Private Sector Involvement in Infrastructure Projects

There has been little systematic discussion of the issues associated with private involvement in infrastructure. Analysis of the relative performance of the private and public sector in different phases of infrastructure provision suggests that, in most cases, the private sector will be most efficient in the construction phase but the public sector will be best equipped to handle the risks associated with ownership. The situation is less clear-cut with respect to operation—a mixture in which core operations are undertaken by the public sector owner with peripheral operations being contracted out may be optimal in many cases.     

The Strategic Industry Supply Curve*

In this paper, we develop the concept of the strategic industry supply curve, representing the locus of Nash equilibrium outputs and prices arising from additive shocks to demand. We show that the standard analysis of partial equilibrium under perfect competition, including the graphical representation of supply and demand, due to Marshall, can be extended to encompass imperfectly competitive markets. Our approach permits a unified treatment of monopoly, oligopoly and competition in linear supply schedules. Further, our model satisfies the five principles of incidence set out by Weyl and Fabinger [2013].     

Is it too late to stabilise the global climate?

Assessment of the feasibility of stabilising the global climate requires consideration of trajectories for emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. This study presents a simple and robust analysis of feasible emissions trajectories. Consideration of feasible trajectories suggests that if the current pace of mitigation efforts is sustained, the likely outcome will be stabilisation at concentrations close to 500 parts per million. Such an outcome will imply a higher than 50 per cent probability of substantial damage from climate change and an enhanced risk of a catastrophic outcome.     

UNDERWRITING AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY PRICES

Underwriting schemes are increasingly being used as a basis for price policy in Australian agricultural industries. These policies simultaneously increase average returns and reduce the risk faced by producers. In this paper, conditions are discussed under which such a combination of policy targets may be desirable. The optimality properties of underwriting schemes in achieving these targets are examined and compared to those of alternative schemes. Aspects of underwriting scheme design are discussed.     

EXITS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN DAIRY INDUSTRY CAUSES AND PREDICTIONS

An analysis of data from Bureau of Agricultural Economics surveys established that farms that left the dairy industry in the 1970s were generally smaller than average, less profitable, and more likely to be those from which cream was still being delivered in cans. In addition, it was found that the probability of exit seemed to be little affected by movements in the relative prices of dairy products and beef. Predictive models which should prove useful in estimating future rates of exit from dairying were derived. Use of one of the models on 1979–80 data suggests the exit rate from the industry should be easing.     

Narrowing the no-arbitrage bounds

It is shown by example and by analytic argument that the no-arbitrage bounds can be narrowed by ruling out arbitrages between asset markets and stochastic production opportunities. The key analytic construct is the derivative-cost function. The narrowed no-arbitrage bounds can be calculated either as directional derivatives of the derivative-cost function or directly from the derivative-cost function itself. It is shown how some assets lying outside the subspace generated by the basis assets can be priced uniquely using the no-arbitrage prices associated with the derivative-cost function. An extension of the analysis to permit market frictions is briefly discussed.     

Inductive reasoning about unawareness

We develop a model of games with awareness that allows for differential levels of awareness. We show that, for the standard modal-logical interpretations of belief and awareness, a player cannot believe there exist propositions of which he is unaware. Nevertheless, we argue that a boundedly rational individual may regard the possibility that there exist propositions of which she is unaware as being supported by inductive reasoning, based on past experience and consideration of the limited awareness of others. In this paper, we provide a formal representation of inductive reasoning in the context of a dynamic game with differential awareness. We show that, given differential awareness over time and between players, individuals can derive inductive support for propositions expressing their own unawareness. We consider the ecological rationality of heuristics to guide decisions in problems involving differential awareness.     

A state-contingent production approach to principal-agent problems with an application to point-source pollution control

Two basic representations of principal-agent relationships, the ‘state-space' and ‘parameterized distribution' formulations, have emerged. Although the state-space formulation appears more natural, analytical studies using this formulation have had limited success. This paper develops a state-space formulation of the moral-hazard problem using a general representation of production under uncertainty. A closed-form solution for the agency-cost problem is derived. Comparative-static results are deduced. Next we solve the principal's problem of selecting the optimal output given the agency-cost function. The analysis is applied to the problem of point-source pollution control.     

The State of Economics in 2012: Complacency Amid Crisis

Despite the emergence of intractable economic stagnation in most developed countries, spectacular failures in financial markets and the empirical refutation of hypotheses central to economic policy for the last three decades, the economics profession remains largely complacent. Some reasons for this complacency are discussed, along with some suggestions for future directions.     

Production under uncertainty: a simulation study

In this paper we model production technology in a state-contingent framework. Our model analyzes production under uncertainty without being explicit about the nature of producer risk preferences. In our model producers’ risk preferences are captured by the risk-neutral probabilities they assign to the different states of nature. Using a state-general state-contingent specification of technology we show that rational producers who encounter the same stochastic technology can make significantly different production choices. Further, we develop an econometric methodology to estimate the risk-neutral probabilities and the parameters of stochastic technology when there are two states of nature and only one of which is observed. Finally, we simulate data based on our state-general state-contingent specification of technology. Biased estimates of the technology parameters are obtained when we apply conventional ordinary least squares estimator on the simulated data.