Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives induced by insurance buyers’ net trades. When there are many agents to share the insurance buyers’ risks, Cournot equilibrium outcomes are close to being second-best. In contrast, if insurance buyers are price takers, equilibria fail to exist or are bounded away from being second-best.     

How do central banks react to wealth composition and asset prices?

We assess the response of monetary policy to developments in asset markets in the euro area, the US and the UK. We estimate the reaction of monetary policy to wealth composition and asset prices using: (i) a linear framework based on a fully simultaneous system approach in a Bayesian environment; and (ii) a nonlinear specification that relies on a smooth transition regression model.     

Cooperative Credit in Spain: An Analysis of Credit Sections of Cooperatives

The long history and deep-rooted tradition of co-operative credit in Spain (credit co-operatives and credit sections of co-operatives) and the lack of detailed studies of the latter suggest the need to reflect on them and highlight their potential. This study examines the ways in which the credit sections can access the financial markets, describes their financial and economic structure and the sources of their income and expenditure and analyses their competitiveness in terms of efficiency.     

The consequences to managers for financial misrepresentation

We track the fortunes of all 2,206 individuals identified as responsible parties for all 788 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from January 1, 1978 through September 30, 2006. Fully 93% lose their jobs by the end of the regulatory enforcement period. Most are explicitly fired. The likelihood of ouster increases with the cost of the misconduct to shareholders and the quality of the firm's governance. Culpable managers also bear substantial financial losses through restrictions on their future employment, their shareholdings in the firm, and SEC fines. A sizeable minority (28%) face criminal charges and penalties, including jail sentences that average 4.3 years. These results indicate that the individual perpetrators of financial misconduct face significant disciplinary action.