Transaction costs and crop marketing in the communal areas of Impendle and Swayimana,KwaZulu-Natal

High transaction costs are detrimental to the efficient operation or existence of markets for inputs and outputs. The cost of information and the costs associated with the search for trade partners, the distance to formal markets and contract enforcement are likely to influence the marketing of food crops. This study hypothesises that the level of income generated from food-crop sales by small-scale farmers in the Impendle and Swayimana districts of KwaZuluNatal is influenced by transaction costs and certain household and farm characteristics. Regression analysis shows that the depth of marketing methods is significantly influenced by transaction cost proxies, such as cooperation with large commercial farmers and ownership of means of transport. Results from a block-recursive regression analysis show that the level of crop income generated is determined by the depth of marketing methods, the size of allocated arable land and off-farm income. Households with lower transaction costs, sizeable allocated land and off-farm income can be expected to generate higher income from food crops. Investment in public goods such as roads, telecommunications and an efficient legal system (to uphold commercial contracts), as well as farmer support services (input supply, extension, marketing information and research), would probably raise farm and non-farm income by reducing transaction costs. This would increase the effective demand for locally produced goods and services, thus contributing to rural employment and livelihoods within rural communal areas.     

Changes In Consumer Attitudes Toward Marketing,Consumerism and Government Regulation: 1971–1975

Trends in consumer attitudes toward business philosophy, product quality, advertising, consumer responsibilities, government regulation and price controls are examined. The findings of three national surveys indicate that the level of consumer discontent did not change substantially between 1971 and 1975. Despite expanding efforts to advance the interests of consumers, the basic criticisms and frustrations expressed by respondents in 1971 were echoed again in 1973 and 1975. However there were some notable trends in the kinds and magnitudes of consumer concerns over this period. The need to treat consumer dissatisfaction as a relative concept is emphasized, and it is suggested that comparisons of present levels of consumer unrest to a zero base would probably lead to exaggerated interpretations of current conditions.     

How a Reduction of Standard Working Hours Affects Employment Dynamics

December 1, 1996 a new law was implemented in Portugal to gradually reduce the standard workweek from 44 to 40 h. We study how this mandatory reduction affected employment through job creation and job destruction. There was considerable regional, sectoral and firm-size variation in the share of workers who were affected by the working hours reduction. We exploit this variation to assess the impact of the workweek reduction. We find evidence that the working hours reduction had a positive effect on employment through a fall in job destruction.     

Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.