Upheaval in the boardroom: Outside director public resignations,motivations, and consequences

We investigate the motives and circumstances surrounding outside directors' decisions to publicly announce their board resignations. Directors who leave “quietly” are in their mid-sixties and professional directors, i.e., retirees, who are retiring entirely from professional life. Directors who announce their resignation are in their mid-fifties and active professionals. Half the time they say they are leaving because they are “busy.” These directors leave from firms with some weakness in their performance, but with no overt manifestations of cronyism such as excessive compensation of either the CEO or directors. The other half of the time directors leave while publicly criticizing the firm. These directors are finance professionals who were members of the audit and compensation committees. They resign from firms with weak boards and financial performance with evidence that managers have manipulated earnings upwards. Public criticism appears to pressure these boards to make management changes associated with improved stock price performance. We conclude that while such public resignations are motivated by the reputational concerns of directors, they can act as a disciplining device for poor board performance.     

The interplay of governance mechanisms in complex procurement projects

Although many studies have investigated governance in inter-firm relationships, little is known about the simultaneous use of several governance mechanisms in complex procurement projects and their impact on project outcomes. In a case study about a complex procurement project in the Norwegian oil and gas industry, we investigate the interplay of contractual incentives, authority and relational governance. The project faced many problems with cost overruns and schedule delays. The study clearly illustrates the interrelationships between governance mechanisms and their effect on project outcomes. The findings suggest that relational governance (trust) is only beneficial for project outcomes when it is accompanied by contractual incentives and control systems (authority). Relational governance in itself does not guarantee an effective and beneficial interplay of all three mechanisms in a way that positive project outcomes are generated.     

Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz

Summary

In the theory of Poisson processes and compound Poisson processes with time-dependent change variables some results are obtained by use of a transformed change variable, independent of time. The theorem presented below shows that this method can be used in a wide class of problems, many of which are of actuarial interest.     

Bank capital regulation, asset risk, and subordinated uninsured debt

Whether more stringent capital requirements lead to reduced or to increased bank risk-taking has been discussed intensively in the academic literature. In this paper we drop the common but unrealistic assumptions that banks only issue deposits whose returns are guaranteed by a subsidised deposit insurance and that deposit insurance is free. We prove that with uninsured debt and a flat-rate deposit insurance premium the reaction of a bank to a higher capital requirement may change substantially. In some scenarios banks increase asset risk due to the enforcement of a more stringent capital requirement.     

Brand Equity, Consumer Learning and Choice

The aim of this paper is to explore the links between brand equity, consumer learning and consumer choice processes in general and considering two recent trends in the market place: store brands and the Internet. We first review the advances that have occurred in brand equity research in marketing in the past decade, with particular emphasis on integrating the separate streams of research emanating from cognitive psychology and information economics. Brand equity has generally been defined as the incremental utility with which a brand endows a product, compared to its non-branded counterpart. We amplify this definition: we propose that brand equity be the incremental effect of the brand on all aspects of the consumer's evaluation and choice process. We propose an agenda of research based on this amplified definition.     

Do (Fe)Male Auditors Impair Audit Quality? Evidence from Going-Concern Opinions

Recent research indicates that there may be a relationship between the characteristics of the audit engagement partner and audit quality. In this paper, we examine the relationship between audit quality and the presence of a female or male audit engagement partner. We use the likelihood that an auditor issues a going-concern opinion (GCO), conditional on the client's financial situation, as an indicator of audit quality. Using a sample of 7105 financially distressed, private Belgian companies, we find that female auditors are, ceteris paribus, more likely to issue GCOs than male auditors. Our results also show that this effect is stronger when clients are either important (i.e. represent a material portion of the auditor's revenues) or high-risk (i.e. associated with increased uncertainties and risks). Collectively, these results indicate higher audit quality by female auditors.     

Match Specific Gains to Marriage: A Random Effects Ordered Response Model

A random effects ordered response model is used to analyze individuallife satisfaction. It is found that a substantial part of the unexplained variance in theindividual's life satisfaction can be ascribed to the household or marriage. It is further found thatthe age variable should be considered as a random effect on life satisfaction, i.e., an effectthat varies between households.     

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in the general model of contests due to Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a contest among singletons. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests. Received: March 2004, Accepted: October 2004, JEL Classification: D72, D74 We thank Joan Maria Esteban, Kai Konrad, Debraj Ray, Stergios Skaperdas and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on the paper. We also benefitted from comments by seminar participants in Barcelona, Istanbul, Paris and WZB Berlin.