FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFORMING CHINESE ECONOMY

Abstract. We conduct a theoretical investigation into how financial reforms are affecting the long‐run economic performance of the partially reformed Chinese economy. In a model with a dual structure in commodity production and financial repression, allowing the co‐existence of a state banking system and an informal credit market and introducing heterogeneity in the transaction technologies of individuals, we examine the interactions between the state banking system and the informal credit market, and the effects of various measures of financial liberalization on individuals’ optimal portfolio choices and the macroeconomic aggregates.     

Strategic Cost Reduction and Cost Revelation

Strategic cost reduction requires cost transparency. When unilateral cost revelation is feasible, strategic cost reduction indeed arises as equilibrium. If it is not feasible, however, credible revelation has to be organized, possibly by a trade association. Then, firms face a prisoners' dilemma: in Cournot duopoly, cost revelation arises as an equilibrium, but hurts firms; in Bertrand duopoly, cost concealing is the equilibrium, while firms would be better off with cost revelation. Since cost revelation is socially desirable (undesirable) in Cournot (Bertrand) competition, it should be encouraged (discouraged).     

The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk

Recent corporate events have brought a heightened public awareness to corporate governance issues. Much work has been accomplished to date, but it is clear that much more remains to be done. This paper provides a review of empirical research in four relevant areas of corporate governance. Specifically, the paper provides an overview of (a) the role that outside directors play in monitoring managers, (b) the emerging literature on the impact of board diversity, (c) the existence of and incentives for corporate executives to manage firm earnings, and (d) managerial incentives to bear risk.     

Democracy and environmental quality

We develop and estimate an econometric model of the relationship between several local and global air pollutants and economic development while allowing for critical aspects of the socio-political-economic regime of a State. We obtain empirical support for our hypothesis that democracy and its associated freedoms provide the conduit through which agents can exercise their preferences for environmental quality more effectively than under an autocratic regime, thus leading to decreased concentrations or emissions of pollution. However, additional factors such as income inequality, age distribution, education, and urbanization may mitigate or exacerbate the net effect of the type of political regime on pollution, depending on the underlying societal preferences and the weights assigned to those preferences by the State.     

Is Regionalism Viable? A Case for Global Free Trade

We assume an imperfectly competitive world with n commodities and address the question of whether or not (regional) trade blocs are viable. To answer this fundamental question, we use a notion of stability, offered by Greenberg (1990) , and show that regional trade blocs are not viable as they are not stable. On the other hand, we demonstrate that a global trade bloc is viable. Therefore, our results provide theoretical support for advocates of global free trade.     

Calibration and hedging under jump diffusion

A jump diffusion model coupled with a local volatility function has been suggested by Andersen and Andreasen (2000). By generating a set of option prices assuming a jump diffusion with known parameters, we investigate two crucial challenges intrinsic to this type of model: calibration of parameters and hedging of jump risk. Even though the estimation problem is ill-posed, our results suggest that the model can be calibrated with sufficient accuracy. Two different strategies are explored for hedging jump risk: a semi-static approach and a dynamic technique. Simulation experiments indicate that each of these methods can sharply reduce risk exposure. JEL Classification G12 · G13     

Internal validity assessment of conjoint estimated attribute importance weights

This paper investigates how various conjoint designs (full versus fractional) and estimation procedures (LINMAP, MONANOVA, OLS) may interact with basic characteristics of the “true” utility functions (i.e., their range, shape, and curvature) when estimating attribute importance weights. Substantial weight distortions are found, especially under a fractional design.     

Trade Gains, Paretian Transfer and the Tragedy of the Commons

Consider trade liberalization between two countries, each of which produces two private goods and provides on a voluntary basis one public good (the common). In these circumstances, what are the consequences of trade liberalization on the production of the public good and on welfare in both countries? Using a Ricardian framework, we first show that the opening of trade increases the opportunity cost of producing the public good in both countries and will therefore reduce the aggregate supply of the public good. On the other hand, at the autarky equilibrium, only one country supplies the public good, the other “free rides”. The analysis of the welfare incidence of the opening of trade then reveals that the country which provides the public good under autarky always enjoys a welfare gain from trade while the free rider under autarky does not unless the terms of trade are sufficiently in its favour to compensate for the reduction in the supply of the common. Finally, if all countries involved in trade liberalization can without cost coordinate their supplies of the common, then the implementation of the first-best outcome is shown to be possible with a conditional Paretian transfer scheme.     

Population Density and Infrastructure Development

A model is proposed with the following features: (1) there is a publicly accessible transport technology, which is more advanced when there is more specialized labor in it; (2) a high population density facilitates the development of the transport technology; (3) an improved transport technology facilitates a finer division of labor, which in turn increases per capita income. These features are compatible with the phenomena of economic development described by Boserup in 1981. It is also shown that, provided the infrastructure sector can charge the users, and individuals are free to choose jobs, the competitive equilibrium will be Pareto-optimal.     

State Power and Private Profit: the political economy of corruption in Southeast Asia

This article reviews the extensive political and economic literature since 1990 on corruption in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. After considering each country's individual recent history of corruption, the article comparatively analyses the relationship of corruption in these countries with, respectively, the roles of the state, the private sector and external actors, democratisation and decentralisation, and the impact of corruption on economic growth and inequality. Our conclusion is that while economic liberalisation, democratisation and centralisation of state power influence the forms of corruption and its impact on national economic performance, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for its decline.