Analysing tax evasion dynamics via the Ising model

We develop a model of tax evasion based on the Ising model. We augment the model using an appropriate enforcement mechanism that may allow policy makers to curb tax evasion. With a certain probability tax evaders are subject to an audit. If they get caught they behave honestly for a certain number of periods. Simulating the model for a range of parameter combinations, we show that tax evasion may be controlled effectively by using punishment as an enforcement mechanism.     

Der erste Eindruck zählt!? – Eine empirische Untersuchung von Ankereffekten bei der Vertrauensbildung in elektronischen Verhandlungen

The importance of electronic negotiations for developing and managing interdependent organizational relationships has increased significantly. Due to reduced cues in electronic negotiations interpersonal trust has become a crucial factor to overcome their limitations. Anchoring effects can set the course for trust building processes before any contact between negotiators occurred. So far, these effects have been analysed in face-to-face interactions. We could demonstrate anchoring effects in electronic interactions using internet-based negotiation simulations. We found that the participants quantified their trust level before and after the negotiation according to a priori information about their partners’ trustworthiness. Intuitive evaluations of the other’s trustworthiness seem to act as an anchor that can regulate ensuing perceptions and trust evaluations.