The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency

This article compares the Recast European Insolvency Regulation of 2015 with the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency of 1997, focussed on their scope of application, international jurisdiction and the coordination of main and secondary proceedings. The scopes of both catalogues of norms and their rules on coordination of main and secondary insolvency proceedings reflect one another. However, the Recast EIR makes a significantly greater contribution to the unification of law and is also more fully differentiated and more precise, even if this comes at a price, namely, limited flexibility. The UNCITRAL Model Law made an important contribution to the harmonisation of international insolvency law but requires now modernisation. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“Haircuts” for the EMU periphery: virtue or vice?

We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt haircut for a member country or bloc of the union. Two different scenarios for such a haircut are assumed: an expected and an unexpected haircut. In the union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a “core” with lower initial public debt, and a “periphery” with higher initial public debt. The “periphery’’ may experience the haircut due to the high level of its sovereign debt. We calculate numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that a haircut as modeled in our study is disadvantageous for both the “core” and the “periphery” of the monetary union, both when expected and when unexpected.     

Bounded Rationality Modeling

This paper deals with bounded rationality as a way to describe behavior and focuses on the question of how to build such boundedly rational models. The first part is a discussion of the reasons why such models are needed and on the situations in which they can be regarded as more particularly useful. The second part examines three strategies of research towards bounded rationality modeling which have emerged in the last ten years and weights them. The concluding remarks offer a first link between the respective typologies of strategies and of situations and calls for additional experimental work by marketing scientists and economists together.     

Adam Smith and the “rich country–poor country” debate: eighteenth-century views on economic progress and international trade

Despite his emphasis on economic development, Adam Smith did not participate in the contemporary “rich country–poor country” debate. Some see the absenteeism as a deficiency, while others assume that Smith propounds a theory of uneven development and agrees with the divergence argument. In this article, Smith's own theory is expounded and related to the contentious points of the “rich country–poor country” debate. It is concluded that Smith's theory does not fit easily into the categories of this debate. He rather takes up a third position, being neither a proponent of pure convergence nor of pure divergence.     

Johan Åkermans Beitrag zur Konjunkturtheorie Zu seinem 80. Geburtstag

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Selbstorganisation von Verbrauchern-theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag referiert die Ergebnisse zweier in den Jahren 1977/78 durchgeführten Befragungen von Vorständen und Mitgliedern von Verbrauchervereinen in der BRD und bringt sie in Zusammenhang mit weiterführenden Argumentationen, die im Rahmen laufender Forschungsvorhaben der AGVP erarbeitet wurden.Ausgehend von einer Analyse der Handlungen von fremd- und selbstorganisierten Verbrauchervereinen wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob die derzeit bestehenden selbstorganisierten Verbrauchervereine eine formale und inhaltliche Alternative zu bestehenden Verbraucherfremdorganisationen bilden.

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The paper reports on a study of local consumer organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany with and without individual membership. The study is part of a theoretical and empirical evaluation of present consumer policy aiming at the discovery of ways to activate consumer organizations. Above all, the project explores whether organizations with individual membership would be an organizationally feasible and qualitatively preferable alternative.To do this, it was necessary, as a first research step, to evaluate the existing local consumer organizations by considering various aspects of organizational and individual behaviour within them. Questionnaires were constructed for both officials and members of the organizations. The study shows that local consumer organizations with and without individual membership do not differ much in their activities. Distributing information about prices and qualities of goods becomes the main task. The direct membership of consumers in consumer organizations does not automatically lead to a qualitatively different situation.Member consumer organizations—that receive their legitimization because of a connection to the rank-and-file — need active consumers. Therefore, in the second step in this research phase, an attempt was made to explain the extent of individual activity in consumer organizations. It was shown that preference for collective strategies and participative organizational structure were relatively strong predictors. The study shows further that organizations without individual membership tend to resemble member organizations; as the organizational structure becomes rigid, individual activity ceases.

     

European Monetary and Fiscal Policies after the EU Enlargement

This paper examines the design of macroeconomic policies after Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have joined the EU. We consider scenarios with and without CEECs being members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and analyze consequences of different intermediate targets for the European Central Bank. For the fiscal policy variables, we assume that the governments of incumbent and new members either refrain from pursuing active stabilization policies or follow either non-cooperative or cooperative activist fiscal policies. Different scenarios are simulated with the macroeconomic McKibbin–Sachs Model (MSG2 Model), and the resulting welfare orderings are determined. They show that the advantages and disadvantages of different policy arrangements depend strongly on the nature of the shock the economies are faced with. Additional macroeconomic noise resulting from the CEECs' membership of the EMU does not seem to be too much of a problem.