Accounting standards,regulatory enforcement,and innovation

We examine the effects of accounting standards and regulatory enforcement on entrepreneurial innovation and social welfare. When the entrepreneur issues a financial report that violates the accounting standards, a regulatory agency may detect the violation and bring charges. We find that when regulatory penalties are relatively insensitive to the magnitude of the violation, optimal standards are sufficiently low that they induce full compliance, and increase as the intensity of enforcement increases. In contrast, when regulatory penalties are sensitive to the magnitude of the violation, optimal standards induce non-compliance and decline as the intensity of enforcement increases.     

Shifting corporate culture: executive stock ownership plan adoptions and incentives to meet or just beat analysts’ expectations

This paper investigates whether adoptions of executive stock ownership plans coincide with decreased incentives to meet or just beat analysts’ near-term EPS forecasts. Firms often assert that ownership plans focus executives on long-term performance. I find that the impact of these adoptions on meeting or just beating analysts’ EPS forecasts differs depending on whether the plan binds the CEO to reach ownership targets by a specified date. In particular, I find that firms that adopt plans requiring an increase in CEO ownership exhibit a lower propensity to meet or just beat earnings forecasts following plan adoptions. In contrast, firms that adopt plans that require no increase exhibit no change in the propensity to meet or just beat. The results suggest that firms use binding ownership plans to shift executives’ focus from near-term earnings benchmarks to long-term value creation.     

The Credit Crunch and Insider Trading

This paper examines the behaviour and information content of insiders’ trades before and after the credit crunch and, in particular, examines the extent to which some insiders anticipated the market crash and took action to protect their positions. In part, the market crash was brought about by the excessive borrowing of financial institutions. Our results point to the view that a number of insiders, primarily directors, were aware that the excessive use of leverage by financial institutions would ultimately have a detrimental impact on the economy. These insiders acted by selling their shares prior to the market collapse and subsequently buying them back at a lower price. Supportive evidence for the above view is provided through both graphical evidence and regression analysis. In particular, we demonstrate a link between insider behaviour and the rapid decline in share values. Further evidence is also provided of a link between insider behaviour and future risk as measured by the CDS premium. In short, we argue that this selling was not motivated by liquidity or other contrarian strategies but was a result of understanding how higher levels of leverage and excessive trading in new risky derivatives could lead to higher levels of risk, an insight possessed only by a subset of insiders.     

A review of: “COST ESTIMATING”, Rodney Stewart,Second Edition,John Wiley and Sons,Inc., New York, 1991, xxi + 359pp., ISBN 0-471-85707-6. List $54.95

In a previous paper Khan and Fiorino analyzed four energy saving projects. They found that use of the Capital Asset Pricing model to account for risk implied that the projects’ required rates of return were less than the return on riskless assets. Effectively lie projects bad negative risk. These negatively with macro economic activity. The current paper has two objectives: (1) to show that cafes of negative risk are rare and unimportant, and (2) to show that the assumption of negative covariance between energy price and the level of economic activity is incorrect.     

The impact of HR configuration on firm performance in Singapore: a resource-based explanation

This study investigates how the characteristics of a firm's human resource practices and processes (HRPPs) are associated with firm performance. The results found that the extent to which HRPPs can be substituted by information technology or codified in employee manuals, made them easy to be imitated and were therefore associated with an attenuation of the firm's financial performance. On the other hand, constant positive investments into a firm's HRPPs were associated with enhanced firm performance. No significant relationships were found between the embeddedness of HRPPs with information technology or the uniqueness of the firm's HRPPs and firm performance. The results are explained in terms of the resource-based view of the firm.     

Employee Movements from Audit Firms to Audit Clients

Regulators have expressed concerns about the “revolving door” between auditors and clients, whereby audit employees move directly from audit firms to audit clients (i.e., “direct alumni hires”). Regulators are concerned that these direct hires could compromise audit quality, partly because these employees could have previously audited their hiring company's financial statements. In contrast, we examine accounting and finance executives who move indirectly from audit firms to audit clients and who could not have previously audited the hiring company's financial statements (i.e., “indirect alumni hires”). We show that indirect hires occur more often than the direct hires that have concerned regulators. We predict and find that both direct and indirect alumni hires are associated with lower rates of executive turnover and audit firm turnover. However, there is no evidence that the reduced rates of executive turnover are explained by managerial entrenchment or that these hires are associated with lower audit quality. Overall, our findings suggest that direct and indirect employee movements from audit firms to audit clients are beneficial to executives, audit clients, and audit firms because they reduce the incidence of costly turnover.