东亚货币合作可行性的经济数据检验——基于OCA理论的分析

在最优货币区理论构筑的分析框架下,东亚区域在经济开放度、出口产品结构相似性、经济冲击对称性方面达到了OCA理论的标准,而在生产要素的流动性、金融市场一体化等方面距离最优货币区的标准尚有差距,但是这种差距正在缩小。通货膨胀相似性方面东亚整体虽未满足OCA标准的要求,但是有次区域已经符合这一标准。考虑到最优货币区标准的内生性,而且大量文献通过对东亚地区进行分组并采用不同的研究方法,证明东亚地区存在形成最优货币区的潜力,因而对次区域的货币合作可行性分析依然乐观。     

有优先权的混贮备可修系统的模糊可靠性分析

研究了有优先权的3个不周型部件和1个修理设备组成的混贮备可修系统,利用普通可靠性和模糊可靠性的基础理论,在转换开关完全可靠的情形下建立了系统模糊可靠性模型,利用模糊数学的原理和方法、马尔可夫型可修系统的研究方法和Maplel 1．0软件,得到了该系统的一些模糊可靠性指标,并给出算例。     

经济增长与环境污染的广义脉冲响应函数分析——以江西省为例

本文选取六类污染指标构建了反映整体污染水平的环境污染综合指数,并基于1987-2008年相关数据,在严格计量检验基础上运用GIRF法、方差分解法考察了江西省经济增长与环境污染之间的长期动态关系.结果表明,环境污染综合指数与经济增长验证了EKC假说,经济增长是污染物增加的重要原因之一;人均GDP对解释各类环境污染排放的预测方差贡献度较大,而污染物排放不是解释经济增长预测方差的重要变量.     

自和谐与共和谐相洽的区域金融和谐发展

当和谐社会成为当今中国经济发展动力和社会目标的时候,从理论上研究并在实践中探索区域金融和谐发展的问题就显得尤为重要。区域金融的和谐不仅表现为"自和谐",而且表现为"共和谐"。区域金融和谐发展是一个"自和谐"与"共和谐"相融相洽的金融复杂系统的动态适应性平衡过程,其基本维次是多方位、立体的。区域金融和谐发展的内在机理之间存在着相互影响、相互制约、相互促进的关系。区域金融和谐发展的本质、内容和形式三个层面之间有秩序有规律地完美结合,形成一个强大的、有力的区域金融和谐发展体系。     

Testing for Regime Changes in Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis

This paper examines whether the efficiency market hypothesis for the Greek sovereign debt holds. As in Blanco et al. (2005) we test the theoretical equivalence of credit default swap (CDS) and spreads that dictates a CI relationship between the two. The main innovation of the present analysis is the use of a threshold vector error-correction (TVECM) model, thus allowing thresholds within the sample covering the period 1990 to 2010. Moreover, by employing this methodology we are able to evaluate the degree and dynamics of transaction costs resulting from various events due to external market imperfections but also domestic factors. The main hypothesis we test is to what extent spreads and CDS are indeed integrated that may result in an efficient and integrated segniorage capital market. Our findings support the gradual integration hypothesis. We find that spreads and CDS are cointegrated, though threshold effects are also revealed in terms of events that have impacted on markets.     

Fiscal Autonomy and Total Government Expenditure: An Austrian Case-study

The ongoing debate on the efficiency of a federal system versus a centralized system has lead to a diverse and unclear empirical picture of the effects of fiscal decentralization on public sector growth. For analyzing these effects it is crucial to consider the sub-national decision power on taxing and spending. In the current paper, we test for the effects of fiscal autonomy on total government expenditure using time series from 1955 to 2007 for Austria. Determinants of government expenditure are economic growth, fiscal illusion of policy makers, and the unemployment rate. We additionally account for different degrees of sub-national fiscal autonomy. Our econometric results suggest that the often-hypothesized dampening effects of fiscal autonomy cannot be corroborated for the Austrian system.     

Under what conditions may social contracts arise? Evidence from the Hanseatic League

Social contractarians commonly take social contracts to be solely hypothetical and refrain from elaborating on the factors that influence the feasibility of the formation of social contracts. In contrast, this paper aims at providing a discussion of the conditions affecting the feasibility of social contracts. I argue that the more aligned the preferences of group members for public goods are, the more the individuals share similar social norms, and the smaller the group is the more feasible a genuine social contract becomes. I provide evidence in support of my contention from the medieval Hanseatic League. At the Hanseatic Kontor in Novgorod, one of the four major trading posts of the Hanseatic League in cities outside of Germany, German merchants agreed to live under the rule of a constitution that gave rise to a political authority for the Kontor society.     

Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators

The economic effects of federalism are unclear: some papers find that federalism has strong positive effects on a number of economically relevant variables, others find negative effects. The results often crucially hinge on the proxies for federalism used. In this paper, we critically survey the existing indicators for both federalism and fiscal decentralization. We argue that federalism is a constitutional institution, whereas decentralization is the outcome of a policy choice, and that the two ought to be systematically distinguished because decentralization can also occur in nonfederally structured states. We further argue that institutional details are very important with regard to federalism and that dummy variables usually capture only very specific aspects of these institutional details. We use factor analysis to test whether the latent variables behind the observed indicators support these assumptions. More than two important factors are derived, implying that a more fine-grained differentiation beyond simply “‘federalism” and “decentralization” might be in order. The correlations of the most important proxies for various aspects of federalism and decentralization with a number of quasi-exogenous variables, as well as with institutional variables, are usually rather modest.