Über die Existenz einer stetigen,reellenNutzenfunktion

Ohne ZusammenfassungHerrn Prof. J. Nitsche (Freiburg) danke ich für die kritische Durchsicht einer ersten Fassung des Manuskriptes, ebenso danke ich Prof. Robert Reichardt (Wien) für einige kritische Anmerkungen. Für mögliche Fehler bleibe ich jedoch allein verantwortlich.     

Dynamic effects of externalities,optimal saving and economic growth

Conclusion Recognizing the fact that provision of mixed public goods can result in both consumption externalities of the Samuelsonian variety as well as production externalities we set out to extend the earlier results of Rao and Kalpagam (1977) on the effect of public goods on economic growth. In so doing, we considered three standard specifications of production externalities and enlarged the concept of consumption displacement. Our basic conclusion is that the results of our earlier paper remain valid under the more general conditions set out in this paper.     

On the theory of macroeconomic quasi-equilibria

Conclusion It has been shown that for the Classical System a quasi-equilibrium cannot exist, unless we make the ad hoc assumption of inflexible nominal wages⁸. The equilibrium in the classical regime corresponds to the general competitive equilibrium, and of course the validity of Walras' Law cannot be questioned. At the same time, however, it has been shown that to extend these conclusions to the Keynesian system as well is not justified. The Keynesian system has, in general, a quasi-equilibrium. The model constructed in this paper and the resulting conclusions are significant because the model: (a) Incorporates the Keynesian notion of effective demand, which includes the demand for capital goods (investment) as being performed by a group of people distinct from the consumers (and so, answering Negishi's point, there is a prince in Hamlet!), (b) Unlike other models (like the recent paper by Glustoff), it does not rely on nominal wage rigidity to explain unemployment, but instead, again answering Negishi's remark, it explains rather than postulates why real wages do not adjust in the presence of unemployment so as to eliminate it. (c) It verifies the validity of Clower's proposition that in the Keynesian System Walras' Law holds only in equilibrium. (d) It reconsiles Bent Hansen's original quasi-equilibrium model with the Keynesian proposition of an unemployment equilibrium, against the apparent view of Hansen that to do that would require the assumption of a Phillips curve, a view also shared by Arrow and Hahn, and many others.An earlier version of this paper was presented in the December 1974 meeting of the Econometric Society in San Francisco. The author wishes to thank Prof. R. Clower, Prof. B. Hansen, Prof. S. Black, and Dr. G. Winckler for their valuable comments, but he obviously claims any errors for himself.     

A theory of sequential reciprocity

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept—sequential reciprocity equilibrium—for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.