Breaking out of the innovation box

In most companies, investments in innovation follow a boom-bust cycle. For a time, the cash flows. Then, as the economy sours or companies rethink their priorities, the taps go dry. But when research budgets are slashed, the strong projects are often abandoned along with the weak ones. Promising initiatives are cut off just when they are about to bear fruit. Expensive labs are closed; partnership agreements costing millions in legal fees are thrown away. When disruptive changes in the competitive landscape come, companies are caught flat-footed. Sustainable innovation requires a new approach: Instead of being largely isolated projects, innovation initiatives need to gain access to the insights and capabilities of other companies. To be protected from the ax of short-term cost reductions and the faddishness born of easy money, the initiatives must become part of the ongoing commerce that takes place among companies. But how can businesses traffic in such sensitive information without giving their competitors an advantage? The answer, the author contends, lies in a practice that's been common since the Middle Ages: the use of independent intermediaries to facilitate the exchange of sensitive information among companies without revealing the principals' identities or motives and without otherwise compromising their interests. Executive search firms, for example, allow job seekers to remain anonymous during the early stages of a search, and they protect businesses from disclosing their hiring plans to rivals. A network of innovation intermediaries would be in a unique position to visualize new opportunities synthesized from insights and technologies provided by several companies--ideas that might never occur to businesses working on their own.     

Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries

The pattern of legal change in countries that have their legalsystems transplanted from abroad differs markedly from countriesthat develop their own systems, irrespective of the legal familyfrom which their laws come. In "transplant" countries, law oftenstagnates for long periods of time; when change takes place,it tends to be radical, if not erratic. External models remaindominant even years after the law was transplanted. Althoughthere is some evidence that transplant countries have engagedin comprehensive legal reforms in response to the pressuresof globalization, it is still too early to judge whether thesenew changes can be taken as a sign that the legal systems inthese countries have started a process of endogenous legal evolution.      

A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement

This paper analyzes agreements between governments that determine the division of policy-making power between central and regional governments. Our analysis demonstrates that initial circumstances and political risks affect the degree of centralization that will be adopted, and that asymmetric forms of federalism are often consequences of ongoing negotiations between regional and central governments over the assignment of policy-making authority. We analyze three settings where gains from constitutional exchange may exist: (i) the under-centralized state, (ii) the over-centralized state, and (iii) the constitutional convention. In each case, an asymmetric form of federalism is the predicted outcome, although the degree of asymmetry differs according to starting point. Modern and historical examples are used to illustrate the relevance of our analysis.     

On the performance of the Chow-Lin procedure for quarterly interpolation of annual data: Some Monte-Carlo analysis

Most of the countries of the OECD offer quarterly estimates of their national growth or of their Gross National Product. Official Statistical Agencies in western countries have to deal with the problem of estimating Quarterly National Accounts series congruently with Annual National Accounts. In Spain, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística uses the Chow-Lin disaggregation method, which is based on information provided by a group of high-frequency related variables, to estimate the quarterly components of National Accounts from annual components. In this paper, we analyse the relative quality of the estimates obtained through the Chow-Lin procedure, under different sets of hypotheses.JEL Classification: C15, C43, M40We are grateful to Maria Amparo Ripoll for her assistance. The authors also wish to thank three anonymous referees and an editor for their constructive suggestions and comments. This research was partially made during the stay of the first author at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. It has been partially supported by the research project DGCYT PB98-1460.     

Precautionary Demand for Education, Inequality, and Technological Progress

This paper offers an explanation for the evolution of wage inequality within and between industries and education groups over the past several decades. The model is based on the disproportionate depreciation of technology-specific skills versus general skills due to technological progress, which occurs randomly across sectors. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that increasing randomness is the primary source of inequality growth within uneducated workers, whereas inequality growth within educated workers is determined more by changes in the composition and return to ability. Increasing randomness generates a precautionary demand for education, which we show empirically to be significant.