Takeover deterrents and cross partial ownership: The case of golden shares

We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital‐linked firms in cross partial ownership (CPO). Before merger, CPO reduces the profitability of involved firms, confirming the “outsider effect.” However, the impact of CPO upon merger profitability is two‐sided in a Cournot setting. CPO, by cointegrating profits, increases output collusion leading to anticompetitive effects with facilitated mergers in most cases. Nonetheless, a protective threshold exists for which CPO arrangements can reduce the incentives for hostile takeovers. This has potentially significant regulatory implications. An illustrative example showcases the potential relevance of CPO as a defence against hostile takeovers across different industries.     

The Missing Link Between the Theory and Empirics of Path Dependence: Conceptual Clarification,Testability Issue,and Methodological Implications

Path dependence is a central construct in organizational research, used to describe a mechanism that connects the past and the future in an abstract way. However, across institutional, technology, and strategy literatures, it remains unclear why path dependence sometimes occurs and sometimes not, why it sometimes lead to inefficient outcomes and sometimes not, how it differs from mere increasing returns, and how scholars can empirically support their claims on path dependence. Hence, path dependence is not yet a theory since it does not causally relate identified variables in a systematized manner. Instead, the existing literature tends to conflate path dependence as a process (i.e. history unfolding in a self‐reinforcing manner) and as an outcome (i.e. a persisting state of the world with specific properties, called ‘lock‐in’). This paper contributes theoretically and methodologically to tackling these issues by: (1) providing a formal definition of path dependence that disentangles process and outcome, and identifies the necessary conditions for path dependence; (2) distinguishing clearly between path dependence and other ‘history matters’ kinds of mechanisms; and (3) specifying the missing link between theoretical and empirical path dependence. In particular, we suggest moving away from historical case studies of supposedly path‐dependent processes to focus on more controlled research designs such as simulations, experiments, and counterfactual investigation.     

The Safeguard Clause, Asymmetric Information, and Endogenous Protection

When imports surge, governments often must seek simultaneously to satisfy protectionist pressures through increased tariffs, induce adjustment to foreign competition, and minimize consumer costs of protection. The WTO's safeguard clause can be viewed as an attempt to resolve these potentially conflicting goals since it allows governments to offer an implicit contract to protected industries to induce adjustment. In this paper, we show that with asymmetric information about costs, protected industries behave strategically which leads to under-adjustment. The safeguard clause therefore cannot optimally resolve the conflict among domestic political objectives.     

Negotiating free trade

We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.     

Financial market integration: Theory and empirical results

In this article, we introduce a new theoretical international asset pricing model which accounts for partial financial market segmentation. We show that if some investors do not hold all international assets because of implicit and/or explicit segmentation factors, the world market portfolio is not efficient and the classic ICAPM must be augmented by a new factor reflecting the local risk undiversifiable internationally. We test this model empirically for a sample of emerging markets. Our findings show that the degree of market integration is time-varying and that the premium associated with the domestic risk factors is the most important component of the total risk premium. However, our results also show that most of the emerging markets we study have become more integrated in the end of our sample period as a result of liberalization and reforms.     

Intergenerational Altruism and the Environment

We construct an overlapping generations model of pollution externality in which individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady-state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite individuals' altruism, the competitive equilibrium is not optimal. We thus study the social optimum and show that it can be decentralized.
JEL classification: D 62; D 64; D 91