Real Estate Brokerage Earnings: The Role of Choice of Compensation Scheme

One of the more interesting characteristics about the real estate brokerage industry is that workers are presented with a choice regarding the sort of compensation scheme under which they want to work. An overwhelming majority of workers choose what is referred to as a commission split scheme in which the salesperson splits any commission that they earn with a supervising broker that they generally are required to work under. In this case the firm provides office support and administrative services to the salesperson and, in return, the salesperson must split any commissions that they earn with the firm. Under the alternative compensation scheme, workers pay a substantial up-front “desk” fee to the firm and then are allowed to keep 100% of any commissions that they earn. In spite of the large volume of research on the determinants of real estate salesperson earnings, to our knowledge there are no studies analyzing the choice of compensation scheme and its impact on the earnings of real estate salespersons. This study uses data from the 2001 and 2003 Membership Surveys of the National Association of REALTORs® to analyze the impact of the real estate salespersons’ choice of compensation scheme on their earnings.     

Negotiations under the threat of an auction

Many takeovers occur after one-on-one negotiations, which suggests a troubling lack of competition. We seek to determine whether acquirers in such friendly deals are truly insulated from competitive pressures. We study two countervailing influences: (1) potential but unobserved latent competition, i.e., the likelihood that rival bidders could appear, and (2) anticipated auction costs when negotiations fail. Using various proxies, we find that latent competition increases the bid premium offered in negotiated deals and that auction costs reduce the premium.     

Regulatory competition and forbearance: Evidence from the life insurance industry

Regulatory separation theory indicates that a system with multiple regulators leads to less forbearance and limits producer gains while a model of banking regulation developed by Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) predicts the opposite. Fragmented regulation of the US life insurance industry provides an especially rich environment for testing the effects of regulatory competition. We find positive relations between regulatory competition and profitability measures for this industry, which is consistent with the Dell’Ariccia and Marquez model. Our results have practical implications for the debate over federal versus state regulation of insurance and financial services in the US.     

Trigger happy or gun shy? Dissolving common‐value partnerships with Texas shootouts

The operating agreements of many business ventures include clauses to facilitate the exit of joint owners. In so‐called Texas Shootouts, one owner names a single buy‐sell price and the other owner is compelled to either buy or sell shares at that named price. Despite their prevalence in real‐world contracts, Texas Shootouts are rarely triggered. In our theoretical framework, sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership. Negotiations are frustrated, however, by the presence of asymmetric information. In equilibrium, owners eschew buy‐sell offers in favor of simple offers to buy or to sell shares and bargaining failures arise. Experimental data support these findings.     

A generalization of Panjer’s recursion and numerically stable risk aggregation

Portfolio credit risk models as well as models for operational risk can often be treated analogously to the collective risk model coming from insurance. Applying the classical Panjer recursion in the collective risk model can lead to numerical instabilities, for instance if the claim number distribution is extended negative binomial or extended logarithmic. We present a generalization of Panjer’s recursion that leads to numerically stable algorithms. The algorithm can be applied to the collective risk model, where the claim number follows, for example, a Poisson distribution mixed over a generalized tempered stable distribution with exponent in (0,1). De Pril’s recursion can be generalized in the same vein. We also present an analogue of our method for the collective model with a severity distribution having mixed support.     

Discussion of: “Flattening the organization: the effect of organizational reporting structure on budgeting effectiveness”

This paper is a discussion of Hannan et al. (Rev Account Stud, 2010), wherein subordinate-participants are endowed with private information, and superior-participants can potentially affect budget requests through their ability to reject them. Their findings are of interest to research on both the design of budgeting systems and span of control. I discuss the relevance of HRT to these literatures and comment on their implementation and experimental design. Also, I offer suggestions for future research, one of which is to explicitly introduce monitoring into experiments on span of control.     

Value creation through stakeholder synergy

Our “stakeholder synergy” perspective identifies new value creation opportunities that are especially effective strategically because a single strategic action (1) increases different types of value for two or more essential stakeholder groups simultaneously, and (2) does not reduce the value already received by any other essential stakeholder group. This result is obtainable because multiple potential sources of value creation exist for each essential stakeholder group. Actions that meet these criteria increase the size of the value “pie” available for essential stakeholder groups, and thereby serve to attract exceptional stakeholders and obtain their increasing effort and commitment. The stakeholder synergy perspective extends stakeholder theory further into the strategy realm, and offers insights for realizing broader value creation that is more likely to produce sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Efficiency in the National Basketball Association: a stochastic frontier approach with panel data

We investigate how closely NBA teams play up to their potential. We find that shooting, rebounding, stealing the ball and blocking shots raise the number of potential wins while turnovers lower it. We also learn that better coaching and defensive prowess raise a team's win efficiency. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reconciling Gray and Hotelling

A bstract .   Early exhaustible resource economics provides an important foundation for recent suggestions that firm-level economic modeling plays a larger role in the analysis of resource scarcity. The lack of empirical support for Hotelling's r -percent rule, introduced in 1931, and recent suggestions that industry behavior may not be reducible to firm behaviors are the primary motivating factors for examining the relative value of Gray's contribution to the field of exhaustible resource economics relative to Hotelling's contribution. Specifically, Gray's papers that appeared in the 1910s provide insight into the heterogeneity of deposits and their spatial dimensions, and offer the possibility that firms will be subject to fixed costs carried over between periods. In this paper, the arguments presented by Gray are formalized in a dynamic model, which allows the differences between Gray's and Hotelling's assumptions to be more fully explored. The results of the paper illustrate that by considering spatially identifiable heterogeneous deposits, fixed costs, and entry costs, in general Hotelling's r -percent rule is not a sufficient condition for firm-level decision making and that firms' extraction behavior cannot be linearly aggregated to describe industry behavior.     

The antecedents of direct management communication to employees in Mauritius

We measure whether, in a developing country, existence of a ‘hard’ strategic human resource management (SHRM) strategy developed at high organizational levels or one designed to enhance employee knowledge inputs and thereby promote employer–employee interdependence (EEIN) is a stronger antecedent of direct communication to employees. We use data from a comprehensive survey of HR practices in Mauritius, one of Africa's most open and successful economies. We find that both SHRM and EEIN are antecedents, but that the latter is stronger in public organizations and in smaller and older companies. We conclude that EEIN is a significant analytic category for explaining management practices especially in a historic sense in this and possibly other developing country contexts.