A model of periodic job training

This paper examines conditions under which a demand-constrained, cost-minimizing firm will provide industry-specific on-the-job-training to its employees, when a flexible stock of outside labor is available for hire. The term industry-specific is used to describe training with general components valued by other firms in the industry. This definition of on-the-job-training offers the possibility that trained workers could be poached by competing firms and provides limited opportunities for newly trained workers to seek alternative employment. The firm's decisions involve whether or not to invest in on-the-job-training, and whether to use in-house labor exclusively or a mix of in-house and outside labor. The cost-minimizing strategy is crucially dependent upon the mutual loyalty of the firm and its workers.This paper has benefited from numerous comments from the participants of the 41st International Atlantic Economic Conference in Paris, March 12–19, 1996.     

Economics of total quality management

This paper presents two models of the economics of total quality management. In the first, the concept of quality management is viewed as a technological innovation that requires investment. To reduce cost and improve quality, firms must make investments that are largely sunk. The effect of market competition on quality related technology investments is studied. Several results follow. With new quality technologies, price falls, quality rises and average cost declines. Firms must anticipate rivals' technology choices and the market prices when justifying quality technology investments. When all firms quickly adopt quality technology, returns of such investments are normal, that is, have a zero net present value. However, firms that do not invest in quality related technology are forced from the market. A firm that is faced by competitors that are slow to adopt quality related technology, can earn positive returns by early adoption. The firm invests more in quality related technology, and produces higher quality products, charges a higher price and earns higher profits than competitors. The firm's quality, price and profit advantages persist over time. In the second model, we show that firm value increases when customer satisfaction is used as an objective by aligning incentives. This explains the common use of customer satisfaction measures in TQM programs.     

European Momentum Strategies,Information Diffusion,and Investor Conservatism

In this paper we conduct an out‐of‐sample test of two behavioural theories that have been proposed to explain momentum in stock returns. We test the gradual‐information‐diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) and the investor conservatism bias model of Barberis et al. (1998) in a sample of 13 European stock markets during the period 1988 to 2001. These two models predict that momentum comes from the (i) gradual dissemination of firm‐specific information and (ii) investors’ failure to update their beliefs sufficiently when they observe new public information. The findings of this study are consistent with the predictions of the behavioural models of Hong and Stein's (1999) and Barberis et al. (1998) . The evidence shows that momentum is the result of the gradual diffusion of private information and investors’ psychological conservatism reflected on the systematic errors they make in forming earnings expectations by not updating them adequately relative to their prior beliefs and by undervaluing the statistical weight of new information.     

Confidence, visibility and pressure: the effects of shared information in computer aided hotel management

This article analyses the use made of computer based information systems in hospitality management. The findings indicate that, rather than replacing the middle management role, computer systems are used as support mechanisms which remove uncertainty associated with decisions based on hunch or inadequate information.     

Joint Cross-Section/Time-Series Maximum Likelihood Estimation for the Parameters of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross Bond Pricing Model

We develop a joint maximum likelihood estimator for the interest rate risk premium and the parameters of the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross bond pricing model. This new approach resolves difficulties inherent in previous approaches that use only time-series data or cross-sectional data. We apply the new approach to a large sample of joint time-series/cross-sectional data. The resulting estimated parameters explain simultaneously the changes in short-term interest rates and the prices of zero-coupon bonds with various maturities. We also identify and provide solutions to potential computational difficulties that other researchers are likely to face.     

Contingent trade policy and economic efficiency

Review of World Economics - This paper models the competition for a domestic market between one domestic and one foreign firm as a pricing game under incomplete cost information. As the foreign...     

Behavioral agency and corporate entrepreneurship: CEO equity incentives & competitive behavior

Scholars have long studied drivers of entrepreneurial behavior among established firms. Yet little is known about how individual factors shape a firm’s choice to pursue entrepreneurship. We draw on behavioral agency theory to explore the role of equity incentives in driving corporate entrepreneurship. Our findings suggest CEOs avoid corporate entrepreneurial behaviors as their option wealth increases. However industry dynamics also prove to be an important contingency when predicting the effects of both restricted stock and stock options on the likelihood that the CEO engages in corporate entrepreneurship. Our findings provide a theoretical platform for predicting dimensions of entrepreneurial behavior and highlight effects of CEO equity ownership.

     

Heterogeneous private sector information,central bank disclosure,and stabilization policy

Conventional wisdom has it that a central bank that uses an informational advantage to undertake active policy intervention can do as well, at least so far as real outcomes are concerned, by making its information publicly available and abstaining from stabilization. This notion is examined using a framework incorporating heterogeneous private sector information concerning aggregate demand shocks. An activist regime, in which the central bank exploits its own information to engage in stabilization, is found to be unambiguously superior to a noninterventionist regime, where the central bank maintains a constant setting of policy but publicly discloses its own information.