOs than to those issued by outsider CEOs. In additional analysis, we find no evidence that these results extend to mandatory reporting quality (i.e., accruals quality, restatements, or internal control weaknesses), perhaps because mandatory disclosure is subjected to heavy oversight by the board of directors, auditors, and regulators. Overall, our findings suggest that when managers have work experience with the firm prior to becoming the CEO, the firm's voluntary disclosure is of higher quality.     

Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

I study the implications for central bank discount window stigma of a workhorse model of adverse selection in financial markets. In the model, firms (banks) need to borrow to finance a productive project. There is limited liability and firms have private information about their ability to repay their debts, which gives rise to the possibility of adverse selection. The central bank can ameliorate the impact of adverse selection by lending to firms. Discount window borrowing is observable and it may be taken as a signal of firms' credit worthiness. Under some conditions, firms borrowing from the discount window may pay higher interest rates to borrow in the market, a phenomenon often associated with the presence of stigma. I discuss these and other outcomes in detail and what they suggest about the relevance of stigma as an empirical phenomenon.     

Lend me your wallets: the effect of charismatic leadership on external support for an organization

We argue that charismatic leadership can influence external support for the organization, particularly in making the company more attractive to outside investors. Two studies were conducted to test this general hypothesis. First, an archival study demonstrated that the stock of companies headed by charismatic leaders appreciated more than the stock of comparable companies, even after differences in corporate performance were controlled. It was also found that the effect of charismatic leadership was heightened under more difficult economic conditions. Second, an experiment was conducted in which the salience of charismatic leadership was manipulated, along with information about the prospects for an organization's turnaround. Results showed that appeals from a charismatic leader led to increased investment in the firm, and the leader's influence was greater when the prospects for an organizational turnaround were more difficult. It was also found that an endowment of stock enhanced the influence of charismatic appeals and that charismatic leadership may have affected the general risk propensities of followers. These findings were interpreted in terms of an external perspective on leadership, illustrating how leaders can manage the firm's economic and social environment. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.